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Foreword
by Nathalie Herlemont-Zoritchak1

For more than 20 years, Handicap International has been
providing assistance to victims of landmines and other
explosive devices, whilst pursuing the global objective
of improving the situation of people with disabilities both
in terms of access to care and services, and also with
regard to their ability to exercise their rights in society. It
was this constant presence in difﬁcult environments that
persuaded us of the need to focus our attention beyond
immediate action in order to try and prevent the disabling
situations that we were witnessing in our day-to-day
work. That Handicap International should, from 1992,
participate actively in the creation and development of
the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL)
thus became evident: obtaining a total ban on landmines
would mean preventing new victims, preventing further
such dramatic disabling situations. We thus learnt to
convince, whilst still endeavouring to assist. The great
victory in 1997, the adoption of the Mine Ban Treaty, was
proof that we were on the right road. We had ﬁnally got
it, this convention that was to prevent the dissemination
of landmines, develop mine-clearance and support the
victims!
We knew, however, that adoption of a new de jure norm is
born of compromise. Consequently, we had to accept that
the deﬁnition of the offending weapon would be restrictive
but vague, and that the duty to provide assistance to
victims would be afﬁrmed, but somehow conditionned by
the “each state Party in a position to do so” sentence in the
text that the 123 countries were going to sign in December
1997. And yet, in the true tradition of NGOs, and more
particularly of those linked to the « without borders»
movement, Handicap International is ﬁercely devoted to the
recognition of the victims’ rights to assistance. Therefore,

whilst participating fully in the ICBL’s efforts to obtain the
universalization and correct application of the treaty, we
felt it was also essential to take action towards developing
assistance and the recognition of victims’ rights. We
became part of the ICBL’s working group focusing on mine
victims assistance, and attempted, whenever possible, to
highlight the need to increase the funding allocated to
this assistance, and also to place the issue of the right to
reparation and compensation at the centre of the debate.
On this last point in any case, the response from the
decision-makers has been underwhelming…
Whilst not at all discounting the treaty of Ottawa and the
progress it represents, we wanted to explore the sources
of the law and its evolution in order to identify aspects,
within and beyond the treaty of Ottawa, that could be
useful to victims in their attempts to obtain recognition.
The deadly and often fratricidal confrontations of the 1990s
convinced public opinion and, very often, political powers,
that the end of a conﬂict does not signify reconciliation: the
victims expect to receive justice; for them it is an essential
part in a healing process that may open up possibilities
for renewed co-existence, if not total reconciliation. The
International Criminal Tribunals, the International Criminal
Court, the Special Court for Sierra Leone, the Justice
and Peace Commissions… attempt to give a concrete
expression to this demand. For mine victims, however,
there is no special provision authorising them to claim
reparation or compensation. Yet their wounds are all the
more painful, and tainted with a hopeless feeling of guilt,
because these victims themselves detonated the weapon
that mutilated them. These wounds cannot heal unless the
innocence of the victim, and consequently the existence of
external responsibility, is acknowledged.

Nathalie Herlemont-Zoritchak, doctor in Political Science, is head of the Strategic Policy service within Handicap International’s Executive Director’s ofﬁce. She has directed
the production of this publication.
1
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right to reparation and the right to compensation are not
yet recognised for victims of landmines and devices with
similar effects.
Questions remain with regard to how such a law would
be implemented. Yet the interest shown by the victims
themselves, in particular during the debates organised in
Nairobi, proves that this subject has already gone beyond
the academic discussion stage.

The work that we are presenting today is not only a legal
exploration of current or future possibilities, of difﬁculties
and pitfalls, outrageous oversights. It should also be
seen as an indignant protest against the nonchalance of
States and the producers of lethal devices, little inclined to
acknowledge and assume their responsibilities. It should
also be heard as an appeal to organisations and authorities
specialised in the accompaniment of victims, particularly
legal accompaniment, to take up this issue. Finally, it is a
way of saying to victims that their determination is not in
vain, that political intent constantly needs pointing in the
right direction and that their demands contribute towards
this. In December 2004, during the summit for a minefree world in Nairobi, the State parties to the Mine Ban
treaty adopted an action plan in which they qualiﬁed victim
assistance as an “obligation”.
However, action on behalf of the victims does not end with
the Treaty of Ottawa.
Because, today, other weapons with the same effects
(unexploded cluster munitions, for example), not prohibited
by the treaty, are being used widely; and because the
See HANDICAP INTERNATIONAL, Pour le développement d’un droit des victimes de mines / Towards the development of the rights of landmine victims / Hacia el desarrollo de
los derechos de la víctimas de la minas, Lyon: HI, 2002, 29 p.
2
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During a workshop organised in Lyon in 2001, with the
help and expertise of academicians and professionals,
we identiﬁed a number of ideas for developing the
rights of landmine victims, both at a national and
international level2. Among these possible ways forward,
the introduction of provisions and measures in favour
of people with disabilities seemed evident to us. Indeed,
landmine victims are generally people in disabling
situations; assisting landmine victims and improving the
situation of people with disabilities are thus very closely
related.
In this area, it must be said, there have been some
encouraging developments over recent years. Disability
issues are now included more frequently in political
agendas, and the work being done to prepare the future
United Nations Convention on the promotion and
protection of the rights and dignity of persons with
disabilities has had a signiﬁcant mobilising effect.
However, these aspects do not provide a response to
certain dimensions of landmine accidents. Moreover, as
landmine victims are often also civilian victims of wars, they
are concerned by other provisions found in international
law, in addition to the Treaty of Ottawa.
We did not want to create a framework exclusively for
landmine victims, so we have adopted an approach that
is at once global and speciﬁc, taking account of a double
imperative: enabling victims to participate fully in society;
meeting their needs by developing the speciﬁc measures
required. The issue of the right to reparation and the
right to compensation seemed to us to be a speciﬁc and
overriding concern for victims of landmines and other
devices with similar effects. The absence of special or
adapted provision, and the absence even of a constructive
debate on this question, convinced us to carry out an indepth study.

© Tim Grant - ICBL

Introduction to
Handicap International’s
report “what rights
for mine victims”
by Elke Schwager*
Elke Schwager is a lawyer and research fellow
with the Heinrich Böll Foundation. At Handicap International’s request,
she kindly accepted to write the article presenting the contents of this report.

An incalculable amount of people are affected by
landmines. The estimated number of landmine survivors
worldwide is between 300,000 and 400,000. In 2003
alone3, 8,065 new victims of mines and unexploded
ordnance were recorded. Not included in this number are
the unregistered victims and victims which suffer from
landmines not because of a direct injury. Examples are
family members of the injured or killed landmine victim
who have to suffer from the consequences of losing a
previously non disabled member of the work force, or
face a psychological injury. Others have to cope with the
serious social, economic and environmental implications
of landmines: mined land, for example, prevents farmers
from using it for agriculture. Landmines constitute nonbiodegradable and toxic garbage, which disturbs the
ecosystem and reduces the soil productivity.
In order to prevent future landmine victims, the
international community has achieved a remarkable goal
by adopting the Convention on the Prohibition of the
Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of AntiPersonnel Mines and on their Destruction4. As the
title suggests, the convention focuses on prohibiting the
development, the production and the use of anti-personnel
mines. It constitutes a major step forward in the ﬁght
against anti-personnel mines. However, the Convention
has two weak points: States like the U.S., China, Russia
or Pakistan, which are major landmine producers, are not
party to the Convention. Further, the interest of past and
actual civil victims is taken into account only by Art. 6 Para.

3 of the Convention, according to which “each State Party
in a position to do so shall provide assistance for the care
and rehabilitation, and social and economic reintegration
of mine victims”. This stipulation, afﬁrming an obligation
to assist victims, leaves it to a certain discretion of the
states as to whether to help mine victims. The requirement
to assist landmine victims was however reafﬁrmed by the
State Parties during the ﬁrst Review Conference of the
convention in Nairobi in 20045.
Landmine victims might also rely on other provisions
and sources to obtain appropriate assistance. A right to
redress would give the landmine victims a secure basis for
their needs. It has also a further implication: if the producer
and/or the employer of landmines have to pay for the
damage the landmines have caused, the production and
the employment of the landmines becomes expensive and
therefore unattractive. In this report Handicap International
has undertaken a considerable effort to examine
whether existing mechanisms provide for redress for
landmine victims. The analysis studies different areas of
international law: human rights, international humanitarian
law, environmental law, as well as national laws in order to
remind all effects of mines and to compile the potential legal
means which could be claimed by landmine victims. As a
second scope of the study, the research on compensation
mechanisms for various harms and damages reveals that
different models can be studied. Therefore a comparative
analysis on the applicability of these different models in the
area of landmine victims’ compensation appears relevant.

*Elke Schwager is currently writing a doctoral thesis on “Jus post bellum. Claims of landmine victims”
3

INTERNATIONAL CAMPAIGN TO BAN LANDMINES (ICBL), Landmine Monitor 2004. Washington: Human Rights Watch, 2004, p. 47-49.
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Adopted in Ottawa on 18 September 1997, entry into force on 1 March 1999, 2056 UN Treaty Series, p. 211, C.N.163.2003.
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Action N°36 of the Nairobi Action Plan, adopted at the First Review Conference on 3rd December 2004. Available on-line at: www.reviewconference.org
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The question on redress for landmine victims belongs to
the ongoing debate regarding claims for victims of war.
The actual discussion started in the 1990s with claims
concerning forced labour and the so called “comfort
women” during the Second World War. Recent conﬂicts
occupy courts as well; individuals harmed by the NATO
bombing in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia6 or by
British troops during the military intervention against Iraq7,
have ﬁled claims before national courts. Within the system
of the United Nations, the issue is subject to the Basic
Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy
and Reparation for Victims of [Gross] Violations of
International Human Rights and [Serious] Violations
of Humanitarian Law prepared by Special Rapporteurs
for the Commission on Human Rights8. The point of
view taken by the different courts and academics varies
considerably. This confusion is sometimes the result of a
lack of differentiation.
When considering a right to reparation for landmine
victims under current law, it is important to distinguish
between rights under international and national law, and
between rights vis-à-vis a state or a non state actor.
Further, a potential right for landmine victims has to be
distinguished from the enforcement of the right i.e. the
procedural capacity to exercise the right. The enforcement
may take place in international or national proceedings.
Following this distinction, Handicap International examines
ﬁrst the international law to see whether there is a claim
for individuals arising out of the general regime of state
responsibility or special provisions.
Under international law, a right for victims of violations of
human rights or international humanitarian can no longer
be denied access to justice by the established argument
that the individual is not a subject of international law9.
It was even in the area of international humanitarian
law, where the individual was vested ﬁrst with rights and
obligations under international law10. The reason therefore
is the need to protect an individual independently of the
assistance of its state in situations of international armed
conﬂict, where the state’s authority may be weak or even
undergo changes11.

The acknowledgement of individual rights does not
automatically lead to a right to redress in case of a violation
of the individual right. Indeed, the general principle under
international law, that every breach of international law
by a State entails its international responsibility12, is
traditionally only valid on the inter-state level13. However,
Art. 33 Para. 2 of the Draft Articles of the International
Law Commission states that this principle, on which the
Draft Articles are based, is “without prejudice to any right,
arising from the international responsibility of a State,
which may accrue directly to any person or entity other
than a State.” The draft thereby accepts that an obligation
to pay reparation may also exist towards individuals14.
And indeed, the developments in the ﬁeld of human rights
make it difﬁcult to explain why an individual should be
the holder of a primary right, for example a human right,
but not of the accompanying secondary right, the right to
reparation15. The observation is also made by the judges
of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
who state: “Thus, in view of these developments, there
does appear to be a right to compensation for victims
under international law16”. If the landmine victim is a victim
of a violation of a rule of international law of which he/she
is the bearer, he/she might have a right to compensation.
In the report Handicap International discuss further whether
speciﬁc provisions, Art. 3 of the IV. Hague Convention 1907, Art.
91 Additional Protocol I, Art. 75 Rome Statute, and stipulation
of the UNCC17, the EECC18 and the regional human rights
conventions provide for an individual right to compensation.
The existence of a right to redress under international
law does not imply the existence of an appropriate
enforcement mechanism for this right. To recite the judges
of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia: “The
question then is not so much is there a right to compensation
but how can that right be implemented19.” Indeed, neither Art.
3 of the IV. Hague Convention 1907 nor Art. 91 Additional
Protocol I foresee a mechanism by which the individual
could enforce the rights it purported to grant. This has led
some courts to reach the conclusion that in the absence
of an enforcement mechanism there can be no subjective
right20. This reasoning cannot be substantiated however,

For a report on the decisions of Dutch courts see L. ZEGVELD, Remedies for victims of violations of international humanitarian law, IRRC 2003, p. 497 at p. 502, 504; in
Germany see LG BONN, NJW 2004, 525 et seq.
6

7

High Court CO/2242/2004 Al –Skeini.

See the three versions prepared by T. VAN BOHVEN: E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/8; E/CN.4/Sub.2/1996/17 and E/CN.4/1997/104, the draft by its successor C. BASSIOUNI: E/
CN.4/2000/62, and the revised version prepared by Alejandro SALINAS: E/CN.4/2004/57.
8
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R. MCCORQUODALE, “The Individual and the International Legal System”, in: International Law, M. EVANS (ed.), 2003, p. 300 et seq.
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K. IPSEN, Völkerrecht, 5th ed. 2004, § 67 Note 3.
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K. IPSEN, Ibid, § 67 Note 4.

Article 1 of the Draft articles on Responsibility of States for internationally wrongful acts, adopted by the International Law Commission at its ﬁfty-third session 2001, Report
of the International Law Commission on the work of its Fifty-third session, Ofﬁcial Records of the General Assembly, Fifty-sixth session, Supplement No. 10 (A/56/10), chp.
IV.E.1, p. 43.
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Article 33 para. 1 of the Draft articles on Responsibility of States for internationally wrongful acts, op.cit..
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M. SASSÒLI, State Responsibility for Violations of International Humanitarian Law, IRRC 2002, p. 401 at p. 418.

K. DOEHRING, „Handelt es sich bei dem Recht, das durch diplomatischen Schutz eingefordert wird, um ein solches, das dem die Protektion ausübenden Staat zusteht, oer
geht es um die Erzwingung von Rechten des betroffenen Individuum?“ In: Der diplomatische Schutz im Völker- und Europarecht, G. Ress/ T. Stein (ed.), 1996, p. 13 at p.
16.
15
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Victims’ Compensation and Participation, Appendix to the Letter dated 2 November 2000 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council
of 3 November 2000, UN Doc. S/2000/1063, pp. 11-12, para. 21.
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United Nations Compensation Commission.
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Eritrea Ethiopia Claims Commission.
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Victims’ Compensation and Participation, op. cit., para. 22.
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“X et al. v. the Government of Japan”, Tokyo High Court, Judgment of 8 February 2001, Japanese Annual of International Law, 2002, p. 142 at 143.

as the bearing of a right has to be differentiated from the
procedural capacity to enforce it21. Thus, a right under
international law exists independently of the procedural
capacity to enforce it under international law22.
Consequently, the report examines the different existing
mechanisms like the International Court of Justice, the
International Criminal Court, the UNCC, EECC, and the
regional courts for human rights to ascertain whether they
can be used to enforce a victims’ right. One option is the
possibility to enforce international rights before domestic
courts. If civil proceedings under domestic laws are available
for victims of violations of international humanitarian law
or human rights law23, then they are suitable for landmine
victims to claim redress. Civil proceedings can be initiated
by the victim itself as he/she will enjoy procedural capacity
before domestic courts. A case can be ﬁled independently
of the existence of a crime. Further, before a civil court,
the victim is not dependent on the help of its home state,
as is usually the case when enforcing its rights under
international law. This subjection is disadvantageous for
the victim, as its rights might be sacriﬁced due to political
considerations.
The report also examines remedies available under
domestic law, concentrating on the issue of product liability.
Further, landmine victims can generally seek reparation
under the national ius delictum. A violation of international
humanitarian law and human rights law usually constitutes
a relevant violation under the ius delictum as well24. In
the event of such violation, the landmine victim can claim
damages from the state responsible for the use of the mine
or the person laying the mine. However, if the landmine
causing injury was used in compliance with the ius in bello,
the international humanitarian law might be invoked as
justiﬁcation for the wrongdoing. It is debatable whether one
can rely on this justiﬁcation if the landmine explodes after
the armed conﬂict has ended. Sometimes it is argued that
in a time of war the national law system is suspended and
that therefore no claims under domestic law can arise25.
This view is unsustainable. There is no reason and no
mechanism to explain why the domestic law system should
cease to operate in time of an armed conﬂict. Potential
rights under domestic law exist in parallel to potential rights
under international law, which might have arisen from the
conﬂict26. A right to reparation might also arise out of special
laws enacted to regulate the consequences of an armed
conﬂict. Claims under the ius delictum and product liability
are available in most of the domestic legal orders. The great

advantage of claims under domestic law is therefore that
there is no need to create a new basis for claims.
Claims under national law are enforced by individuals.
Some national legal systems provide the possibility of
group actions, appropriate for example in situations of
mass production. In such group actions, the plaintiff
seeks recovery for all members of the group he/she is
representing27. The enforcement of potential claims under
national law may be confronted by different obstacles,
which are examined by the report.
In its second part, the report of Handicap International
describes steps which can be undertaken by the
international community to set up appropriate
mechanisms. It does so by reviewing existing national
compensation funds for the victims of terrorism, the
International Oil Pollution Compensation Fund (IOPC), and
the United Nations Voluntary Fund for Victims of Torture.
Even if none of these funds can offer an immediate pattern
for a compensation mechanism to landmine victims, each
single one gives a rather interesting viewpoint.
Existing victims of terrorism compensation mechanisms28
are useful in both identifying and developing compensation
mechanisms for landmine victims. However the simple
transposition of the victims of terrorism compensation
model to one for landmine victims does not address a
number of problems, including for example the lack of
national infrastructure capable of providing medical reports
and certiﬁcates, proof of costs, and loss of earnings.
Regarding the IOPC, the system of no-fault liability
which is its basis, seems appropriate when dealing with
antipersonnel mines. It offers the advantage of avoiding
situations of conﬂict (in the search for liability or fault)
which could result in harming the victim even more or
reducing his/her chances of obtaining compensation. And
yet the IOPC proves to be adapted to a speciﬁc scope that
does not really ﬁt the concerns of landmines victims.
Studying the United Nations Voluntary Fund for Victims of
Torture, Handicap International assesses that victims of
torture and victims of mines are faced with the same type
of needs, medical and psychological care and sometimes
socio-economic assistance, although methods for providing
assistance may differ, as the type of trauma suffered is not
comparable in the two cases. Unfortunately, an individual
victim cannot obtain assistance from the Fund if she/he
is not represented by an NGO; and the Fund itself faces
difﬁculties to gather adequate contributions.

9
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PCIJ, “Appeal from a Judgment of the Hungaro-Czechosloval Mixed Arbitral Tribunal (The Peter Pázmány University v. The State of Czechoslowakia)”, P.C.I.J. Series
A/B, No. 61, 1933, p. 207 at p. 231; A. RANDELZHOFER, “The Legal Position of the Individual under Present International Law”, in A. RANDELZHOFER /C. TOMUSCHAT (eds.), State
Responsibility and the Individual, 1999, p. 231 at p. 234.
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R. MCCORQUODALE, “The Individual and the International Legal System”, op. cit., p. 300 at p. 304.

The U.S., for example, authorizes foreign plaintiffs under the Alien Tort Claim Act to base their substantive claims on a violation of international law norms. The Torture
Victim Protection Act creates liability under U.S. law where under „color of law of any foreign nation“ an individual is subject to torture or extra judicial killing. This remedy is
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The study describes the working of two compensation schemes: the Guarantee Fund for Victims of Acts of Terrorism and other Violations of the Law (France); the Criminal
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For Human rights violation see G. FISCHER, „Schadenersatzansprüche wegen Menschenrechtsverletzungen im Internationalen Privat- und Prozessrecht“, in: Festschrift für
Walter Remmers, 1995, p. 447, at p. 450 et seq.

None of the existing funds examined in this report provides
an ideal solution. However, a study of these different models
might be useful for identifying and perhaps developing
compensation mechanisms for landmine victims. It would
seem necessary to discuss the compensation issue at
a political level in order to establish whether or not such
mechanisms should be included in the Mine Ban Treaty.
The varied and numerous observations made in the report
show how tremendous are the efforts still needed to offer
landmine victims proper reparation and compensation.
They also stress a wide range of potentialities.

DEFINITIONS
In order to study the issue of reparation and compensation
for victims, a number of global deﬁnitions need to be established, and in particular “antipersonnel mine”, “antipersonnel mine victim”, and “antipersonnel mine accident”,
used by Handicap International.
An antipersonnel mine is a “device placed on or in the
ground, or on another surface and designed to explode
or splinter due to the presence, proximity, or contact of a
person29”. The following categories of landmine should be
distinguished:

10

• Antipersonnel mines are designed to wound or kill people, either by blast effect or splintering;
• Unexploded ordnance (UXO) scattered over the ground
can be regarded as anti-personnel weaponry because it
remains active, unstable, highly explosive, and can be
activated by the contact of a person even after the end of
the conﬂict30. The 1997 Ottawa Treaty31 only covers antipersonnel mines. However, we would suggest that any
compensation scheme be extended to UXO accidents.
Very often, the words “landmine” and “antipersonnel mine”
are used without differentiation.
According to Handicap International32, antipersonnel mine

and UXO victims should include
• All persons who have been killed or injured by a landmine or an UXO, whatever the nature of the physical,
psychological or sensorial damage caused;
• Family members of the killed, injured, or mutilated persons;
• All persons who, because of action or negligence related
to the use of landmines or UXO, have either collectively
or individually been the object of economic and/or social
injury, or suffered any other serious infringement of their
fundamental rights, preventing them from carrying out
their normal activities33.
Finally, it should be noted that the deﬁnition of a “victim”
as given in the Landmine Victim Assistance World Report
2001 includes “All persons who have been killed or
injured” without specifying the status of the victim (civilian
or combatant) 34.
Various other landmine victim deﬁnitions should also be
taken into account, most notably those developed within
the framework of the International Campaign to Ban
Landmines (ICBL) and by specialised United Nations
Agencies35.
The deﬁnition of a landmine accident is that of a sudden
delivery of chemical, physical, or thermal energy due to
the explosion of an antipersonnel mine, causing individual
or collective damage.
Landmine accidents are recognised as such when they
produce a victim, that is, a person who is killed or injured36,
but should also include the less restrictive deﬁnition noted
above.
This study is based on a broad deﬁnition of “victim”, which
does not focus only on the survivors. It is therefore difﬁcult to
estimate the number of victims in the world. Data collected
each year by the Landmine Monitor gives the number of
survivors (estimated at around 300,000 according to the
Landmine Monitor 2003) and the numbers of casualties
and deaths due to landmines and unexploded ordnances
each year (the number of people injured or killed by
landmines is estimated at between 15,000 and 20,000
each year, 8,065 were identiﬁed in 2003 according to the
Landmine Monitor 200437).
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HANDICAP INTERNATIONAL, Landmine Victim Assistance World Report 2001, Lyon: HI, 2001, p.333.
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Id., p.333.

Document No. 8, Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction, Ottawa, (September
18, 1997). p.324 [Hereinafter Ottawa Convention].
31

32

HANDICAP INTERNATIONAL, Towards Real Assistance to Landmine Victims, Lyon: HI, 2000, 9p.

Id., p.3. This deﬁnition contrasts with a more restrictive one adopted by the Ottawa Convention, which deﬁnes a landmine victim as a person injured or killed as a direct
result of a landmine accident. Compensation should however be payable on the basis of a more global deﬁnition of landmine victim.
33

Should soldiers and combatants injured by landmines as part of a military operation be able to claim compensation if such a compensation fund was established? These
combatants, injured in the course of their military activities, often receive compensation from their government. Moreover, the ﬁght against mines is based on the deeply
unfair and inhuman effects of mines on civilians. The question remains open to discussion.
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HANDICAP INTERNATIONAL, Towards Real Assistance to Landmine Victims: op. cit.
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HANDICAP INTERNATIONAL, Landmine Victim Assistance World Report 2001, op. cit., p. 333.
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INTERNATIONAL CAMPAIGN TO BAN LANDMINES, Toward a mine-free World: Landmine Monitor Report 2004, NY: HRW, 2004, p 47-49.
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I- The right to reparation
for landmine victims
“Adequate, effective, and prompt reparation shall be intended to promote justice
by redressing gross violations of international human rights or serious violations of
humanitarian law. Reparation should be proportional to the gravity of the violations
and the harm suffered38”.
The obligation to make good any breach of the law that
has caused harm to another person constitutes a basic
principle of all judicial systems. However, the question
that raises as regard to the application of this principle in
favour of antipersonnel mines victims is to know whether
they can be considered as victims of violations of law.

- The establishment of a connection between the victim
and the crime/violation that led to the injury.
- In some countries, the recognition by a judicial institution
that the person who committed the fault is responsible for
the harm, whether or not the fault was intentional, is also
a condition.

Reparations must, as far as possible, remove all
consequences of the illegal act and re-establish the state
of affairs that would have existed had the act not been
committed. However, when the illegal act has already
produced irreversible effects, alternative reparations must
be found, and this may take the form of an indemnity.

In the case of landmine victims, establishing a right to
reparation implies that there has been a violation of
existing law. That being the case, it is advisable to make a
list of the different points of law that, if violated, might allow
landmine victims to claim reparations.

For this study, it has to be mentioned that the term
“reparation” involved the engagement of a responsibility
of an actor by a jurisdiction and directly addresses the
individual or organisation that wrongs the victim.
The term “compensation”, will be used in the study as
a recognition of the loss endured by the victim without
necessarily addressing the author of the wrongful act. It
covers on the one hand, all reasonable accommodations
that have to be guaranteed to victims in order to obtain
equalization of opportunities. On the other hand, it can
take the form of indemnities.
Generally speaking, a certain number of criteria must be
established in order to obtain reparation or other forms of
compensation:
- The existence of harm.
- The existence of a fault having caused the harm39.

Another worthwhile approach is to study previous legal
submissions to ﬁnd out which national and international
jurisdictions are disposed to recognize a victim’s right to
reparation.
Lastly, we should examine current developments in international law and consider how these may help to further
the rights of landmine victims.

1. Existing law: regimes of responsibility
/ liability and areas of the law relating to
damage or injury caused by landmines
A regime of responsibility / liability exists in all judicial
systems. However, it does not include the same criteria
from one judicial system to another and from one ﬁeld of
law to another.

Article 16 of the Draft Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights and Humanitarian
Law, United Nations, E/CN.4/2004/57.
38

The existence of fault constitutes a precondition for reparations in international law; in national law, however, this is not always the case. In administrative law, the existence
of fault logically constitutes the common law of liability, but concerns about improving the situation of victims and the phenomenon of collective risk has led to a growing
acceptance of the concept of no-fault liability. The latter for the most part has its origins in jurisprudence, but it has been increasingly recognized in laws enacted in France
(as well as many other countries that have a civil code of law). This is the logic behind France’s creation of its guarantee Fund for victims of acts of terrorism. Despite the
absence of fault, therefore, the government may be held liable for compensating a victim of landmines on its territory.

39
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In all systems of law, both at national and international
levels, actors have agreed multiple obligations. They
consist on actions or omissions of different natures. If
these obligations are not executed, the responsibility /
liability of the actor in cause can be engaged. In other
terms, the breach of an obligation is constituted when an
act is not in conformity with what is required under the
relevant judicial system.
The engagement of such a responsibility / liability has
generally fundamental legal consequences: it may create
other obligations, which are called secondary obligations.
They may consist, on the one hand, in the obligation to
cease the illegal act and to guarantee the non-repetition of
the violation. On the other hand, secondary obligation for
an unlawful act may consist in the reparation of the nonexecution of the primary obligation. Reparation should, as
far as possible, remove all consequences of the illegal
act and re-establish the state of affairs that would have
existed had the act not been committed. This form of
reparation is called restitutio in integrum. However, when
the illegal act has already produced irreversible effects,
alternative reparation must be found, and this may take
the form of ﬁnancial compensation.
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Doctrine and State practice have differentiated kinds of
responsibility / liability. They depend on the criteria that
have to be invoked to create responsibility / liability. As
a result, fault-based responsibility / liability is engaged
when harm occurs and when the violation of law has to
be linked with a fault of the perpetrator that has made the
violation in cause. On the other side, strict responsibility /
liability do not need the existence of a fault to be engaged.
The victim of the injury has only to prove the existence
of harm, a breach of law and the connexion between
the harm suffered and the wrongful act. In other terms,
according to this regime, a perpetrator is responsible /
liable for the breach of an obligation without regard to fault
as an additional factor. The rules of law may also provide
for the engagement of strict responsibility / liability on the
basis of harm or injury alone. This type of responsibility
/ liability is most appropriate in case of ultra-hazardous
activities, and activities entailing risk or having other
similar characteristics.
We shall be looking at national and international law
dealing with the use of antipersonnel mines. Under
international law, reparation for damages due to the
use of antipersonnel mines could be claimed against
States as part of general international responsibility for
wrongful acts. Moreover, some speciﬁc legal instruments
could be used in order to engage responsibility. As
speciﬁc ﬁelds of international law, it is the international
humanitarian law and especially Additional Protocol I of
the Geneva Conventions, Protocol II of the Convention
on prohibitions or restrictions on the use of certain
conventional weapons which may be deemed to
be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate

effects (CCW), and the Convention on the prohibition
of the use, stockpiling, production, and transfer of
antipersonnel mines and on their destruction (the
Ottawa Convention, also known as the Mine Ban Treaty)
which are relevant. Other areas of international law
which have to be taken into consideration as well are
international environmental law and human rights law.
Under national law, we shall examine tort law as well as
product liability.

1.1. Responsibility of States for Wrongful Acts
According to Article 2 of the Draft articles on Responsibility
of States for internationally wrongful acts40,
“There is an internationally wrongful act of a State
when conduct consisting of an action or omission: (a) is
attributable to the State under international law; and (b)
constitutes a breach of an international obligation of the
State.”
Under Article 31 of the Draft, the responsible State is
under an obligation to make full reparation for the injury
caused by the wrongful act.
However, it has to be mentioned that these Draft
articles have no binding force. Their legal value remains
recommendatory.
In the case of antipersonnel mine victims, establishing a
right to reparation implies that there would be a violation
of existing law.
In the hypothetical case of a legal use of antipersonnel
mines (i.e. before the Ottawa Convention came into effect
for States Parties, or – in the case of States that have not
signed on to this Convention – when their use conforms
to the other standards, such as international humanitarian
law, environmental law, human rights law etc.), the State
could not be held liable. The non-compliance with an
international obligation prohibiting the concrete use of
antipersonnel mines entails the responsibility of States.
General international law recognises State responsibility
for the use or the laying out of landmines. That is the case
for any action from an ofﬁcial member of the regular army
of one State.
As regards armed rebel groups, States cannot, at ﬁrst, be
liable for their acts. However, “the conduct of a person or
a group of persons shall be considered an act of a State
under international law if the person or group of persons is
in fact acting on the instruction of, or under the direction or
control of that State in carrying out the conduct”41. Thus,
the mines laid out by armed groups can, by this disposition,
be attributed to a State.
However, the illegal conduct of persons, other than
ofﬁcials, in practice, cannot easily engage the international
responsibility of a State and this, even if this act is

40
Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its Fifty-third session (2001), Ofﬁcial Records of the General Assembly, Fifty-sixth session, Supplement No.
10 (A/56/10), chp.IV.E.1

Article 8 of the Draft Articles “Responsibility of States for internationally wrongful acts”, Report of the International Law Commission, ﬁfty-third session, (2001). The Draft
Articles have been reafﬁrmed in a declaration of the United Nations General Assembly.
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considered as internationally illegal. In other terms, if the
link between one State and a person (or a group of persons)
is not proven, the ﬁrst would not be liable for the conduct
of the last. Concerning armed rebel groups, States are
obliged only to protect civilians from the dangers resulting
from the conduct of such groups42 (e.g. by clearing mines
from the zones under their control and keeping civilians
out of such areas).
The responsibility of States under international law
presents a great weakness. Indeed, in case of a general
prohibition of landmines, a claim for a wrongful act of
a State could only be made by another State. In other
terms, victims of landmines cannot invoke directly state
responsibility in order to claim reparation for the harm they
suffered.
In order to avoid the denial of justice which would result
from such a situation, the national State of the injured
person shall take up the latter’s defence and act on his
behalf. Following this espousal of the individual’s claim
the latter is transformed into a matter between States. The
State is then said to be exercising diplomatic protection
in favour of its national. Once again, the possibility for
a state to engage international responsibility of another
state is only relevant in case of a prohibition of landmines
in general or of the concrete use in question. Diplomatic
protection can be a mean for reparation in favor of victims.
However, in this procedure, such a reparation remains to
the willingness of States, and it is said that it is the State
which is considered as being violated in its own right.
That is why, various conventions and points of law are
relevant for this study in order to list aspects of law linked to
the use of landmines. They present proper characteristics.
As a result, besides the general regime there are some
special rules in some instruments, as for example the
Additional Protocol I of the Geneva Conventions.

1.2. Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions
Humanitarian law is founded on the idea that the individual
is unique and entitled to respect, and that the life and
dignity of the individual are precious and inalienable,
even during time of war. It therefore tends to balance the
protection of civilians and military necessity. This principle
was established in the Saint Petersburg Declaration of
11 December 1868: “The necessities of war ought to yield
to the requirements of humanity.”
Additional Protocol I (1977) codiﬁes and advances the
fundamental principles of international humanitarian law
regarding warfare.
Parties engaged in international armed conﬂict have to
respect the principle of proportionality, make a distinction
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between the civilian population and combatants, and not
use weapons and methods of warfare of a nature to cause
superﬂuous injury or unnecessary suffering. The question
of responsibility of a party to an armed conﬂict and the
liability to pay compensation is addressed by article 91 of
Additional Protocol I:
“A Party to the conﬂict which violates the provisions of the
Conventions or of this Protocol shall, if the case demands,
be liable to pay compensation. It shall be responsible
for all acts committed by persons forming part of armed
forces.”
It is arguable whether the article, which is based on
Article 3 of the IV. Hague Convention of 1907, provides
for compensation to the State and to individual victims43.
If the use of antipersonnel landmines constitutes a
violation of the Geneva Conventions or its Additional
Protocol I, antipersonnel mines victims could then claim
compensation pursuant to this article. Therefore, we shall
examine whether the use of antipersonnel landmines
constitutes a violation of the Geneva conventions or its
Additional Protocol I.
Article 51 para. 2 of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva
Conventions stipulates: “The civilian population as such,
as well as individual civilians, shall not be the object of
attack. Acts or threats of violence the primary purpose of
which is to spread terror among the civilian population are
prohibited.”
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Article 51 para. 4 concretises the rule of distinction
between civilians and combatants. It stipulates that:
“Indiscriminate attacks are prohibited. Indiscriminate
attacks are:
(a) those which are not directed at a speciﬁc military
objective;
(b) those which employ a method or means of combat
which cannot be directed at a speciﬁc military objective;
or
(c) those which employ a method or means of combat
the effects of which cannot be limited as required by this
Protocol
and consequently, in each of such case, are of a nature
to strike military objectives and civilians or civilian objects
without distinction.”
There are situations where antipersonnel mines were
intentionally and systematically laid or dropped, with no
clear military objective, in areas frequented by villagers
and other such civilians. These seem to be attacks on
civilians, forbidden under art. 51 para. 4 lit. a Additional
Protocol I, even if the effects of some of these mines are
only felt years later. However, it is quite difﬁcult to prove

This general principle for the protection of civilians in time of war is an obligation for all parties to the conﬂict. This principle is a custom of international humanitarian law.

L.ZEGVELD, Remedies for victims of violations of international humanitarian law, IRRC 2003, p. 497 at p. 506; F. KALSHOVEN, State Responsibility for Warlike Acts of the Armed
Forces, 40 ICLQ (1991) p. 827 at p. 847 for Art. 3 of the IV Hague Convention.
© A. Sutton
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that laying mines constitutes an attack on civilians. In a
period of armed conﬂict, explosions that affect civilians
tend to be seen as collateral damage in most cases.
If actual intent cannot be proven, the lack of a clear and
legitimate military objective44 should serve to deﬁne such
antipersonnel mines use as an indiscriminate attack on
civilians in breach of art. 51 para. 4 Additional Protocol I.
A more difﬁcult case would be where a military objective
might be present, but the landmine use exceeded what was
necessary for that military objective, such as the mining of
an entire village or farming area near a waterhole when
the military objective is to avoid the enemy supplying. In
this type of situation, the method of combat was not limited
to a speciﬁc military objective and so could be deemed an
indiscriminate attack .
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Because of their long lasting effects, antipersonnel
landmines without any self neutralisation mechanism
could be regarded as a weapon which effects cannot be
limited according to art. 51 para. 4 lit. c Additional Protocol
I. Such an interpretation would be in accordance with the
idea expressed in Art. 1 of the Hague Convention VIII
of 1907. The latter Convention prohibits the laying of
unanchored automatic submarine contact mines unless
they become harmless one hour after leaving their user’s
control and the laying of anchored mines unless they
self-neutralize should their anchorage be disrupted. It is
reasonable to suppose that the spirit of the text is aimed at
ensuring that, by drifting, such weapons do not represent
a danger to non-combatants or prove impossible to ﬁnd
once the conﬂict is over. Antipersonnel mines may also
be displaced by climatic changes and natural disasters.
Furthermore, if the antipersonnel landmines are remotely
delivered, their location cannot be controlled and marked.
As a result, they pose a degree of threat similar to that of
drifting underwater mines. The same could be said about
manually delivered mines for which the location cannot be
guaranteed.
Article 35 para. 2 of Additional Protocol I contains another
fundamental principle of international humanitarian law,
seen as customary international law45. It states that:
“It is prohibited to employ weapons, projectiles and
material and methods of warfare of a nature to cause
superﬂuous injury or unnecessary suffering.”
The rule, valid for combatants as well as civilians,
does not list the types of weapon of a nature to cause
superﬂuous injury or unnecessary suffering. This generic
prohibition raises a fundamental question: At what point
can we say that a weapon causes superﬂuous injury or
unnecessary suffering? Two interpretations are possible.
The ﬁrst interpretation takes the phrase to refer to injuries
that are gratuitous in relation to the military advantage

sought, thus applying an utilitarian concept. A second
interpretation considers the gratuitous injuries in relation
to the level of injury that, if sustained by the victim,
would put him/her out of action. This second concept is
more medical and focuses on the harm sustained by the
victim. It appears that, so far, the utilitarian concept has
been favoured in interpretations of this Article. A weapon
causes superﬂuous injury or unnecessary suffering under
both concepts if there is a weapon which while achieving
the same military advantage causes less harm.
Antipersonnel mines containing unusual materials such
as plastic splitters cause more harm than antipersonnel
landmines containing ordinary materials. Therefore, they
could be considered as weapons causing superﬂuous
injury or unnecessary suffering. An antipersonnel landmine
containing plastic splitters is also forbidden under Protocol
I of the CCW, which prohibits the use of any weapon the
primary effect of which is to injure by fragments which
in the human body escape detection by X-rays. Another
example for a type of mine causing superﬂuous injury or
unnecessary suffering is an antipersonnel mine containing
more than the 30 gram explosive necessary to injure
heavily a combatant.
If the use of an antipersonnel landmine is forbidden
under international humanitarian law, victims have a
right to compensation according to Art. 3 of the IV Hague
Convention and Art. 91 Additional Protocol I. However, the
question is to which forum victims can bring their claims.
The problem is that a breach of international humanitarian
law does not automatically give rise to a right of action for
individual victims.

1.3. Protocols II and V of the CCW
Protocol II of the Convention on prohibitions or
restrictions on the use of certain conventional weapons
which may be deemed to be excessively injurious or to
have indiscriminate effects (CCW) restricts the use of
mines, booby traps, and other such devices, and prohibits
the use of certain types of mines. Its main clauses are
intended to ensure that mines will only be used against
military objectives, never indiscriminately, and that a certain
number of precautions will be taken to protect civilians.
Protocol II applies to international conﬂicts and, since its
revision in 1996, to non-international armed conﬂicts.
In particular, the revised Protocol II stipulates that the
deployment of all landmines, booby traps, and other
such devices must be registered, that remotely delivered
antipersonnel mines must be equipped with selfdestruct and self-deactivation mechanisms, and that all
antipersonnel mines must be detectable; it prohibits the
use of mines, booby traps, and other such devices that
explode when detected with magnetic equipment.

Disallowing as a legitimate military objective, for example, using terror as a means of forcing civilians to ﬂee their property and thereby gaining these civilian areas for
occupation.
44

45

Advisory Opinion of International Court of Justice, legality of the use by a state of nuclear weapons in armed conﬂicts, 8 July 1996.

However, Protocol II has a number of weaknesses.
First of all, the deﬁnition of antipersonnel mines creates
a deliberate legal vagueness, which excludes from the
ruling all devices that are “principally designed” for a
purpose other than as antipersonnel devices, regardless
of the antipersonnel effects they might have.
Furthermore, the text of the modiﬁed Convention seems to
justify the use of so-called “intelligent” mines (programmable
mines equipped with self-destruct and self-deactivation
mechanisms, mines deployed by remote methods, and the
like), thus promoting a new generation of mines.
Finally, the Convention does not deﬁne any mechanisms for
control, surveillance, or sanctions in the case of violations.
The CCW does not contain any clause concerning the
question of responsibility in case of a violation of a
stipulation of the convention and its protocols. Therefore,
the general regime of state responsibility applies.

1.4. The Mine Ban Treaty
The Mine Ban Treaty prohibits the production, stockpiling,
use, and transfer of antipersonnel mines. In Article 2(1), it
deﬁnes the antipersonnel mine as:
“a mine designed to be exploded by the presence,
proximity or contact of a person and that will incapacitate,
injure or kill one or more persons.”
The total ban of the use of antipersonnel mines constitutes
a big progress in the battle against antipersonnel mines as
the treaty was ratiﬁed by 144 States, as of 31st December
2004.

However, the Mine Ban Treaty contains some weaknesses.
Article 2 (1) speciﬁes:
“Mines designed to be detonated by the presence,
proximity or contact of a vehicle as opposed to a person,
that are equipped with anti-handling devices, are not
considered anti-personnel mines as a result of being so
equipped”.
Yet such devices do in fact function as antipersonnel mines.
The International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL)
emphasizes this fact, and also expresses its concerns
that Claymore mines (directional fragmentation mines)
are not all prohibited by the Ottawa Convention, despite
the fact that they can easily be adapted for use with trip
wires, making them equivalent to antipersonnel mines.
In addition, the Ottawa Convention does not address the
issue of bomblets, although unexploded bomblets have
the same effect as antipersonnel mines46.
Moreover, the only procedure envisaged by the Convention
for dealing with the non-observance of its articles by a
State Party is for other States to lodge a complaint. The
States Parties must then decide, via a two-thirds majority,
on a response to any violation of the Convention after
consultation with the UN General Secretary. The main
problem with this mechanism is that it has never been
implemented; States are reluctant to use it because of
diplomatic pressures and the fear that they themselves
might run afoul of the Convention at some point.
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In addition, although the Convention does require States
to present an annual report on its application (Article 7), it
does not require this to be drawn up by an independent
authority, and there is no body of experts to evaluate
these annual reports. Although NGOs and individuals may
condemn violations of the Convention, they have no voice
in the assembly of States Parties. The onus is entirely
upon the States. If a State takes no action in the case of a
violation of the Convention – by, for example, a company
that produces mines – there is no recourse available
except against the State itself (the obligation to exercise
due diligence). The Convention makes no provision for a
system that would allow direct, non-State control over the
use of anti-personnel mines. However, during the Nairobi
Summit in December 2004, the States parties reafﬁrmed
the need to call armed non-state actors to account for
violations of the convention47.
Finally, the Convention does not make direct provision
for compensation in the case of a violation. The Article
that comes closest to this idea is the one dealing with
assistance for victims (Article 6, Paragraph 3), which
allows for assistance with the care and rehabilitation
of antipersonnel mines victims as well as their social
and economic reintegration and programmes to raise
awareness of the dangers of antipersonnel mines. The
ICBL working group on victims assistance interpreted

46

HANDICAP INTERNATIONAL, Cluster munitions systems: situation and inventory, Lyon: HI (August 2003), 64 p.

47

Action n°64 Nairobi Action plan adopted at the First Review Conference on 3rd December 2004: Ending the suffering caused by anti-personnel mines.
© A. Sutton

Furthermore, the modiﬁed Protocol II establishes a
framework intended to facilitate the removal of munitions.
Article 3(2) stipulates that each side in a conﬂict is
responsible for all the mines and booby traps it has used.
All information concerning mined areas must be registered
and retained. After the cessation of active hostilities,
the parties involved in the conﬂict are obliged to take all
necessary measures to protect civilians from the effects
of mineﬁelds, mined zones, mines, booby traps, and other
such devices in the zones under their control. All mined or
booby-trapped zones must be cleared without delay after
the cessation of active hostilities. These obligations were
reafﬁrmed with Protocol V on explosive remnants of
war signed by the States on November 28, 2003, which
states an obligation for the States to clear their territory of
all explosive remnants of war that threaten civilians after
the conﬂict and to share information about the location of
unexploded ordnances in order to improve the efﬁciency
of the marking and the mine clearance. Protocol V also
invites the Parties “in a position to do so [to] provide
assistance for the care and rehabilitation and social and
economic reintegration of victims of explosive remnants
of war”.

this article in a sense of a real obligation from the States,
to ﬁnance and support victims assistance as a whole. If
the volontary solidarity remains the basis of the actual
mechanism, in adopting the Nairobi Action Plan 20052009, the State Parties admitted the obligation contained
in this article48.

1.5. International environmental law
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Landmines can have serious consequences for the
environment. They prejudice economic development
by disrupting the biosphere’s life support systems and
diminishing the capacity of the environment to supply the
raw materials and natural resources. This is also true as
regard to UXO.
The consequences are multiple:
- Mines and UXO deny access to natural resources. In
poor countries landmines have denied land to farmers,
pastoral communities and returning refugees and
internal displaced persons. There is a loss of vast tracts
of arable land from safe use for decades, and disruption
of transportation and agricultural markets.
- Mines have covered large tracts of the earth’s surface
with non-biodegradable and toxic garbage. They
cause irreversible damage to ecosystems, including
prolonged direct damage to soil through shattering
and displacement, destruction of soil structure, and
increased vulnerability of soil to water and wind erosion.
In Vietnam, for example, landmines have reduced the
soil productivity in rice yield by 50%49.
- Mines and UXO deplete biological diversity by destroying
ﬂora and fauna, and killing wildlife50.
- Moreover, the loss in productivity of farmlands and
the displacement of communities have generated
exploitations of new fragile and marginal environments
and speed the depletion of resources and destruction of
biological diversity.
Unfortunately, the retrieval of landmines also has a
detrimental effect on the environment. In the process of
clearing Iraqi mineﬁelds, bomb disposal units ploughed up
large areas of the desert, tearing up and damaging fragile
and slow-growing vegetation and destroying habitat for
numerous animal species51. Moreover, the substances
used for the retrieval of landmines have also noxious
effects on soil structure and on water table that could be
contaminated.
According to the Institute of International Law52, dealing

with “Responsibility and liability under international law
for environmental damage”, environmental law creates
different obligations.
Indeed, according to article 1 of this report:
“the breach of an obligation of environmental protection
established under international law engages responsibility
of the state (state responsibility) entailing as a
consequence the obligation to re-establish the original
position or to pay compensation”.
In the ﬁeld of antipersonnel mines in link with environment,
the obligation to re-establish the original position could
consist in mine clearance in order to restore the ecosystem
of the location.
Moreover, “the rules of international law may also
provide for the engagement of the strict responsibility
of the state on the basis of harm or injury alone. This
type of responsibility is most appropriate in case of
ultra-hazardous activities and activities entailing risk or
having other similar characteristics” (Article 4). The strict
responsibility of the state on the basis of harm or injury
alone would mean that no fault of the state has to be
proved to engage its responsibility; the use of landmines
could be seen as damage to environment by itself.
Existing
conventions
concerning
international
environmental law create obligations to states. The States
parties to these different conventions have to respect
these norms dealing with responsibility for damages
caused to environment. As a result, one could imagine
making a link between effects on environment generated
by landmines and by hazardous and noxious substances
dealt in different conventions. Thus, these speciﬁc
environmental conventions could by extension apply to
the use of landmines and explosive remnants of war.
By this way, a general mechanism of responsibility and
reparation could be established in order to help victims of
landmines in terms of environment. A State whose territory
was mined by another State could therefore conceivably
go before an international authority to claim reparation for
a breach of international environmental law.
Finally, some instruments of international environmental
law have especially developed strict responsibility of
operators. Applied to landmines, operators could be seen
as all persons who are in relation to the exploitation, at
any stage, of landmines. More precisely, they could be
producers and users. Thus, these operators can be held
responsible for damages caused to environment, without
any fault to be proven53. However, these mechanisms

Ibid. Action n°36 “States Parties in a position to do so will act upon their obligation under Article 6 (3) to promptly assist those States Parties with clearly demonstrated
needs for external support for care, rehabilitation and reintegration of mine victims...”
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ABDHESH GANGWAR, “Impact of War and Landmines on Environment”, Centre for Environment Education, (20th April 2003)

Bears in Croatia, clouded leopards, snow leopard and royal Bengal tiger in India, elephants in Africa and Sri Lanka, silver black mountain gorillas in Rwanda, snow leopard
in Afghanistan. In Libya, gazelles have disappeared from sites that were mined during World War II. Reference note supra.
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That is the case for example in the International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, under article 9.

can only be made before national courts. No international
jurisdiction can engage the responsibility of individuals.
This approach aims to transpose effects due to landmines
to speciﬁc effects due to other substances that are dealt
with into international conventions on environment. Some
of these texts cannot be applied to damages caused by
landmines, even by extension of their dispositions. That
is the case of the UN Convention on the law of the sea.
Indeed, although it has been recognised that the use of
landmines has noxious effects on rivers and water table
in the sense that TNT and RDX54 are lethal to mammals,
aquatic micro-organisms, and ﬁsh, it has not been proved
that landmines affect marine environment.
Concerning damages to environment, article 3 of the
Convention on Biological Diversity55 stipulates: “States
have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations
and the principles of international law, the sovereign
right to exploit their own resources pursuant to their own
environmental policies, and the responsibility to ensure
that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not
cause damage to the environment of other States or of
areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.” The
Convention enounces in its article 14 that “the Conference
of the Parties shall examine, on the basis of studies to
be carried out, the issue of liability and redress, including
restoration and compensation, for damage to biological
diversity, except where such liability is a purely internal
matter”. According to these dispositions, states have the
obligation to ensure that activities carried out under their
jurisdiction are not harmful to other state’s environment56.
This obligation has been ﬁrst afﬁrmed by the “Trail
smelter” arbitration57. It has also been emphasized by the
International Court of Justice which has stated that “the
general obligation of States to ensure that activities within
their jurisdiction and control respect the environment of
other States or of areas beyond national control is now
part of the corpus of international law relating to the
environment58”.
Therefore, they would not be allowed to use landmines
in a way that could have effects outside their territory.
As demonstrated above the use of landmines depletes
biological diversity and destroys fauna and ﬂora. Military
strategists stress that landmines are placed near borders
with a defensive purpose. However, we can emphasize
that these military actions, using landmines near borders,
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can have effects on the environment of the other state and
would thus be prohibited under this convention. The terms
of the article 14 do not create any obligation for States
to give reparation. It only entails a recommendation to
examine this issue of reparation.
Moreover, by this Convention, states are invited to
establish thematic reports concerning the implementation
of their obligations59. An example is given in the “Thematic
report on mountain ecosystems”60. By this way, states
have to notify different threats and causes of damages
to mountains ecosystems. According to India, ‘inter-state
bounder disputes” as well as wars, are parts of them. As a
result, the use of landmines, as weapons used in conﬂicts
and borders disputes, could be also part of causes of
damages to environment.
The 1972 Stockholm Declaration concerns human
environment. It is part of soft law and thus creates no
responsibility to states. By its nature, it cannot bind States.
It may however be seen as one of the cornerstones of
modern international environmental law. Principle 24 of
this declaration demands international cooperation in order
to “control, prevent, reduce, and eliminate” environmental
damage, and Principle 21 holds States responsible for
ensuring that activities carried out under their jurisdiction
and control do not cause environmental damage in other
States. These two Principles, reiterated in 1992 in the Rio
Declaration (Principles 7 and 2, respectively), may be
invoked in matters concerning the production and use of
antipersonnel mines61.
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Other more general principles of international environmental
law may also apply, such as the principle of preventative
action, which requires a State to take measures to protect
the environment before damage occurs62. Furthermore,
Principle 16 of the Rio Declaration, known as “the ‘Polluter
Pays’ Principle”, obliges the polluter to bear the cost of
measures deemed necessary by the public authorities to
restore the environment to an ‘acceptable’ state63.
With regard to the particular situations of armed conﬂict,
the use of landmines is much more relevant than in
time of peace. Indeed, effects of war, and especially of
landmines, on humans and their environment continue
even after the coming of peace. “Today, some battleﬁelds
of the First and Second World Wars, to give only two
examples, remain unﬁt to cultivation or dangerous to the
population because of the unexploded devices (especially

TNT means “Trinitrotoluene” and RDX “research Department Explosives”.
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“National authorities should endeavour to promote the internalisation of environmental costs and the use of economic instruments, taking into account the approach that
the polluter should, in principle, bear the cost of pollution, with due regard to the public interest and without distorting international trade and investment.”
© A. Sutton
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mines) still embedded in the soil64”. International law has
to ensure the protection of environment against damages
resulting from military activities. Indeed, principle 24 of
the Rio Declaration afﬁrms that: “Warfare is inherently
destructive of sustainable development. States shall
therefore respect international law providing protection for
the environment in time of armed conﬂict and cooperate
in its further development, as necessary.”

Dispositions of the Additional Protocol I to the Geneva
Conventions could prohibit the use of antipersonnel
mines because of damages caused to environment,
Moreover, after the 1991 Gulf War, numerous States
expressed support for the creation of a new convention
on the protection of environment during a period of armed
conﬂict. With the same prospect, the Council of Europe
made its recommendation 149566.

Some rules of international humanitarian law deal with
the protection of environment in time of armed conﬂict.
However, these dispositions included in the Additional
Protocol I are not part of customary international law. As
a result, they can only bind States part to this Additional
Protocol.

As landmines have noxious effects on environment,
international environmental law can be applied to their
use. Consequently, if the use of landmines by a State
is inconsistent with its obligation under international
environmental law, victims of this violation may claim for
reparation.

Article 35 (3) of the Geneva Conventions’ Additional
Protocol I of 12 August 1949 is relevant to the ﬁeld of
damage caused by landmines to environment. It enounces
that “it is prohibited to employ methods or means of
warfare which are intended, or may be expected, to
cause widespread, long-term and severe damage to the
natural environment”. This article is controversial and its
application depends on the interpretation of the terms.
However, the Committee on Disarmament aimed to clarify
its dispositions65.
Article 55 of the same Protocol concerns especially the
“protection of the natural environment”. It stipulates:
“Care shall be taken in warfare to protect the natural
environment against widespread, long-term and severe
damage. This protection includes a prohibition of the use
of methods or means of warfare which are intended or
may be expected to cause such damage to the natural
environment and thereby to prejudice the health or
survival of the population”. Thus, this article has an
anthropocentric approach, in the sense that it aims to
protect human survival.
As previously mentioned, not all damages to environment
are considered as illegal under international humanitarian
law. In other terms, damages to environment which are
not “widespread, long term and severe” are tolerated
under this article.
However, one can, once more, assume that effects of
antipersonnel mines can be seen as creating “widespread,
long-term and severe damage to the natural environment”.
Indeed, it seems reasonable to assume that antipersonnel
mines, which have a considerable destructive impact
on the environment, go beyond the limits accepted by
international humanitarian law.

1.6. International Human Rights Law
When antipersonnel mines are deployed close to
populated areas (e.g, in ﬁelds, along roads, or around
watering places), thus posing a signiﬁcant threat to the
lives of individuals and communities, their use might be
contrary to certain human rights such as the right to life
and bodily security, the right to food, the right to access
to safe drinking water, the right to choose one’s place of
residence, and others. These rights are protected by legal
instruments as, for example, the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights (adopted on December, 10th 1948) and
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(adopted on December, 16th 1966). Unlike international
humanitarian law, these may be invoked in any situation,
be it war or peacetime. However, in time of war or other
public emergency, derogations from some rights are
permitted. The articles which are valid in time of war as
well, as for example the right not arbitrarily to be deprived
of one’s life, are interpreted according to the lex specialis
in this context, the international humanitarian law.
Article 8 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
states that an individual whose fundamental rights are
violated can apply to the courts in his or her own country.
Individuals could conceivably cite the violation of their
fundamental rights in order to try to obtain reparations
for harm caused by antipersonnel mines so long as the
State in question has implemented the international treaty
in such a way so as to give rise to an actionable right in
the domestic court. The same grounds might form the
basis for a claim before a regional human rights court (e.g.
the European Court of Human Rights; Inter-American
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commission/court67) for reparations from a State68.
According to Art. 41 of the European Convention on
Human Rights and Art. 63 para.1 sent. 2 of the American
Convention on Human Rights, the courts can rule that
compensation shall be paid to the victim of a violation of
human rights.

this negligence argument would require an acceptance
that securing compensation for victims today takes priority
over the longer term concept of banning landmines,
and the belief that the wider struggle will not in fact be
undermined by securing compensation for victims in this
manner.

1.7. National law

The theory of strict liability may be more acceptable and
could even be more effective in pursuing compensation
for the victims. Strict liability, unlike negligence, does not
look to place blame on the defendant. Rather, it focuses
on the plaintiff’s injuries and places the cost of the injury
on the person most able to absorb the loss. Strict liability is
divided into two separate concepts: products defects, and
abnormally dangerous products.

At national level, certain theories of liability may be invoked
to establish landmine producers’ liability to the victims69.
These bases for liability would apply equally to landmine
producers and their component suppliers.
By viewing landmines as a product manufactured for proﬁt,
the relevant substantive laws regarding potential liability
are relatively straightforward. Landmine producers made
business decisions to enter the competitive landmine
market where they designed, manufactured and marketed
their products in the hopes of generating ﬁnancial proﬁts.
Under the law, those landmine producers are no different
than producers of any other product, although landmine
producers may have certain defences available to them
that are discussed further below. In terms of the bases for
liability, however, they are no different.
Under U.S law for example, products liability can be based
on either negligence or strict liability. Negligence places
blame on a defendant for failing to act with ordinary care,
whereas strict liability focuses on the plaintiff’s injuries
rather than the defendant’s behaviour.
Negligence is an age-old concept that can be deﬁned as
conduct which falls below the standard established by law
for the protection of others against unreasonable risk of
harm. A defendant will be held liable for his negligence
if his failure to act with ordinary care causes injury to
another. Regardless of their intended use, landmines
are products and landmine producers have breached
their duty of care if, through their landmine design or
manufacture, the producers could have reduced the risk
of injury to civilians. This would be especially true in the
instance of post-conﬂict civilians who are injured long after
the hostilities when a simple and relatively inexpensive
self-destruct or self-defusing mechanism could have
prevented the injury.
Understandably, this argument appears morally disputable
because no distinction should be made between types of
landmines and that doing so tacitly undermines the wider
struggle against landmines in general. Any effort to use
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In terms of viewing landmine production and use as an
abnormally dangerous activity, the deﬁnition includes six
factors:
1) the existence of a high degree of risk of some harm to
the person, land or property of others;
2) the likelihood that the harm that results from it will be
great;
3) the inability to eliminate the risk by the exercise of
reasonable care;
4) the extent to which the activity is not a matter of
common usage;
5) the inappropriateness of the activity to the place where
it is carried out; and
6) the extent to which its value to the community is
outweighed by its dangerous attributes.
The production of landmines meets every condition under
this deﬁnition.
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The problem with strict liability is that many landmine
producers produce only component parts of landmines.
Should a component part maker be held strictly liable even

Inter-American system has heard right to life cases for indigenous groups affected by environmental damage – similar arguments could be made for mine devastation.
See part 2.2: enforcement at regional level.
Cf. ASHTAKALA, Tara, op. cit., p. 4s.
© A. Sutton
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Defective product strict liability is based on the idea that
a producer of a defective product is in the best position to
either insure against the loss or to spread the loss among
all consumers of the product. This liability attaches even if
the producer has acted with reasonable care. The public
policy behind this theory is directly applicable to the case
of landmines, including: the substantial cost of injury to
a victim as compared with the ability to insure the risk of
injury by the producer; the public interest in discouraging
producers from marketing defective products; the inability
to prove negligence because of the secretive nature of the
manufacturing process; and the inability of the plaintiffs to
investigate thoroughly the safety of a particular product.

though its particular part may not have been defective or
its contribution may not be abnormally dangerous? Case
law and other legal guides suggest that the knowledge of
the component maker can be a factor – did the component
maker know the component would be used in a landmine
– and the component maker may be liable if it participated
in the integration of its component into the landmine.
Otherwise, the strict liability approach could offer a good
way of establishing producers’ liability, and, unlike the
negligence approach, could do so without having to make
any distinction between the types of landmines involved.
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Other, but less promising, theories of liability that might be
used include negligent entrustment or intentional torts. A
defendant can be held liable under a negligent entrustment
theory if he supplies a product that is highly dangerous,
has speciﬁc knowledge of the buyer’s dangerous intent
or is witness to the buyer’s conduct that clearly shows
the buyer’s unsuitability to use the product, and, with this
knowledge, then displays a reckless disregard for the
safety of the buyer or others whom the buyer may injure.
In the case of landmines, this theory would at best apply
where the producers sold the landmines to users who
were likely to transfer the landmines to irregular forces,
terrorists or criminals. Intentional tort claims, of course,
require intent. It would be necessary for landmine victims
to prove that the producers actually intended to cause
their injuries and, although theoretically possible involving
transferred intent or for certain types of intentional torts,
this approach probably would not be applicable for most
landmine victim situations.
The creation of national solidarity Funds for mine victims
in the countries affected by antipersonnel mines is another
idea worth promoting. This fund could, for example, be
modelled on the Guarantee Fund for Victims of Acts of
Terrorism (FGTI) instituted in France by the law of 6 July
1990, or the Fund set up by a Quebec law in 1972 to
provide compensation for victims of criminal acts. Certain
other countries have adopted compensation procedures
for crime victims (29 countries have established such
mechanisms70). Colombia, for example, has established a
system for awarding ﬁnancial compensation to victims of
a terrorist or guerrilla action, an act of war, or a massacre.
There is, however, no evidence that landmine victims have
beneﬁted from it71.

2. Enforcement
The preceding chapter looks at avenues that might allow
individuals, whether or not through the intermediary of
their States, to obtain a right to reparation if they have
been harmed by landmines. As we have seen, some of
these avenues remain very problematic when it comes to
using them effectively.

It is far from certain that, if legal proceedings were launched
against States or landmine producers, these actions would
be followed by concrete results. Nevertheless, some legal
cases are worth studying and may serve as precedents
regarding this issue.
Indeed, with the aim to enforce existing laws giving right to
reparation for landmines victims, some jurisdictions made
them competent in hearing claims related to this issue.
These jurisdictions are both at international and regional
levels.
Moreover, the example of national cases, as class actions,
can be signiﬁcant.

2.1. At international level
Given that, at international level, there are no legal
institutions with general jurisdiction, the effective
application of international law often generates complex
problems. The simplest way of persuading States to
respect their international obligations is thus through
bilateral or multilateral negotiations. Failing this, it is
possible to take a case to the International Court of
Justice, but only if all the States involved recognize its
jurisdiction. In the absence of any means of international
compulsion, if a State refuses to cooperate, it is hard to
envisage a solution that could be applied in practice.

2.1.1. The International Court of Justice (ICJ)
The International Court of Justice has sole power to rule
on the interpretation of international law. If it recognized
that States had a duty to make reparations to landmine
victims, this would represent a great step forward for
victims’ rights. To the present day, the Court has never
given a ruling on this issue.
The ICJ has a double brief: to settle, in accordance with
international law, legal disagreements submitted to it by
the States, and to give advice on legal questions posed
by those specialized bodies and institutions of the United
Nations (UN) that are entitled to do so.
It has no powers of compulsion, but its rulings and
precedents may be considered a source of law.
Insofar as only the bodies of the UN are entitled to request
advice, it is important to determine which body might most
legitimately solicit this advice, or the request will be refused
by the ICJ. To solicit advice, specialized bodies must prove
a link between the request and their own area of expertise;
in other words, if the advice is solicited by the WHO (World
Health Organisation), the WHO has to prove that the issue
of landmines is directly linked to its mandate (in this case,
the right to health). Of possible relevance, the ICJ has,
in the past, rejected a request from the WHO for advice
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It is very unlikely that the ICJ will state that there is
a general obligation for states to pay reparation to
antipersonnel mine victims. The Ottawa Treaty is only
binding on its member States and has no retrospective
effect.
That being so, there is another type of legal proceeding
that might lead the ICJ to pronounce on the question of
reparation for landmine victims. If State A wishes to obtain
reparations from State B for harm caused by landmines
laid on its territory by State B, it can make a deposition
to the ICJ. The jurisdiction of the ICJ is subject to one
essential condition, however: both States must recognize
the jurisdiction of the ICJ and agree to bring their dispute
before this jurisdiction. Moreover, such proceedings
have certain limitations: since the Court has no power to
compel, it cannot force States to obey its rulings, nor can
it apply sanctions if they choose not to.
Ultimately, settlement of the dispute is made from
one State to the other; victims are not consulted, and
reparations, if made, go to the State and not to individual
victims unless such measures have been provided for
within the framework of a treaty between the two States.
For example, at the end of the Second World War,
Japan signed a peace agreement with the Allies. In this
treaty, the funds allocated were to be used, in part, to
compensate individuals who had been prisoners of war
in Japan73.
The Court has rendered two decisions on the use of
maritime mines, both within a context of inter-State
relations.
In the “Corfu Channel Case”, two British warships were
damaged and members of the crew were killed when the
ships struck anchored maritime mines in the Northern
Corfu Channel. The People’s Republic of Albania must
have been aware of the mineﬁeld, but did not notify its
existence to the British ships. The Court ruled74 that the
Hague Convention VIII of 1907 relating to the laying of
unanchored automatic submarine contact mines is only
applicable in time of war. However, the omission of Albania,
which occurred in time of peace, violated “elementary
considerations of humanity, the principle of the freedom of
maritime communication, and every State’s obligation not
to allow knowingly its territory to be used for acts contrary
to the rights of other States”.

In the case “Nicaragua v. the United States of America.
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against
Nicaragua”75, the ICJ examined the allegations of
Nicaragua that the mining of Nicaraguan ports or waters
was carried out by United States military personnel or
persons of the nationality of Latin American countries in
the pay of the United States.
After examining the facts, the ICJ “established that, on a
date in late 1983 or early 1984, the President of the United
States authorized a United States Government agency to
lay mines in Nicaraguan ports, that in early 1984 mines
were laid in or close to the ports of El Bluff, Corinto and
Puerto Sandino, either in Nicaraguan internal waters or in
its territorial sea or both, by persons in the pay and acting
on the instructions of that agency, under the supervision
and with the logistic support of United States agents; that
neither before the laying of the mines, nor subsequently,
did the United States Government issue any public and
ofﬁcial warning to international shipping of the existence
and location of the mines; and that personal and material
injury was caused by the explosion of the mines, which
also created risks causing a rise in marine insurance
rates.”
The ICJ decided “that, by laying mines in the internal or
territorial waters of the Republic of Nicaragua during the
ﬁrst months of 1984, the United States of America had
acted, against the Republic of Nicaragua, in breach of its
obligations under customary international law not to use
force against another State, not to intervene in its affairs,
not to violate its sovereignty and not to interrupt peaceful
maritime commerce.”
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The ICJ stated further “that the United States of America,
by failing to make known the existence and location of the
mines laid by it, […] has acted in breach of its obligations
under customary international law in this respect;” and
“that the United States of America was under an obligation
to make reparation to the Republic of Nicaragua for all
injury caused to Nicaragua by the breaches of obligations
under customary international law enumerated above.”
The ICJ recognized that the use of mines was, in the
present case, contrary to international law, and that the
United States had failed in its duty to mark out the mines.
The ICJ demanded reparations for the harm suffered.
However, the importance of this decision in matters of
jurisprudence should not be overestimated:
- This ruling applies in a context of conﬂicts between two
countries and is based on the recognition that there had
been an illegal use of force. Consequently, it is not the
use of mines per se that was condemned by the ICJ.
- Moreover, if a country wanted the ICJ to recognize
the illegal nature of the use of mines on its territory by
another State, it would need the other State to agree to
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on the legality of using nuclear weapons in light of their
effects on health. The ICJ decided that the issue was not
within the area of expertise conferred on the WHO by its
mandate72. The advice was subsequently solicited by the
General Assembly, whose wider mandate gives it greater
legitimacy before the ICJ, which then agreed to rule on the
issue. If advice were to be solicited on reparations due to
landmine victims, the request should therefore be made
by the General Assembly.

bring the case and to recognize the jurisdiction of the
ICJ. It is worth pointing out that, in the affair mentioned
above, the United States did not admit the competence
of the Court and did not follow the decision.
- Reparations must be granted from one State to another,
without consulting victims and with no guarantee that
they will receive individual compensation. Mine victims’
rights are therefore not necessarily enhanced.

2.1.2. Mixed claims commissions
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In some settings, quasi judicial bodies have been set up
ad hoc to compensate war victims. This is the case for
instance of the Eritrea Ethiopia Claims Commission
or the United Nations Compensation Commission
(UNCC) concerning the ﬁrst Gulf war. These bodies do
not work similarly which generates injustices between
victims. For instance, a victim can get compensation from
the Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission only if there has
been a violation of international humanitarian law. Such
an approach generates signiﬁcant inequalities between
victims; for the same kind of prejudice, in one case the
cause will be attributed to a violation of humanitarian
law, whereas in the other the prejudice will be due to
permissible collateral damages. Thus, for example, in a
ruling on 28th April 200476, the Eritrea-Ethiopia Commission
had to deliver a judgement on a complaint lodged by
Ethiopia accusing Eritrea of having used anti-personnel
mines indiscriminately, deliberately even, against civilian
Ethiopians. In its decision, the Commission began by
determining what legal basis to apply in determining
whether or not the use here of anti-personnel mines was
a violation of the law.
It considered that, in as much as neither of the two
parties had signed the mine-ban treaty or Protocol II of
the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) at the
time of the events, only customary law applied. It further
considered that the Treaty of Ottawa and most of the
provisions in Protocol II of the CCW were too recent and
State practice with regard to these two legal instruments
too sporadic and diverse to constitute customary law.
Only certain provisions of Protocol II of the CCW relative
to mine-ﬁelds, the prohibition of the indiscriminate use
of mines and the protection of civilian populations are
constituents of customary law.
Once the legal basis had been established, the
Commission delivered its judgement on the question of
whether the use of anti-personnel mines by Eritrea was
effectively contrary to international customary law. In the
case in point, it considered that the mines had been placed
in front of the Eritrean armed forces’ ﬁxed positions and
were thus used defensively in conformity with international
customary law. Insofar as the damages suffered by the
civilians occurred after the retreat of the Eritrean troops
during the Ethiopian offensive, the court considered that

it was understandable for the Eritrean forces not to have
been able to decontaminate the zone before leaving.
Thus, on the question of Eritrea’s responsibility, which,
if engaged, would entitle victims to compensation, the
Commission judged that, “the evidence indicates that
Eritrea made extensive use of anti-personnel landmines,
but it does not demonstrate that there was a pattern to
their unlawful use. For liability, the Commission would
have to conclude that landmines were used in ways that
intentionally targeted civilians or were indiscriminate. The
available evidence suggests, however, that landmines
were extensively used as part of the defence of Eritrea’s
trenches and ﬁeld fortiﬁcations. Thus, declarations citing
the presence of anti-personnel mines also frequently refer
to the presence of Eritrean trenches in the area/kushet
concerned. In principle, the defensive use of mineﬁelds to
protect trenches would be a lawful use under customary
international law.”
Although it is regrettable that civilian victims are unable
to obtain compensation for the prejudice caused by the
mines, this judgement is not completely devoid of interest.
First of all, the Commission mentioned the importance
of the Treaty of Ottawa (paragraph 51). Furthermore, in
carefully examining the circumstances in which the mines
had been used and abandoned by the Eritrean forces,
the Commission does not consider that the use of antipersonnel mines outside of the framework of the Treaty of
Ottawa is always legal, but rather that it is worth analysing
on a case by case basis. Consequently, it is possible that
in different circumstances of mine use, the Commission
may consider that compensation should be paid.
What is important to note is that these ad hoc mechanisms
have been set up as part of the settlement of international
disputes – in these cases, political and arbitral negotiations
have led to an agreed set of terms for the mandate of the
Commission77.
In other cases, such as the Swiss Banks litigations in the
US, claims commissions were established pursuant to
court sanctioned settlement negotiations78.
Given the speciﬁcity of the negotiations, it is
understandable that there are differences in approach
– e.g., in what issues were subject to the dispute, in what
money was available for compensation, etc. What one
must advocate for, therefore, is consistent principles of
law, not necessarily a consistent result in all cases (in
terms of quantum or nature of reparations).
The UNCC has adopted a more ﬂexible approach
which entitles landmine and ERW victims to seek for
compensation. The UNCC was created in 1991 as a
subsidiary organ of the UN Security Council. Its mandate
is to process claims and pay compensation for losses
and damage suffered as a direct result of Iraq’s unlawful
invasion and occupation of Kuwait. This is a particular
situation in the sense that because Iraq committed a
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That is the case for the creation of the United Nations Compensation Committee, created by the way of the Security council resolution 692, dated on the 20th May 1991.

On the 22nd November 2000, judge Korman, chief judge of the United States District Court, in the Swiss Banks settlement, approved the restitution plan for Holocaust
victims. Funds are allocated by the way of different associations.
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crime of aggression (or illegitimate recourse to force)
and had been beaten, it had to support the war losses.
Compensations are funded through Iraqi oil revenue.
The UNCC compensates individuals, corporations,
governments, and international organisations. It receives
a large variety of claims classiﬁed in six categories
according to the nature and the amount of the losses and
damages and the nature of the claimants. Individuals who
seek compensation have to submit their claims through
their government.

does not allow for harmonisation of the procedures and
can generate inequalities between landmine victims.

A victim can receive compensation for an injury regardless
of its direct cause and even if it is not considered as a
violation of law, as long as the prejudice is linked with
the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq. Thus, landmine and ERW
victims have received compensation (even including
trauma caused by witnessing a child being killed by a
landmine) as part of the category D3 claims79. Decisions
on compensation being not opened to the public, it is
difﬁcult to evaluate the amount of the allocated ﬁnancial
compensation.
According to a UN report, there were several million mines
and other pieces of unexploded ordnance in Kuwait at the
end of the occupation. That report stated that “the most
lasting environmental problem facing Kuwait will be that of
mines and other unexploded ordnance”80. Environmental
damage can also be compensated by the UNCC. However,
no claim has been submitted for the compensation of
pollution of the territory by landmines and UXO.

As said, effects caused by landmines can be considered
as violations of fundamental rights. Thus, victims of
landmines could make requests before these regional
courts in order to obtain reparation for the violation of their
human rights.

The deadline for ﬁling the claims in cases of damages and
loss resulting from injuries sustained as a result of landmine
and ordnance explosions has even been extended to
take into account the long-term threat of these weapons,
whereas ﬁling deadlines for all other claims have expired.
Landmine and ERW victims can make a claim before the
Commission up to one year after the damage occurred81.
It is important to note that the right to compensation is
not based on landmine use itself, but rather on the act
of aggression perpetrated by Iraq. There are no judicial
proceedings and no punitive procedures. The question
of the liability for the use of landmine is not even raised
since Iraq is responsible for all damages and loss due to
military actions committed by either side. Therefore if the
damage occurred during the period of the invasion, the
work of the commission focuses only on the estimation of
the compensation due.
Thus, compensation bodies set up after armed conﬂicts
can lead to a compensation for landmine victims. However
the exceptional and ad hoc aspect of these mechanisms
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2.2. At regional level
Regional jurisdictions concerning the protection of
human rights have known a great development since
few decades. Numerous States agree to see their
responsibility engaged before a regional court for acts
they have committed in violation of human rights.

That can be the case before the Inter-American Court
of Human Rights. This latter has jurisdiction to engage
the responsibility of one of the 21 member States of the
American Convention on Human Rights in case of
violation of rights protected by this text. An action brought
by a landmine victim could be based on the violation of
one of his/her fundamental rights such as right to life, right
to have his/her physical integrity respected included in
articles 4 and 5 of the Convention, or on article 22 that
protects freedom of movement and residence. Moreover,
12 States parties to the Organisation of American States
(OAS) have ratiﬁed the Additional Protocol on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights82. Among these rights are the
right to a healthy environment and the right to food.
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If one of these rights is considered as violated, the State
liable can be under an obligation to reparation83.
Nevertheless, no individual recourse can be made
directly before the Inter-American Court. This limitation
is a great weakness for victims. Only member States
of the Inter-American Commission as well as the InterAmerican Commission on Human Rights have this ability.
This latter is an autonomous organ representing the
OAS. It is authorized to examine complaints or petitions
regarding speciﬁc cases of human rights violations from
“any person or group of persons, or any nongovernmental
entity legally recognized in one or more member states
of the Organisation.” As a result, a petition lodged before
the Commission cannot directly give right to reparation.
The Commission is not assimilated to a jurisdiction; it can
only make some recommendations. It cannot pretend to
engage the responsibility of one State unless it brings
an action before the Court. This latter is the only organ
to have jurisdiction to impose reparation of a violation

Category “D” claims are individual claims for damages above US$100,000 each.

Report to the Secretary-General by a United Nations mission, led by Mr. Abdulrahim A. Farah, former Under-Secretary-General, Assessing the Scope and Nature of
Damage Inﬂicted on Kuwait’s Infrastructure During the Iraqi Occupation of the Country from 2 August 1990 to 27 February 1991 (S/22535, dated 22 April 1991), (the Farah
Report);para. 538.
80

81
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According to article 63 of the Inter-American Convention, “if the Court ﬁnds that there has been a violation of a right or freedom protected by the Convention, the Court
shall rule that the injured party be ensured the enjoyment of his right or freedom that was violated. It shall also rule, if appropriate, that the consequences of the measure or
situation that constituted the breach of such right or freedom be remedied and that fair compensation be paid to the injured party.”
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of a right protected by the Convention. Such an action
brought before the Inter-American Court of Human Rights,
if achieved, could lead to circumvent the non-ratiﬁcation of
the Ottawa Convention by the United States for instance.
Landmine victims could, through the Commission, make
an action against this State or another member of the
American Convention but non-signatory of the Ottawa
Treaty, in order to engage its responsibility. However, the
claim is only possible if there is effectively a violation of
their human rights. In times of an armed conﬂict, they are
interpreted according to international humanitarian law.
However, a major hindrance for such an engagement of
responsibility is still the difﬁcult link to establish between
the State in cause and the prejudice due to the landmine.
As a result, in addition to the lack of individual recourse
available before the Court, victims of landmines are
confronted to the difﬁculty of landmines traceability.
The African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights entered
into force on 25th January 2004 by the mean of the
Protocol to the African Charter of Human and Peoples’
Rights. It has jurisdiction to guarantee the application of
the Charter as well as any other relevant human rights
instrument ratiﬁed by the States concerned. If the Court
ﬁnds that there has been a violation of a human or
people’s right, “it shall make appropriate orders to remedy
the violation, including the payment of fair compensation
or reparation”84.
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The referral to the Court is opened to members States and to
African inter-governmental organisations. Requests made
by individuals as well as non-governmental organisations
are also possible but submitted to some conditions85.
By now, 15 member States of the Organisation of African
Unity have ratiﬁed the Protocol instituting the African
Court.
The institution of this recent regional jurisdiction can beneﬁt
in the future to landmine victims in the African continent.
However, the optional jurisdiction of the African Court
both for individual and non-governmental organisations’
requests remains a great weakness. These requests
are still submitted to the willingness of member States.
One can nevertheless see some reparation possibilities
in favour of landmine victims in actions brought before
the African Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights. Indeed,
requests lodged by the numerous NGOs with observer
status before the Commission can lead to an efﬁcient
mean in order to engage the responsibility of the African
Charter members States. But, once again, concerning
landmines, the problem of their difﬁcult traceability can
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be seen as a real obstacle for victims in order to summon
States.
The European Court of Human Rights is an important
jurisdiction acting for the protection of human rights at
regional level. Both landmine and cluster munitions victims
can see, by this mean, relevant actions in order to engage
the responsibility of members States to the European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms. To date, 45 States have ratiﬁed
the Protocol N°11 to the Convention. This latter amends
the Convention and establishes the European’s Court
obligatory jurisdiction for individual requests claiming for
a violation of human rights. Indeed, under article 34 of
the Convention, “the Court may receive applications from
any person, non-governmental organisation or group of
individuals claiming to be the victim of a violation by one
of the High Contracting Parties of the rights set forth in the
Convention or the protocols thereto.” Court’s decisions
are binding all member States. If the Court concludes to a
breach of the Convention or of any of its protocols, and if
the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned
allows only partial reparation to be made, it shall, if
necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party. This
just satisfaction includes generally costs and expenses
award as well as, if appropriate, compensation for material
and/or moral damage. As a result, any landmine victims
are able to launch a case before the European Court if
they can claim for a violation of a right from any State
under the jurisdiction of the Court. The problem raising
is that limitations are held for an individual claim to be
entitled to proceed. Indeed, the risk of a potential violation
of rights cannot, by itself, lead to entitle a claim to be made
before the Court; one has to prove the damage occurred.
That means that the person bringing a case before the
European Court must be a victim.
According to the Landmine Monitor Report 2003, the
Federation of Russia and Georgia, both members of the
Council of Europe and therefore under the jurisdiction
of the European Court of Human Rights, are still using
antipersonnel mines. However, the prosecution of a
State remains dependent on the difﬁcult traceability of
landmines. As said, the link between the use of landmine
and its State user is difﬁcult to make.
One could also advocate for a claim before the European
Court against the use of cluster munitions by members
States. Indeed it has been acknowledged that since 1991,
Great Britain as well as the Netherlands have used cluster
munitions systems. Moreover, 10 members States of the
Council of Europe produce this type of arms86. Individual
requests for damages due to cluster munitions explosion

Article 27 of the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights.

Concerning the ﬁrsts, their right of recourse before the African Court must have been ofﬁcially accepted by the State against which the violation is alleged. By now,
Burkina Faso only has made a declaration allowing such an individual right. Non governmental organisations can make a request before the Court only if they are entitled
with observer status before the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights. For the list of Non Governmental Organisations with observer status before the African
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, see: http://www.achpr.org/english/_info/directory_ngo_en.html.
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can be based on fundamental rights as right to life (article
2 of the European Convention) or right to physical integrity
(included in article 8). Moreover, responsibility of States
can be engaged for a violation of other protected rights.
Concerning cluster munitions, that can be the case of
right of freedom of movement (article 2 of Protocol 4 to
the European Convention, signed in 1963). Moreover,
jurisprudence of the Court concerning international
environment law can be advocated in favour of reparation
for cluster munitions victims. Indeed, the Court has enlarged
the right to the protection of life to the environmental
scope87. The right to a healthy environment seems by
now indirectly protected by the Court jurisprudence. The
presence of unexploded ordnance creates risks for the
population living around the contaminated area. Finally,
it is now clear that individuals do have a human right to
effective access to information88. As a result, victims of
cluster munitions could bring a claim before the Court if
it is proved that they had not been beforehand informed
of the risks due to the contaminated environment in which
they were living.
At date, although it can be acknowledged a certain
activism from these regional jurisdictions, no violation has
been invoked in relation to the use of antipersonnel mines
or cluster munitions.

2.3. At national level
In order to estimate landmine victims’ possibilities of
claims at national level, the issue of jurisdiction has ﬁrst
to be studied.
Some examples of recourses have to be analysed such
as class actions and associational representations which
are interesting as regards victims’ claims against States
or producers.
However, causation as well as defences are obstacles
with which victims can be confronted.

2.3.1. Jurisdiction
• Court’s jurisdiction
The ﬁrst problem at the national level is establishing that
the courts have jurisdiction to decide a case brought by
landmine victims. U.S. courts, for example, will only exert
jurisdiction over a defendant that has some “minimum
contacts” within that court’s normal territory for jurisdiction.
This applies to any type of entity including individuals,
corporations, and even governments. The usual
conditions to establish minimum contacts are: domicile;
actual presence; conducting business in the territory; or
if the claimed injury occurred in the territory. Ultimately,
courts that are asked to exert their jurisdiction over a
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defendant will consider whether subjecting that defendant
to the court’s jurisdiction would offend traditional notions of
fair play and substantial justice.
So the type and circumstances of landmine producers
affect whether or not a U.S. court would be willing to exert
its jurisdiction over a case brought by landmine victims
against landmine producers. From a U.S. perspective,
landmine producers fall into four categories: U.S.
corporations; foreign corporations; the U.S. government;
and foreign governments. Courts in the U.S. could exert
their jurisdiction over the U.S. corporations and U.S.
government, and to some extent over foreign governments
and foreign corporations (as long as those corporations
are doing business in the U.S., even if that business does
not involve landmine production).
Nevertheless, another method for establishing jurisdiction
over foreign defendants is the Alien Tort Claims Act
(ATCA) which grants U.S. courts jurisdiction as long as
the injury claim also involves a violation of the “law of
nations”. For the application of the ATCA, courts have
interpreted the “law of nations” to mean generally the laws
dealing with the relationship among nations rather than
individuals. This approach would allow U.S. jurisdiction
over any type of foreign defendants without any need
to prove minimum contacts, but the landmine victims’
claims in the case, in addition to their claims regarding
their personal injuries, would need to argue that either the
landmines themselves or landmine use was a violation of
international law.
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• Universal jurisdiction
Another jurisdictional aspect concerns national enforcement
of the universal jurisdiction. Universal jurisdiction aimed
at the national implementation of states’ obligations to
bring to justice persons responsible for crimes under
international law, such as genocide, crimes against
humanity, war crimes, torture, extrajudicial executions and
‘’disappearances’’.
The principle of universal jurisdiction can be seen as part
of customary international law89.
However, the study of national laws related to the
application of universal jurisdiction involves some limits:
- First of all, it is very unlikely that a State would recognize the use of landmine as a crime90. This interpretation is not commonly admitted and states would rather
use their universal jurisdiction to prosecute crimes that
are commonly recognized as such.
As mentioned in an Amnesty International report on
universal jurisdiction, the states practise of universal

It is mentioned in the Geneva Conventions, in the preambul of the International Criminal Court Statute and in different General Assembly resolutions. As a result, a state
can legislate in favor of the universal jurisdiction of its national Courts. Moreover, even if national law of one state does not include universal jurisdiction, the Courts can apply
it in the name of customary international law.
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jurisdiction do not allow to clearly deﬁne the kind of
crimes that could be prosecuted91.

of litigation, and there can be no undue management
difﬁculties in bringing the class action.

- Then, most of states require an element of connexion
(such as territoriality, personality) to enforce the
application of the universal jurisdiction in their courts.
Belgium, which is considered as the pioneer country in
term of application of the universal jurisdiction, enacted
in 1993 a law to implement universal jurisdiction which
does not require any elements of connexion (universal
jurisdiction in abstentia), but repealed it on 1st August
2003, so that now an element of territoriality has to be
established in Belgian courts as well92.

Some of these requirements could be problematic since
the situations of landmine victims from different States and
regions of the world vary greatly, and the sheer number
of victims with vastly differing languages and access to
communications would raise enormous management
difﬁculties. The only reasonable approach would be to
divide the victims into multiple subclasses based on
geographic areas where damages occurred. This would
focus the common questions of law or fact and likely
cause them to predominate over questions affecting
individual members; it would enhance the potential for
one or several victims to have the same interest and injury
as other class members and to represent the class fairly
and adequately; and it would ease the management and
communications difﬁculties.

- The main limit of universal jurisdiction is the immunity
which protects any persons with ofﬁcial functions. This
principle was reafﬁrmed by the ICJ in a decision dated
14 February 200293.
- Finally, admitting that despite all the limits mentioned, a
state would consider prosecuting a person responsible
for the use of landmines in civilian areas under its
universal jurisdiction law, it would aim at punishing the
crime and not at providing reparation to the victims.

2.3.2. Collective claims
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• Class actions
A class action would allow one or several landmine
victims to represent other similarly-situated landmine
victims without each victim having to take an active role
in the litigation. By this way, victims would avoid important
costs of claims made individually. Under U.S. law, there
are a variety of types of class actions, depending in part
on whether they are commenced in federal or U.S. State
courts.
In general, however, successfully bringing a class action
can be difﬁcult and certain requirements must be met.
First, there must be a sufﬁcient number of class members
so that it would be impracticable to simply join several in
an individual lawsuit. Secondly, common questions of law
or fact must exist. Further, the class member who acts
as the representative must have the same interests and
suffer the same injuries as the rest of the class members,
and the representative must fairly and adequately
protect the interests of the class. Finally, in the type of
class action most appropriate for landmine victims, the
common questions of law or fact must predominate over
any questions affecting only individual class members,
the class action must be superior to all other methods

Example of a class action case regarding landmines brought
against a state94
In 2000, a group of 200 Kenyan nationals, victims of
accidents caused by mines and unexploded ordnance,
formed a class and brought a case in the British court
against the British government. In the 1990s, the British
army had carried out military exercises on Kenyan soil with
the agreement of the Kenyan authorities. During these
exercises, landmines were scattered over the territory and
the contaminated zones were not subsequently cleared.
Here, the plaintiffs did not base their case on the Ottawa
Treaty but on issues of environmental pollution and
damage caused to the community. No verdict was declared
because the case was settled out of court. The British
authorities agreed to pay $7 million in compensation to
victims but did not accept liability.
This example is encouraging as well as interesting. The
fault of the State in this particular case, although not recognized, is blatant, inasmuch as the mines were used for
military training and not in the context of a war. It is a question, really, of fault by omission: the training zones were
not cleared, leading to the contamination of Kenyan soil.
Such an example should not lead to disregard class actions limits as regards victims’ rights. Thanks to this collective claim mechanism, some victims are able to exercise
their rights and to obtain reparation. But the conclusion of
this procedure is often dealt by way of a transaction, which
makes it very dependant on the negotiations abilities of
the victims and their representative. Moreover if the tran-

AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, Universal Jurisdiction - the duty of states to enact and enforce legislation (September 2001), http://www.web.amnesty.org/web/web.nsf/pages/
legal_memorandum.
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saction can represent a precedent for future cases it might
not appear as strong as a court decision. Furthermore,
the risk of a shift towards commercialised justice remains
high with this type of action.
• Associational representation
In US law, a possible alternative to class actions for
landmine victims might be for a non-governmental
organisation (NGO), in which the victims are members,
to bring the lawsuit on their behalf. Such associational
representation is allowed when: the individual members
of the NGO would otherwise have standing to bring suit
by themselves; the interests at stake are germane to the
NGO’s purpose; and, neither the claim asserted nor the
relief requested requires participation by the members in
the lawsuit.
For landmine victims, this would mean forming an NGO
with the express purpose of seeking funding to assist
landmine victims, but it also would mean that the victims
could not seek individual monetary compensation because
they cannot directly participate in the lawsuit under this
approach. Rather, the NGO would seek funding for
regional or global trust funds in support of other NGOs
and agencies that, in turn, would provide care and support
for landmine victims95.
As collective procedure, this form of reparation can lead
to bar one of the class actions limits: to extend victims
support beyond the claim, and to keep future victims able
to beneﬁt precedent collective initiatives by the mean of
instituted funds.

2.3.3. Speciﬁc obstacles in national law
At national level, victims can face some obstacles to the
enforcement of claims. On the one hand, these difﬁculties
can be linked to causation between the landmine and the
injury suffered and on the other hand, to arguments that
can be used by the defence.
• Causation
In US law, it might seem obvious that a victim’s injury was
caused by the explosion of a landmine, and indeed this
can be shown to establish “general” causation, proving
that the landmine is capable of causing such an injury.
But “speciﬁc” causation also must be proved and, in the
case of landmines, this is much more difﬁcult. Speciﬁc
causation requires proof that the individual landmine
victim’s injury was actually caused by a landmine from
a speciﬁc landmine producer. Typically, landmine victims
will not be able to prove the source of the landmine that
caused their injury.

There are two solutions to this problem. First, the victims
could argue that proof of general causation is sufﬁcient.
A recent and successful example of this argument in
the U.S. courts involved a case against the producers
of Agent Orange, a defoliant chemical used by the U.S.
military that has been linked to several serious illnesses.
In that case, the Court found that although none of those
victims could prove which producer’s chemicals caused
the harm, each of the producer’s chemicals could have
caused the harm. All of the defendant producers were
found liable and their respective shares of the liability were
set at relative levels equal to their respective shares of the
Agent Orange market. Landmine victims could assert the
same argument in their case since they also could prove
general causation but would ﬁnd it virtually impossible to
prove speciﬁc causation.
The second argument would assert an “enterprise liability
theory.” This theory originated in the U.S. in 1972 with
a case involving blasting caps, which are often used at
construction sites96. Thirteen children who had been
injured in twelve distinct situations in ten different U.S.
States brought suit against the blasting cap producers.
Since the victims could not prove which blasting cap that
caused their injuries came from which producer, the court
allowed the victims to name every blasting cap producer
as a defendant since that list comprised the entire blasting
cap industry. Even though no speciﬁc causation could
be proven, and even though all of the defendants had
adhered to the current safety standards of their industry,
all were found liable97.
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Landmine victims, under this approach, would need to
name all known landmine producers and then assert that
if none of the producers could prove that they were not
the maker of the particular landmines in question, they
must be held liable for the victims’ injuries in proportion to
their share of the landmine market. If successfully argued,
this approach would hold all landmine producers liable
for a proportionate share of the victims’ injuries unless a
particular producer could avoid some liability by proving
that their landmines could not have been a cause of the
injuries (e.g., the producer’s landmine were sold but never
used, or were only used in a geographic area other than
that where the victims were injured).
• Defences
Another obstacles to claims outcome at national level deal
with arguments used by the Defence.
For the U.S. government and foreign governments, the
most obvious and strongest defences would be based
on concepts of governmental immunity. These are
well established under U.S. law and only very narrow

Examples of these types of cases have involved special interest organisations such as environmental groups (e.g., the Sierra Club) or labour unions. In the instance of
landmine victims, it would be necessary for the NGO to have victims as its members, but that NGO would not need to have all landmine victims as its members in order to
represent them.
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supplied the DES that caused any individual victim’s cancer. The court found that since the victims could not prove speciﬁc causation, justice required that the burden of
proof shift to the producers to prove that any particular producer was not the source of the DES that caused the injury to any particular victim. In the end, the court found the
producers liable and apportioned liability according to their respective shares in the DES marker. New York County DES Litigation (Wetherill c. Eli Lilly & Co.) 678 N.E.2d
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exceptions to such defences are available. For example,
immunity for the U.S. government would be very difﬁcult to
avoid unless the landmine victims could successfully argue
that the U.S. government’s use or export of landmines
had violated the victims’ civil rights, in which case the
Federal Tort Claim Act (FTCA) mandates that the U.S.
government be treated just as any private individual. Such
an argument would not likely succeed, however.
Immunity for foreign governments in United States also
would be problematic since the Foreign Sovereign
Immunity Act (FSIA) provides only seven enumerated
exceptions and only one of those might apply for landmine
cases. Foreign governments are not protected by the
FSIA for injuries or losses based “upon an act outside
the territory of the United States in connection with a
commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere and
causes a direct effect in the United States.” In a landmine
case, the victims or their families would need to establish
that at least some of their injuries or losses occurred in
the United States (which might include injuries such as
emotional distress). As with U.S. governmental immunity,
the arguments to avoid foreign governmental immunity
would be difﬁcult to raise successfully.
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This leaves the landmine producing U.S. and foreign
corporations subject to U.S. court jurisdiction. This is not a
signiﬁcant reduction from the entire universe of landmine
producers since most governments contract with private
corporations to produce their landmines. In the U.S.,
virtually all landmines have been produced this way, and
current estimates place the number of U.S. landmines at
nine to ten million or more of the 60 to 80 million uncleared
landmines located in dozens of countries. During its time
from the 1960s to the mid-1980s as a leading world
producer of landmines, the U.S. exported landmines to
more than 30 countries.
These private landmine producers probably would not
raise any of the conventional defences for personal injury
cases such as: consent; assumption of risk; or contributory
negligence. The fact situations of most landmine cases
would not support these defences, and the defendant
landmine producers would not want to raise defences that
require placing any blame on the victims.
Another defences likely to be raised, however, would be
the statute of limitations. Typically, a tort case such as one
that a landmine victim might bring must be brought within
two to three years of the injury. This time limit varies for
different jurisdictions within the U.S., and other factors can
affect its length, but in most events it is a relatively short
period of time.
Nevertheless, “equitable tolling” principals can bar a
defendant from raising the statute of limitations defence
under certain circumstances where there was fraud,
concealment, deception or other misconduct by the
defendant. The essence of equitable tolling is that the
statute of limitations does not run against victims who
are unaware that they have a legal cause of action. A

recent example of equitable tolling involved a lawsuit
brought in the U.S. by Holocaust victims to recover their
assets decades after those assets were stolen, based on
concealment by those defendants. In the case of landmine
victims, the stronger equitable tolling argument would be
based on the victims’ lack of knowledge regarding their
legal claims, and on their lack of access to U.S. courts.
Finally, another equitable tolling argument against the
statute of limitations defence could be the “continuing
violation doctrine” which states that the limitations period
does not begin until the offence is complete. In the
instance of landmines, an argument could be made that
the offence will not be complete until all or a substantial
amount of the landmines are removed or detonated. Since
this is unlikely to occur for many years, landmine victims
would be free to pursue their claims without being barred
by time limitations.
Another remaining defence is the “government contractor
defence.” This would be available only to corporations
that contracted with the U.S. government to produce
landmines. Based on the current understanding of
the landmine industry, this would include only U.S.
corporations (also meaning that any landmine producing
foreign corporations over which U.S. courts might exert
jurisdiction would have few remaining viable defences).
The government contractor defence essentially is an
extension of the sovereign immunity defence available to
the U.S. government. The policy behind the government
contractor defence is to shield private entities from liability
for products intended for use in armed conﬂict, thereby
encouraging private entities to contract with the U.S.
government for what are in essence government activities
which, if conducted by the government, would otherwise
be protected by sovereign immunity.
Required elements of the government contractor defence
are: 1) the U.S. government approved reasonably
precise speciﬁcations; 2) the product conformed to those
speciﬁcations; and 3) the producer warned the U.S.
government about dangers in the use of the product that
were known to the producer but not the U.S. government.
This defence would absolutely shield U.S. landmine
producers from liability unless the victims could show that
at least one of the elements is missing.
U.S. landmine producers almost certainly could prove
the ﬁrst element and, even allowing for some defectively
produced landmines, the second element. The third
element, however, provides room for argument as well
as controversy. If the victims could show that the U.S.
producers did not fully warn the U.S. government of the
dangers of landmines, then the producers could not use
the government contractor defence even if the landmines
were produced to meet approved speciﬁcations. The
landmine victims would need to show that had the U.S.
government been aware when the landmines were
produced that technology existed that could have reduced
their danger, it would have changed the speciﬁcations to
include that technology.

The existence of self-destruct technology prior to
production of the majority of landmines made by U.S.
producers now littering the world can be proven even if
the failure of the producers to warn the U.S. government
can only be inferred. Another related approach does not
require proof that the producer failed to warn, but rather
that the producer used its own discretion in producing the
product, in this case ignoring even the possibility of any
“safer alternative,” and that the U.S. government then
merely accepted the producers’ decisions.
Another, and somewhat less controversial, exception to
the government contractor defence concerns the cost of
changing the product compared with the cost of unintended
injury from the product. In other words, if the ﬁnancial
burden of changing the landmine – whether through selfdestruct technology or otherwise – is less than the cost
of unintended injuries caused by the landmine, then the
producer will be found negligent for failing to make the
reasonable alterations and the government contractor
defence will not be available. However, the evaluation of
the unintended injury cost would not be easy to make.
Whether any of these arguments would be sufﬁcient to
overcome the government contractor defence is uncertain.
At the very least, if the victims’ lawsuit could progress to
the point that the U.S. landmine producers must argue
whether or not they warned the U.S. government about
landmine dangers or could have applied some technology
to make them less dangerous to post-conﬂict civilians, the
victims’ case might effectively be won.
The greater controversy, however, is that this legal
approach does not conform with the position that no
landmines, regardless of self-destruct technology, are
safe for civilians or should be legal. In truth, such a case
does not in any way address the issue of the legality of
landmines under international law, nor could a ruling
under U.S. law in favour of landmine victims be reasonably
used in support of legitimising the use of self-destructing

landmines. In fact, the international law arguments against
landmines would have no force in such a case under U.S.
law except if they were necessary for gaining jurisdiction
through the Alien Tort Claims Act approach (as discussed
above under, “Jurisdiction”).
Unfortunately, the theory needed under U.S. law to
overcome the absolute shield of the government
contractor defence requires arguing that on the whole,
at least in terms of post-conﬂict civilians, U.S. produced
landmines with self-destruct mechanisms would have
been less dangerous. This does not mean that any type
of landmine is safe or acceptable, but only that the U.S.
producers failed to adequately warn the U.S. government,
or improperly used their own discretion in producing
landmines, and so cannot shield themselves from liability.
The enforcement of landmine victims’ rights is thus
conceivable before international, regional and national
jurisdictions. However, obstacles to these legal actions
have been exposed. They may affect the effectiveness of
a right to reparation for landmine victims. Developments of
general international law could be an interesting track for
the development of victims’ rights.

3. Developments in international law:
implications for landmine victims
Recently, the international community became aware
of the necessary reparation of damages suffered by
victims. The establishment of the International Criminal
Court is an important contribution regarding this issue.
There are as well interesting works and studies made by
the UN Human Rights Commission. Nonetheless, these
developments in international law raise the problem of
their difﬁcult applicability to the speciﬁcity of antipersonnel
mines victims.
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3.1. The International Criminal Court (ICC)
The adoption of the Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court in July 1998 marks an important
development in victims’ rights at international level. It
makes it possible for victims of crimes within the Court’s
jurisdiction to associate in a court action with the public
prosecutor, the result being that they can participate in all
stages of the trial and obtain reparations.
The International Criminal Court is competent to rule on
the most serious crimes and, consequently, ICC trials
see the involvement of victims who have often suffered
terrible wrongs. For the ﬁrst time in human history, an
international court has the power to order one individual
to pay reparations to another individual. Under Article 75,
paragraph 2 of the Rome Statute, the Court may order
a convicted person to pay money for compensation,
restitution or rehabilitation.
In accordance with Article 79 of the Rome Statute, the
ﬁrst Session of the Assembly of States Parties that took
place in September 2002 established a trust Fund for the
© A. Sutton

This is where the controversy begins. First of all, in terms
of landmines, the only technology that might have reduced
their danger involved self-destruct technology. This mean,
if it does not reduce the landmine capacity to harm at
the moment of the explosion, can at least permit a faster
neutralisation and then reduce its long term threat. This
technology was available as early as 1964 but it likely
would be impossible to prove that producers did not warn
the U.S. government about the dangers of landmines
without the technology. The only evidence of this failure to
warn might reasonably be drawn from the U.S. experience
in Vietnam where landmines caused 33 percent of all U.S.
casualties and 90 percent of all mine and booby-trap
components used against U.S. troop were of U.S. origin. If
the U.S. government had been warned by producers about
landmines without self-destruct technology, it is not logical
(or moral) that the U.S. government would have ordered
and continued to use landmines that were causing so many
casualties to their own troops, not to mention endangering
so many civilians for decades after the conﬂict.

beneﬁt of victims of crimes within the jurisdiction of the
Court and their families (Resolution 6). The purpose of the
Fund is to fully incorporate a reparative function into the
overall mandate of the Court. The Trust Fund will work in
tandem with the Court’s reparation function under Article
75 of the Statute. Sometimes this will be money that the
court orders an offender to pay as reparation. According
to article 75(2) of the Rome statute, “the Court may make
an order directly against a convicted person specifying
appropriate reparations to, or in respect of, victims,
including restitution, compensation and rehabilitation”. The
funds can be allocated either to individuals or collectively
to a group. Collective awards are not necessarily money
to a collectivity – they can also be symbolic awards,
memorials etc... The Fund may make payments directly to
victims or to other bodies, such as an aid organisation.
A convict might not have the necessary funds to pay the
compensation sum imposed by the Court; in this case, the
Board of Directors of the Trust Fund may decide to use its
voluntary contributions for the beneﬁt of the recipient of
the Court’s award98.
The question remains whether or not landmine victims
come within the jurisdiction of the Court, and would
therefore be likely to receive reparations by means of a
trial in the ICC, or through the Trust Fund. Chapter 2 of
the ICC’s Statute lists the various crimes that come within
the Court’s jurisdiction. The next step is therefore to ﬁnd
out if landmine victims can be put in the same category as
victims of these crimes.
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• Genocide99
The use of mines cannot be categorized as genocide
unless it is considered as part of a deliberate intention
to destroy an entire national, ethnic, racial, or religious
group. Mines may, in fact, be employed with the intention
of destroying an ethnic group. When they are made to
look like toys or tins of tomatoes, for example, and then
dropped in a village, the use of mines may be evidence
of an intention to eliminate an ethnic group or community.
Even if the Rome Statute does not refer speciﬁcally to
antipersonnel mines, the means used to commit these
crimes are not really important. The key thing is the result,
i.e. the crime. The Rome Statute, for example, describes
‘killing members of a group’ as genocide, without
specifying the means that might be used.
Nevertheless, the indiscriminate nature of landmine
injuries probably rules out a charge of genocide, because
the proof of the “intentional willing” remains absent.

• Crimes against humanity100
In theory, the Court may not consider landmine victims to
be victims of a crime against humanity either, inasmuch
as this crime is committed “in the context of a generalized
or systematic attack launched against any civilian
population”. Once again, the indiscriminate character of
the mine make the notion of “generalized or systematic
attack” uncertain.
However, if the mines are deliberately deployed close to
villages, or if armed groups knowingly force civilians to
gather up or detonate mines as it happened in Burma
in 2002101, might not this precise situation constitute
a crime against humanity? Indeed, Article 7(1k) of the
Court’s statute deﬁnes crimes against humanity as “other
inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing
great suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or
physical health”.
Nevertheless, “Attack directed against any civilian
population” means a course of conduct involving the
multiple commission of acts referred to in paragraph
1 against any civilian population, pursuant to or in
furtherance of a State or organisational policy to commit
such attack”102.
Consequently, still using the Burmese case of forced
de-mining as an example, proof would be needed that
the casualties to which villagers fall victim are part of a
deliberate policy aimed at harming a target population,
and therefore that it is no longer a question of accident but
rather of a criminal act.
Moreover, some authors can consider that damages to
another State’s environment caused by landmines can
fall under the deﬁnition of such a crime. Indeed, according
to Professor Doug Rokke, “A nation’s military personnel
cannot willfully contaminate any other nation, cause harm
to persons and the environment and then ignore the
consequences of their actions. To do so is a crime against
humanity”103.
• War crimes104
As mentioned earlier, it is very difﬁcult to prove that the
use of mines in wartime constitutes a violation of the
Geneva Conventions on the protection of civilians.
Among the deﬁnitions of war crimes that ﬁgure in the ICC
Statute, there is Article 8 paragraph 2b: “Intentionally
launching an attack in the knowledge that such attack

External voluntary contributions to the Fund must ﬁrst be approved by the Board of Directors of the Trust Fund, which will refuse those contributions that are incompatible
with the objectives and activities of the aid Fund, or those where allocating the sum in the way that the donor demands would lead to a manifestly inequitable distribution of
the available funds among the different groups of victims.
99
Article 6 of the Court Statute.
100
Article 7 of the Court Statute.
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As mentioned in: INTERNATIONAL CAMPAIGN TO BAN LANDMINES, Landmine Monitor Report: Toward a Mine-Free World(2003), op. cit., p. 567, forced mine clearing have been
reported in Burma.
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Article 8 of the Court Statute.

will cause incidental loss of life or injury to civilians or
damage to civilian objects or widespread, long-term and
severe damage to the natural environment which would
be clearly excessive in relation to the concrete and direct
overall military advantage anticipated”.
Does laying a landmine constitute such an attack? If
so, it has never been recognized, although such an
interpretation remains possible and largely legitimated by
the high proportion of landmine civilian victims105. The user
of a mine with no self-destruct mechanism knows very
well that the mine will have an effect over the long term,
even after the end of a conﬂict. In laying such a mine, he
has consciously exposed civilians to danger once peace
has been restored. Furthermore, even if the mine has a
limited life thanks to a self-destruct mechanism, there is
no guarantee that it will only cause losses in enemy ranks;
‘collateral damage’ (the loss of civilian lives) may always
be considered as exceeding the expected returns in terms
of military strategy.
This being so, might the laying of antipersonnel mines be
seen as a war crime? Can one prosecute a person who
commits an act in wartime for the peacetime effects of
that act?
Still using the Burmese example of forced mine clearing:
does the fact of knowingly using a civilian to detonate a
mine not constitute a war crime? This, however, would
mean condemning the atrocity of forced mine clearing,
and not the use of mines. The Court’s position could only
permit such advancement of interpretation.
• The crime of aggression
The crime of aggression ﬁgures in the statute of the
ICC. However, “the Court shall exercise jurisdiction over
the crime of aggression once a provision is adopted in
accordance with articles 121 and 123 deﬁning the crime
and setting out the conditions under which the Court shall
exercise jurisdiction with respect to this crime. Such a
provision shall be consistent with the relevant provisions
of the Charter of the United Nations106”.
Even if the States Parties have yet to ﬁnd a deﬁnition of
the crime of aggression that satisﬁes everyone, the illegal
use of force probably does constitute such a crime.
Indeed, in the Nicaragua case107, the illegal use of force
has been recognised as a crime of aggression.
That would not be automatically the case of the use of
landmines since it is the circumstances and not the mean
which has been retained. In the sub-mentioned case,
mines have been effectively used, but it is not this element
which lead the Court to qualify American acts as a crime
of aggression.

Concentrating on the victim, it can be established that
landmine victims can seek reparations through the ICC
for one of the crimes mentioned above. However, one has
to accept that, even if the Court did recognize that the use
of a mine constituted a crime within its jurisdiction, the
difﬁculty would be in proving the link between the victim
and the mine user.

3.2. Basic Principles and Guidelines on the
Right to Remedy and Reparation for Victims
of Gross Violations of International Human
Rights and Humanitarian Law
Since the beginning of the 90’s the United Nations Human
Rights Commission has been working on the issue of
reparation and compensation for victims. Two experts
assisted with the drawing up of a draft document, which
is currently being reviewed by States and civil society
organisations for their comments.
The UN Convention against Torture does not deﬁne
the terms reparation, compensation and rehabilitation;
it does not even contain any strict deﬁnition of the term
‘victim’. Two UN documents tend to bar this weakness: the
Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims
of Crime and Abuse of Power and the Basic Principles
and Guidelines on the Right to Remedy and Reparation
for Victims of gross Violations of International Human
Rights and Humanitarian Law (hereafter referred to as
the “ Draft Principles”).
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One of the speciﬁcities of the Draft Principles is that
they take as a starting point the needs and wishes of the
victims themselves. As highlighted by the International
Rehabilitation Council for Torture Victims108, the Draft
Principles approach the right to remedy from the victim’s
perspective.
Although initially intended to compensate for a recognised
gap in the UN Convention against Torture, the Draft
Principles in fact go beyond this in focusing not only
on violations that constitute acts of torture, but also on
any gross violation of human rights and international
humanitarian law. It is therefore interesting to study these
draft Principles in the perspective of landmine victims.
First of all it is important to notice that although the
previous Draft Principles109 was directed at “violations of
international human rights and humanitarian right”, the
document was amended in October 2003110 to restrict
the scope of the document to “gross violations of human
rights and serious violations of humanitarian law”. These
amendments to the text constitute a real step backward as
far as landmine victims are concerned.

According to the landmine Monitor 2003, op. cit., (p39-40), 85% of landmine victims are civilians.
Article 5.2 of the Court Statute.
107
ICJ decision, Military and paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (“Nicaragua v. United States”), 27th June 1986.
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In the amended Draft Principles111, “a victim is a person or
a collective group of persons who suffered harm, including
physical or mental injury, emotional suffering, economic
loss, or impairment of their fundamental legal rights”. A
“victim” may also be “a legal personality, the representative
of a victim, a dependant, a member of the immediate
family or household of the direct victim, as well as a
person who, in intervening to assist a victim or prevent the
occurrence of further violations, suffered physical, mental,
or economic harm”.
A victim as deﬁned above is “one who suffers harm as a
result of acts or omissions that constitute a gross violation
of international human rights, or serious violations of
humanitarian law.”
Whereas landmine victims could ﬁt in the deﬁnition of
victims as stated in the previous draft, the reference to
“gross violations” may have constituted a signiﬁcant bar.
As it was mentioned previously, it is not yet admitted in
the current jurisprudence whether the general use of a
landmine constitutes a grave breach of humanitarian
law. However, the speciﬁc use of several landmines can
be in breach of international human rights. Further, in the
Preamble of the draft Principles, it is considered that “gross
violations of civil, political, economic, social and cultural
rights includes the protection of life, physical integrity
and other aspects essential to the human person and to
human dignity”. A landmine victim could be considered as
a victim of a gross violation of human rights.
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The Draft Principles list a certain number of obligations on
States, among which are the obligation to respect, ensure
respect for and enforce international human rights and
humanitarian law. These obligations are given in chapters
1 and 2. Articles 4 and 5 of chapter 3, however, focus more
speciﬁcally on those gross violations of human rights and
international humanitarian law that constitute crimes under
international law. Because of their gravity, these violations
require states to prosecute the alleged perpetrators and
provide for universal jurisdiction. Statutes of limitation
are not applicable. Regarding landmine victims, it is
very unlikely for the time being and for the reasons
already mentioned, that states will acknowledge the use
of landmines as constituting a crime under international
law. However, victims of landmines may still be entitled
to claim certain rights, which include the right of access
to justice, the right to reparation for harm suffered and
other appropriate remedies, and the right of access to all
information relevant to the violations (article 12).
1. The right of access to justice
It must be possible to exercise this right within the
framework of existing domestic law and in accordance
with international law. States must therefore ensure
that violations of international law (Human rights and
humanitarian law) can be prosecuted under national
jurisdiction.
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Articles 8 and 9.

For the victims of landmine, it would mean that the
violation of human rights (the use of landmine) they have
suffered from is recognized as such in domestic law.
Article 13 states that the State also has an obligation to
“make available all appropriate diplomatic and legal means
to ensure that victims can exercise their rights to remedy
and reparation for violations of international human rights
or humanitarian law”. The mention of diplomatic means
could be interpreted as assistance from the victim’s home
State in obtaining compensation from another State liable
for the harm he or she has suffered. Obviously, these
diplomatic means are highly political and it is very unlikely,
for example, that the Vietnamese government makes
diplomatic means available to its citizen for obtaining
reparation from the United States for the damage caused
by the landmines laid by the US army in the 70s. Thus the
use of diplomatic means may be discretionary according
to which States are involved. Article 14 mentions that, in
addition to individual access to justice, access should also
be made available for groups of victim to make a collective
claim. As it was mentioned previously, collective access
to justice and reparation could prove to be a very useful
approach for landmine victims.
2. Victims’ right to reparation
It is stated in chapter IX of the Draft Principles that
“reparation should be proportional to the gravity of the
violations and the harm suffered”. However, this raises
the question of the correlation between the gravity of
the violations and the extent of the harm suffered. No
information indicates how the gravity of the violations will
be assessed. It is likely that, in accordance with previous
articles in the Draft Principles, a violation will be considered
as “gross” when it constitutes a crime under international
law. Does this mean that reparation will be calculated
partly on the basis of whether or not the violation is gross?
How will the gravity of those violations, not considered to
be crimes under international law, be assessed?
In the case of landmine victims, the violation (use of
landmines) does not necessarily constitute a crime
under international law and some may argue that it does
not constitute a gross violation either, and yet the harm
suffered can be of extreme gravity (loss of one or several
limbs, death of a family member). It is difﬁcult, therefore, to
imagine how the amount of reparation could be calculated.
Furthermore, it would seem both difﬁcult and unrealistic to
talk about proportional reparation.
“In accordance with its domestic laws and international
legal obligations, a State shall provide reparation to
victims for its acts or omissions constituting gross
violations of international human rights and serious
violations of humanitarian law norms” (article 16). This
article would seem to be particularly relevant to landmine
victims. Indeed, although the State may not be held liable
for a wrongful act (the use of landmine), damage caused

by landmines is also due to an omission: the omission to
clear the areas polluted by landmines after the end of the
conﬂict, the omission to identify and close off access to
polluted areas, the omission to warn and inform civilians
about the danger and the location of landmines. Neither
should it be forgotten that States are liable for acts
committed by previous governments.
Article 16 also refers to a case in which the violation is
not attributable to the State. In such a case, “the party
responsible for the violation should provide reparation to
the victim or to the State, if the State has already provided
reparation to the victim”. As outlined in article 3(b), a
State is obliged to “investigate violations […] and, where
appropriate, take action against the alleged perpetrators
in accordance with domestic and international law”, this
would mean that a State could, on behalf of a victim,
claim compensation from the party held liable for the
damage, whatever this party’s nationality. In a case
where the liable party is unable or unwilling to meet its
obligations, the victims’ home State should endeavour
to provide them with reparation via the establishment of
a national compensation/reparation Fund. In the case
of harm caused by landmines, liability is often difﬁcult to
demonstrate: the liable party may be a rebel group, which
has no legal status and may have disappeared since the
wrongful act was committed, or a foreign state or identity
that will not easily admit its liability112.
If a foreign entity, in particular a State, is held liable, the
claim for reparation takes on a very diplomatic aspect. The
two States could bring the case before the International
Court of Justice, but we have already seen the limits of this
procedure113. The victims may be able to obtain reparation
from his or her home State, but this would most likely be
after diplomatic channels had failed, and would therefore
be a lengthy process. Moreover, since the violation will
not be considered a crime under international law, it is
unlikely that the same means be made available to victims
for claiming compensation. This is all the more so as,
according to Chapter III, only crimes under international
law require universal jurisdiction.
The establishment of a national Fund raises the issue of
the ﬁnancial resources available. If the State is not willing
or not able to provide the funding, and this would certainly
be the case in most of the countries where landmines
victims are to be found, not only will the wrongful act
remain unpunished but reparation will not be guaranteed
either114.
Chapter X of the Draft Principles refers to different kinds
of reparation:
• Restitution
“Restitution should, whenever possible, restore the victim
to the original situation before the violations of international
human rights or humanitarian law occurred” (article 22).
In the case of landmine victims, especially in the case

of communities affected by landmines, restitution could
mean clearance of the polluted area and the ability to
return to the living or working area. However, restitution
is not possible for physical injuries which resulted in
permanent disability.
• Compensation
“Compensation should be provided for any economically
assessable damage, as appropriate and proportional to
the violation and the circumstances of each case, resulting
from gross violations of international human rights and
serious violations of humanitarian law” (article 22).
Each example listed in this article is relevant to the kind of
damages suffered by landmine victims:
- Physical or mental harm, including pain, suffering and
emotional distress,
- Lost opportunities, including employment, education and
social beneﬁts,
- Material damages and loss of earnings, including loss of
earning potential;
- Harm to reputation or dignity,
- Costs required for legal or expert assistance, medicines
and medical services, and psychological and social
services.
• Rehabilitation
Rehabilitation is deﬁned in a broad approach in article 23:
it covers not only physical and psychological rehabilitation
but also access to legal and social services.
Collective or community care-management of physical
rehabilitation for landmine victims is often the best
adapted. This highlights the appropriateness of collective
procedures for reparation.
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• Satisfaction and guarantee of non-repetition
Satisfaction is deﬁned in the Draft Principles via a series of
enumerations (apology, including public acknowledgement,
commemorations and tributes to the victims, ofﬁcial
declarations…). Such measures have a very symbolic
value but are of great signiﬁcance to the victims. Article 24
also mentions judicial or administrative sanctions against
parties responsible for the violations as part of satisfaction.
This is unlikely to happen in the case of reparation to
landmine victims since liability for the wrongful act is
difﬁcult to prove. Nonetheless, the fact of admitting publicly
that the use of landmines constitutes a gross violation of
human rights or international humanitarian law, that the
State’s omission to clear an area and to protect civilians
constitutes a violation as well, will lead to an evolution in
the jurisprudence. It is only through this kind of generalised
recognition and statement that, in the long term, the use
of landmines will be legally considered a gross violation of
international law and custom.
As regards the guarantees of non-repetition, for
landmine victims, this would mean the clearance of

Judgment of the International Court of Justice: Nicaragua v. the United States of America, Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua. 27/06/86).
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contaminated areas, and for the States that continue
producing landmines, or importing and exporting them,
this could mean an end to production and all forms of the
commercialisation of landmines.
The question of the scope of the Draft Principles remains
to be seen. In the Preamble of the amended draft, it is
emphasized “that the principle and guideline do not
create new substantive international or domestic legal
obligations but identiﬁes mechanisms, modalities,
procedures and methods for the implementation of existing
legal obligations under international human rights and
international humanitarian law which are complementary
though different as to their norms”. It is very likely that this
new clariﬁcation, along with the restriction of the scope of
the text now referring only to “gross” respectively “serious”
violations”, may be due to the comments made by some of
the States arguing that many of the principles had no basis
in custom or in treaty115. Will the principles and guidelines
be legally binding on the States or will they remain
simple objectives? If they do become legally binding,
what recourse would there be in the event of a State not
complying with its obligations to provide reparation? All
these questions are not settled yet; the role, the nature
and the statute of this text is still a fundamental issue.
If the text is adopted by the General Assembly, even if
does not acquire a legally binding status; it may still be an
important reference for landmine victims.

4. Conclusions
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Landmine victims could claim reparation for the
prejudice they have suffered before competent national
courts. These actions by individual victims depend on the
procedural and material law conditions of each State.
The example of class actions in the United States is also
an interesting idea. If all the conditions are met, landmine
victims could group together as a class and make a claim
in order to engage the liability of the landmine manufacturer
that caused the injuries they have suffered.
In order to facilitate such legal actions, the liability of the
arms manufacturers should be more apparent. One of
the main problems consists in establishing a causal link.
This difﬁculty could be resolved by improving landmine
traceability.

Claims against States for violation of human rights
can be ﬁled by individuals or by their representatives
in certain regional human rights courts.
Defending victims’ rights requires increased direct and
indirect judicial assistance. In addition to the mechanisms
that already exist116, further assistance could be provided
by non-governmental human rights organisations or
any other relevant bodies in order to make claims more
effective and efﬁcient.
NGOs also have an important role to play in providing
judicial assistance to victims; ensuring respect for
procedural rules and rights and providing assistance in
the constitution of the claim.
The aim is to inform victims of the range of possibilities for
legal remedy and thus of compensation/reparation from
jurisdictions they are not always familiar with.
NGOs should also be able to represent victims directly
before regional courts in order to obtain reparation for
damages due to landmines. In other words, NGOs could
act as the victims’ representatives.
The jurisdiction of international courts may be a
means of engaging the responsibility of actors who
violate international humanitarian law and international
law on human rights. The engagement of international
responsibility as well as individual criminal responsibility
may be a means of improving victims’ rights. States
parties to the Ottawa Treaty could exercise their diplomatic
protection on behalf of one of their nationals before the
International Court of Justice in order to obtain reparation
for prejudice suffered caused by the non-execution of an
obligation by another State party.
The legality of the use of landmines could also be
challenged by engaging individual criminal responsibility
before the International Criminal Court. This international
body has already created an important precedent with
regard to incrimination in cases of rape. Organisations and
associations for the defence of human rights obtained this
incrimination through their persistent pleading before the
ICC. This could also be the case for the use of landmines.
In other words, if these organisations were more active
with regard to the ICC, it could be possible to incriminate
the use of landmines within the framework of actions taken
against individuals.

Judicial action at national level should be taken by
competent lawyers in this ﬁeld. These lawyers should
provide victims with judicial assistance and knowledge of
the extent of their rights.
Moreover, if the use of a landmine constitutes a war
crime, universal jurisdiction to prosecute this crime could
be engaged. However, States may exercise international
jurisdiction only if a certain territorial link exists. This
condition should be softened.

United States Mission –Geneva Press Releases 2003 “General Comments of the United States on Basic Principles and Guideline on the Right to a Remedy for Victims
of Violations of International Human Rights and Humanitarian Law”.
116
According to article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights; article 8.2 of the American Convention on Human Rights; article 7 of the African Charter on Human
and Peoples’ Rights.
115
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II. Compensation Fund
for mine victims
Despite changes in international law, mine victims have still
not obtained real judicial recognition as an identiﬁed group.
There have been some encouraging developments over
recent years in the ﬁeld of the rights of disabled people,
and it is fully recognized that assisting landmine victims
and improving the situation of people with disabilities are
very closely related. However these aspects do not provide
a response to certain dimensions of landmines harms.
Given that, for the time being, the question of reparation
for mine victims seems difﬁcult to implement, it is worth
examining whether the creation of a compensation fund
could ﬁll this gap.
Different systems could be envisaged for giving mine
victims access to compensation: through national
compensation mechanisms or through the creation of an
international compensation Fund.
Examples of existing funds providing compensation for
other kinds of injury and damage are interesting models to
study. This document analyses three of them:
- Two national compensation funds for the victims of
terrorism
- The International Oil Pollution Compensation Fund
- The United Nations Voluntary Fund for Victims of
Torture
First of all, we need to identify which mine victims could
obtain compensation from a hypothetical fund and what
their needs would be in terms of compensation in order
to then analyse the different models of compensation
mechanism and the extent to which they could be applied
to the area of mine victims.

1. What kind of compensation for mine
victims and for what kind of injury and
damage?
Mines victims are faced with three different kinds of
damage and injury:
1. Physical injury requiring expenditure on health and care
over the long term and may lead to death.
2. Injury to economic interest, including loss of earnings
arising from the incapacity to work; loss of income when a
ﬁeld can no longer be used for agricultural purposes; loss
of income for a victim’s family.
3. Psychological and emotional injuries due to the trauma
caused by the death of a family member or the constant
threat of landmines.
Antipersonnel mine and UXO victims should get financial
compensation for the harm suffered. This part of the
study focuses on this particular aspect of compensation.
As victims of mine accidents often suffer from permanent
disability, they need special provisions in their daily life.
The person’s deﬁciencies and limited capacity to allow
him/her to participate fully within the society should be
compensated. The victims should have:
• the right to an adapted daily environment;
• the right to use normal means of transport and
communication;
• the right of access to technical aids and to essential
human assistance.
• the concern for the needs and burden of the families and
assistants.
This should be implemented through public policy related
to disabled people.
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According to the type of compensation fund and the kind
of damages and injury suffered, compensation could also
be claimed collectively instead of individually.

The care and physical rehabilitation of victims also
depend on the kind of orthosis and prosthesis offered, the
materials used etc.

1.1. Physical injuries

1.2. Injury to economic interest

Landmine injuries or trauma are all body lesions suffered by
an individual caused by the explosion of an antipersonnel
mine or UXO. The damage can affect the head, the
abdomen, the throat, the back, or the limbs. When victims
survive long enough to reach the hospital, they usually
suffer from one of the three following types of injury117:

Injury to economic interest results in ﬁnancial loss if:
- the survivor can no longer work because of a physical
disabilities or mental trauma;
- a victim’s family is in dire need;
sence of mines in the area prevents the exercise of
professional activities.

Type 1 (30%): Caused by stepping on a mine buried in the
ground. The subsequent lesions result in the amputation
of the foot or the leg with serious injuries to the other leg,
the genital organs, and the arms. This type of injury is
usually the most serious, and is often accompanied by
burns.

Compensation for economic loss is also difﬁcult to
assess and should be estimated on a case-by-case basis
according to the victim’s family circumstances and his/her
professional situation (income) before the accident.
Compensation should allow the victim to reintegrate in the
professional and social life: professional redeployment,
skills and vocational training, and income generating
projects.
Funeral expenses for deceased victims should also be
taken into account.
The presence of mines in an area may force individuals
or communities to relocate. The amount of compensation
should cover the economic loss for the individuals and
communities and the socio-economic consequences
caused by the relocation. In these particular cases,
collective compensation may be more appropriate.

Type 2 (50%): Caused by splinter mines. Deep wounds
from the penetration of metallic splinters causing lesions
all over the body, damaging the skin, the organs, and the
bones. The multiplicity of deep injuries is life-threatening.
Type 3 (5%): Caused by an explosion during handling by
deminers, children, or mine setters, which usually causes
the mutilation of the upper limbs, and serious injuries to
the face that can result in deafness and blindness.
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15% of injuries caused by mine accidents do not enter
these categories.
Whatever the type of ordnance, there are often lesions
due to the “blast effect”: a pathologic process causing
lesions in a body exposed to a shock wave during an
explosion.
Compensation should at least cover medical expenses
and rehabilitation and care over the long term and be
assessed on the basis of the following criteria:
• Pre-hospitalisation assistance and care (evaluation, ﬁrst
aid, and transportation);
• Hospital care (medical care, surgery, post-operative care
and pain management);
• Rehabilitation (physiotherapy, occupational therapy,
prosthetic appliances and technical aids, and psychological
support).
The ICBL working group on victim assistance estimated
the costs of rehabilitation at 9000 USD per mine accident
survivor over their lifetime118. However, it is very difﬁcult
to assess the amount of compensation for each type of
prejudice suffered. Indeed, according to where the victim
lives, the costs of medical expenses differ substantially.

1.3. Psychological injury
Compensation for psychological injury is certainly the
most difﬁcult to estimate: by “psychological injury” we
mean the trauma suffered by the survivors or the victim’s
family. In the case of survivors, it is worth remembering
that social exclusion of the victim due to the social burden
of disability can constitute a cause of psychological
vulnerability.
A compensation for the direct victims’ families should take
into account the degree of relationship and the potential
witnessing of the accident by a family member. As
previously stated, the UNCC considers that the witnessing
of an accident by a family member is a factor to be included
in the calculation of compensation119.

1.4. A subjective or an objective approach?
The issue of compensation is a complex and wide-ranging
one. Sir Kenneth Bloomﬁeld, the Northern Ireland Victims
Commissioner, notes in his report following the Omagh
bombing, that he has «overall, […] often come to the
conclusion that schemes apparently well-matched to their
purpose do not always deliver the goods»120.
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HANDICAP INTERNATIONAL, Landmine Victim Assistance World Report 2002, Lyon: HI, 2002, p. 458-459.
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HANDICAP INTERNATIONAL, Les mines antipersonnel aujourd’hui! Synthèse du Rapport 1999, Paris: L’esprit frappeur, 1999, p. 89.
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See part 2.1.2 of the ﬁrst part of the study.
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Sir Kenneth BLOOMFIELD, We will remember them: Report of the Northen Ireland Victims Commissioner, 1998, para. 5.10.

In December 1987, Professor Desmond Greer of Queen’s
University Belfast wrote a paper on ‘Compensation and
support for victims of crime’, which included the following
recommendation: «Consideration should be given to the
overall effectiveness of the various provisions to ensure
that the payment of compensation to the victims of crime
- and particularly the victims of terrorist crime - was
adequate»121. This basic principle must constitute the basis
on which any victim compensation scheme is designed.

schemes.123 For a long time in England for example, the
State had no role in enforcing criminal actions; interested
parties, usually the victim, would prosecute the offender
and collect the resulting ﬁne or award. As the State
assumed a more prominent role in enforcing sanctions,
the victim progressively disappeared from the prosecution
process. Eventually, victims lost both the discretion to
bring an action and a pecuniary stake in the outcome of
the trial124.

Where the underlying yardstick is the loss of maintenance
to a family, the death of one person may be deemed worth
less than that of another, which highlights the issue of
whether the test for compensation should be a subjective
or an objective one. For example, a distinction is made
between compensation for what a successful individual in
the prime of his life with realistic expectations of continuing
high earnings would receive, and compensatory payments
made available in the case of an ailing older man with a
long history of unemployment and poor job prospects.
As a consequence of adopting the subjective test, the
perception may be that one life has been deemed to be
worth less than that of another: the compensation is for
what has been lost in the material sense, and does not
attempt to achieve any social objective.

The victim has in recent years gradually re-entered the
public enforcement forum of penal law.125 Previously,
victims could only seek reparation from the offender through
the initiation of a private tort action. Victims may now be
compensated either at the criminal sentencing stage,
receiving payments directly from the convicted offender, or
through a State victim compensation programme. These
two alternatives within the public enforcement forum
correspond to the distinction between compensation
and reparation. While compensation seeks from another
agency recognition of the loss endured, reparation directly
addresses the individual or organisation that wronged the
victim126. In relation to landmine victims, the question of
seeking reparation from the perpetrators is not dealt with
in this part as it has been discussed in the ﬁrst part of
this study. The analysis will instead focus on the issue of
compensation, and the possibility of payment from a State
agency for loss and injury suffered by landmine and UXO
victims.

The contrasting approach, the objective test, is where
the awarding of compensation reﬂects ethical and social
justice, and would therefore rule out discrimination, for
the beneﬁt is based on equal rights for every casualty,
regardless of income at the time of injury. This illustrates the
reality that there are different ways of developing a policy
for the payment of compensation. The different schemes
in operation in Great Britain and in Northern Ireland
highlight these two possible approaches to compensation.
No scheme will ever be universally acceptable: wherever
the line is drawn, some applicants will ﬁnd somehow
themselves disadvantaged122.

2. An Applicable Model?
National Compensation Funds
2.1. Introduction
Public enforcement of penal law focuses on the offender
rather than on the victim. The general phenomenon of
the irrelevance of the victim can be traced historically to
the shift from private legal actions to public enforcement

This analysis concentrates on existing schemes that
compensate victims of terrorism. While much of the
literature on the subject focuses on the separate issues of
moral reparation and truth and reconciliation, for many, the
identity of the perpetrator is not known. The payment of
compensatory government Funds to victims of crime is thus
the only means by which the inadequacies of the past may
be redressed127. This chapter will describe the workings of
two recent compensation schemes in place for victims of
terrorism, the ﬁrst of which includes Guarantee Funds for
Victims of Acts of Terrorism and Other Violations of the
Law, a Fund set up in France in 1990128 following terrorist
attacks in the country. The second scheme is the existing
system in Northern Ireland, whereby victims of terrorism
have the right to claim compensation from the Secretary
of State for injury or death caused by terrorist offences.
Both models will be examined with a view of establishing
an equitable system to compensate landmine victims. The
underlying purpose of compensation schemes must also
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be highlighted, for the nature of the scheme will depend on
its aim: whether it seeks to compensate fully for loss in the
material sense, or whether the awarding of compensation
would be a reﬂection of ethical and social justice.

2.2. Compensation Schemes for the Victims
of Terrorism
2.2.1. Guarantee Fund for Victims of Acts of
Terrorism and Other Violations of the Law
(FGTI)129
• Judicial Basis for the FGTI
A compensation Fund for victims of terrorism in France
was set up under Article 9 of the 1986 Law relating to
the Fight Against Terrorism and Attacks Against the
Foundations of the State130. Victims of terrorism are
afforded the status of civilian victims of war131.

42

Created in 1990, the FGTI regulates the compensation of
victims of terrorism, as well as victims of other types of
attack, including assault and rape132. The compensation
regime is rooted in the 1986 Law, and payments are ﬁxed
by the FGTI in accordance with the victims. The FGTI
is ﬁnanced by a tax deduction from insurance contracts
for goods133; for every contract in 2001, this contribution
amounted to 3.35 euros134. Financial resources are
maximised by the reimbursements received from those
responsible for the attacks.
• Applying to the FGTI
The Administrative Council of the FGTI is competent to
qualify the act of terrorism.
The FGTI compensates every victim regardless of his/her
nationality, for acts of terrorism perpetrated in France
after 1 January 1985. For acts of terrorism perpetrated
abroad, the FGTI solely compensates victims of French
nationality. The State Prosecutor of the French Republic
or the relevant embassy and diplomatic representatives
are to inform the FGTI of an attack and of the identity of
any victims, in which case the FGTI will contact the victims

directly. Those who consider themselves a victim of an act
of terrorism may address the FGTI directly. The victim or
the next of kin have a time period of ten years from the
date of the terrorist act to apply for compensation.
If conditions are met, the FGTI will compensate for the
physical injury suffered by a person victim of an attack,
or if the victim is deceased, the economic loss incurred
by the next of kin, however beneﬁts already paid by the
State will be taken into account. Damage to goods is not
covered by the FGTI135.
• Compensation
The procedure for the payment of compensation is
governed by Article 9 of the 1986 Law Relative to the
Fight Against Terrorism and Attacks Against the
Foundations of the State136.
- The compensation procedure
Payments to victims depend on the injury according to their
permanent nature or not. This latter is determined by medical
expertise. In both instances, the costs are to be reduced
from social welfare bodies. In the case of death, the offer of
compensation will be presented to the next of kin.
Compensation will be made for mental trauma, funeral
expenses, and economic losses, and will be paid by social
welfare bodies.
- Options for the victim
Once the victim receives the offer of compensation, he/
she can accept it, discuss it further, or refuse it; in the case
of refusal, the amount of compensation paid will then be
determined judicially and the FGTI will be subject to the
ruling of the tribunal.
- Other rights
Beneﬁciaries of victims of terrorist acts are exempted from
legal succession. Victims of acts of terrorism committed
after 1 January 1985 will beneﬁt from the civilian victims of
war statute. The rights and advantages that arise from this
statute are contained in the Code of Military Pensions for
disability and Victims of War137, including the granting
of a pension that cannot be held concurrently with any
other, and access to free medical care and equipment.
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The following information is for illustrative purposes. The law governing the FGTI is contained in the insurance code in articles; L 126-1 and L 126-2 , L 422-1 to L 422-5
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Every victim of a terrorist act will become a member of the
National Veteran’s Ofﬁce (ONAC), which provides both a
disability card if the victim is disabled, and signiﬁcant help
with all administrative and social aspects138.
- Proof
In addition to all conditions required and in support of
his/her application, the victim has to prove and provide all
relevant documents and information139.

2.2.2. Northern Ireland
The Criminal Injuries Compensation (Northern Ireland)
Order 1988140, which came into operation on 1 August
1988, provides a right to claim compensation from the
Secretary of State for injury or death caused by violent,
including terrorist offences in Northern Ireland. The
Compensation Agency carries out the Secretary of State’s
functions in relation to the provision of compensation for
criminal injuries under the legislation141.
• When is compensation payable?
Compensation is payable if a person is injured or killed
in Northern Ireland as a direct result of either a violent
offence or attempting to arrest a suspected offender, or to
prevent the commission of an offence.
• Who can apply?
The victim usually makes an application for compensation.
An application may also be made by any person
responsible for the maintenance of the victim, or any
relative of the dead victim for pecuniary loss for example
(loss of earnings), or for expenses reasonably incurred as
a direct result of the victim’s injury or death.
• What compensation will be paid?
Where a person has sustained a criminal injury,
compensation may be paid for the following: expenses
actually and reasonably incurred as a result of the injury
- pecuniary loss resulting from the injury, including loss
of earnings arising from incapacity to work, and for pain,
suffering, and loss of amenities caused by the injury. In the
case of the death of the victim, compensation may be paid
for funeral expenses.
There are signiﬁcant respects in which compensatory
arrangements in Northern Ireland differ from those in
Great Britain. In brief, compensation from the State for
victims of crime in Great Britain is now made by virtue of
the Criminal Injuries Compensation Act 1995142 under
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2.3. Review of criminal injuries compensation
In response to the problems associated with State victim
compensation schemes, a review of measures was proposed
in 1998 by the Northern Ireland Victims Commissioner. The
Review sought to advise the government on the adequacy
of compensation arrangements in Northern Ireland in the
light of the experiences of victims of terrorist violence145.
It was also concerned with rectifying any identiﬁed
shortcomings in a new statutory framework that provided
for a system of criminal injury compensation in Northern
Ireland. The Review took into account the ways in which
other jurisdictions compensate victims of violent crime, and
the need for fairness, equity, openness, and affordability.
Marion Gibson and Professor Desmond Greer, a leading
authority on the issue of victim compensation, conducted
the Review. The recommendations of the Review could
afford an interesting basis for a scheme to compensate
landmine victims.

Compensation, available at http://www.fgti.fr/indterro.htm.
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The Compensation Agency, Charter Statement, available at http://www2.nio.gov.uk/comp98.htm See also The Compensation Agency, A Guide to Criminal Injuries
Compensation in Northern Ireland, Northern Ireland Ofﬁce.
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a tariff scheme, under which a special tariff is laid down
for each kind of personal injury and for death. In Northern
Ireland on the other hand, State compensation is governed
by common law principles that seek to compensate the
particular loss suffered by each individual victim. These
principles are subject to interpretation and application by
the courts accustomed to assessing the damages payable
to ordinary accident victims in the common law context.
Academics and other observers note that the Northern
Ireland scheme is taken as a whole, generous because
awards are not, as they are now in Great Britain, subject
to a cap of £500,000. Considering the total amount given
to the victims, an estimated £186 millions were paid: £26
millions for the death of victims, £160 millions granted
for non lethal arms. In assessing these ﬁgures, account
must be taken of the fact that much of this compensation
was paid a considerable time ago143. The Northern Ireland
scheme of State compensation is the only European
scheme that seeks to provide full compensation to all
victims of violent crime, and is understood in civil action as
damages involving personal injury and death144.
As a result, the system in Northern Ireland differs from
that in Great Britain in that the former is implemented
on a common law basis, and in that full awards can be
made without the constraints of a statutory tariff, which
ﬁxes the amount of the award according to the category
of the victim applying. In essence, the scheme in place
in Northern Ireland corresponds to a subjective approach
to compensation, while in Great Britain, an objective
approach is employed.
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Report of the Review: main recommendations
The Review recommends a merging of the two systems
applied in Northern Ireland and in Great Britain, and
proposes a hybrid scheme where a new tariff approach
is adopted for claims for less serious injuries146. There
should be no payment for legal support in making a claim,
according to the Review. Rather, assistance for applicants
should be provided by Victim Support, and no deductions
should be made from the award with respect to social
security beneﬁts or pensions147.
However, claims resulting from serious injury and death
should continue to be dealt with on the existing common
law basis, with expenses paid directly to the applicant in
successful cases. This means that in such cases, there is
no ﬁxed limit to the amount that can be awarded.
The system should incorporate a new fast track
and relatively informal review procedure within the
Compensation Agency. This would allow people to have
differences over their claims resolved without the need
to appeal to the courts, and would offer other beneﬁts,
including speed, informality, and conﬁdentiality.

The Compensation Agency should, according to the
Review, be given the authority to reopen a case where as
a result of the injury there has been a material change in
the victim’s medical condition or in his earning capacity,
when compared to the basis on which compensation was
originally assessed.

The Review also recommends that the scope of the
scheme would be expanded to allow compensation to be
paid to those who suffer a recognised psychiatric illness
as a result of:
1. The death or injury of someone with whom they have a
close tie of love and affection whether or not they where
present at the scene of the incident;
2. Fear of immediate physical harm;
3. Assisting with rescue efforts at the time of the incident
or in its immediate aftermath when these are not part of
their professional duties; and
4. Assisting with rescue efforts in the course of their
professional duties if they feared that someone with whom
they had a close tie of love and affection had been injured
or killed in the incident148.

A national compensation scheme for antipersonnel mine
and UXO victims should enact the measures common to
both the FGTI and to the victim compensation regime in
Northern Ireland. The requirements regarding the time
limit, proof, the right to appeal, and who can apply are
broadly similar in Northern Ireland and in France. Both
regimes have a ﬁxed time limit between the event and
the application for compensation, have strict requirements
regarding proof, incorporate a right to appeal any offer of
compensation, and operate under a similar deﬁnition of a
‘victim.’ The schemes differ with regards to the amount of
compensation paid, and the amount may be determined
either subjectively or objectively.

According to the Review, a spouse, cohabitant, parent, and
child of the deceased should be awarded a bereavement
payment “[…] to acknowledge the grief and sorrow caused
by the death, and the loss of non-pecuniary beneﬁt (i.e. loss
of care and guidance). An amount of £10,000 should be
paid to a spouse or partner, and £5,000 to a parent or child,
subject to an overall limit in each case of £50,000. 149”
Again, the amount of the award should be ﬁxed by statute
and should not be at the discretion of the courts.

Following the publication of the Review’s ﬁndings, the
Victims Commissioner stated that “[t]he Review team was
not at all persuaded that the wider support of victims yet
enjoys an appropriate public expenditure priority. Society,
in a troubled community, may need to think less about
expensive capital projects and more about the restoration
and development of its human capital150.” The following
compensation for landmine victims proposals build on this
invaluable development of human capital.

2.4. Application of National Compensation
Scheme: Compensation Mechanism to Landmine Victims

If we consider a compensatory scheme concerning
landmine victims, referring to the latter, such a scheme
should compensate therefore every landmine victim
regardless of nationality for landmine accidents on
national territory, and should also extend to nationals who
are injured abroad. The relevant embassy or diplomatic
representative should inform the scheme of the accident
and of the identity of the victims, in which case the victims
should be contacted directly. Also, the scheme should be
subject to a limitation clause, whereby a maximum period
would be allocated between the date of the accident and
the application for compensation. The scheme should pay
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Professor Desmond GREER and Marion GIBSON, Review of Criminal Injuries Compensation (Northern Ireland), (1999), available at http://www.nio.gov.uk/issues/agreelinks/
implemgov/990702b-nio.htm [hereinafter Review]. The Review recommends drawing up a Northern Ireland tariff based on levels of awards in Great Britain, for injuries up to
level 10 of the British tariff (awards of up to £5,000 for example, scarring of lower limbs causing serious disﬁgurement, and dislocated shoulder with continuing disability).
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Ibid.

Ibid., Recommendation Number 4, ‘Compensation for Psychiatric Injury.’ The Review does not specify whether the Recommendation would be enacted under a tariff
scheme or under the common law. The concept of nervous shock was developed by the courts in Great Britain and due to the signiﬁcant amount of caselaw in the area,
it is suggested that a common law approach would be followed in Northern Ireland. Indeed, the test for the four categories of victim found in the Review derives from the
judgements of Lord Lloyd in Page v. Smith [1995] 2 ALL ER 736, and Lord Wilberforce in McLoughlin v. O’Brien [1983] 1 AC 410. In Alcock v. Chief Constable of South
Yorkshire Police [1991] 4 ALL ER 907, the concept of nervous shock was extended to incorporate ‘secondary victims’, including bystanders, who are not participants in the
events that give rise to the claims, or may not have even been present.
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Sir Kenneth BLOOMFIELD, Press Release, 2 July 1999.

a ﬁrst instalment, at the latest one month after the request
for compensation to aid the victim with initial costs. The
scheme should then present the victim in writing with a
deﬁnitive offer of compensation, at the latest three months
after the receipt of proof of loss or injury from the victim.
The victim would then be given ﬁfteen days in which to
consider the offer, and if he/she accepts, the scheme
should pay the remainder of the compensation. If he/she
rejects the offer, he/she ought to be able to bring his/her
claim to a competent court151.

solicited in order to supplement national Funds. Indeed,
the countries most affected by antipersonnel mines and
UXO are often classiﬁed among the poorest. Although
this type of mechanism has been introduced in certain
zones such as in Taiwan where the Ministry of Defence’s
Compensation Committee for damages caused to civilians
awards compensation to civilian mine victims153, not all
countries are in a position to do so. Regarding this issue
of funding, international compensation fund can appear
more relevant.

The scheme should compensate for the physical,
psychological, or sensorial injury suffered by the person,
or if the person is deceased, the economic loss incurred
by the next of kin. Those prevented from pursuing their
normal activities as a result of social prejudice or any
other human right violation should also be compensated.
In the case of injury with no permanent after-effects, the
scheme should compensate on the basis of medical
certiﬁcates submitted, as well as on proof of costs and
loss of earnings. In the case of injury with permanent aftereffects, the scheme should offer one or more provisional
payments. Once the victim’s state of health has been
stabilised, the scheme should give the victim a detailed
breakdown of the proposed payments on the basis of the
medical reports, and costs should be deducted from social
welfare bodies.

3. An applicable model? the International
Oil Pollution Compensation Funds

Conclusion
The hypothetical model outlined above illustrates the
workings of a hypothetical compensation fund for mines
victims; it would provide the necessary support to those
who mourn and to those who face the continuing effects of
serious injury, both the injured themselves and those who
care for them.
Existing victims of terrorism compensation mechanisms
are useful in both identifying and developing
compensation mechanisms for landmine victims. The
simple transposition however, of the victims of terrorism
compensation model to one for landmine victims does
not address a number of problems, including the lack for
example, of national infrastructure capable of providing
medical reports and certiﬁcates, proof of costs, and
loss of earnings. Lack of infrastructure may itself be
problematic in countries most affected by landmines and
their after-effects. Also, international aid will have to be

Taking this observation as our starting point, could it be
possible to create an international compensation fund
for victims of antipersonnel mines, funded by the arms
industries? In other words, could the IOPC model be used
to compensate victims of mines?
To reply to this question, it would seem necessary to take
into account for each type of pollution (by antipersonnel
mines or fuel oil), the legal and practical context, the different
actors involved and the risks and potential advantages they
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Adapted from Conditions for Submitting a case to the Court, FGTI, available at www.fgti.fr/indterro.htm.
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Adapted from GREER and GIBSON, op. cit.

In February 2003, a total of 53 mine victims (families and survivors) are said to have received compensation by this means, and 57 requests for compensation are still
being processed. Landmine Monitor report 2004, Washington : Human Rights Watch, 2004, p 1239.
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See below, “The IOPC’s complementary role”.
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The comparison with the IOPC seems even more
interesting in view of the fact that the oil industries, like
the arms industries, are highly strategic sectors for States.
The States’ interests, even if they are no longer the only
producers and users of mines, and the ﬁrms’ interests
are, in both cases, closely linked. In the same way, the
non-pecuniary liability for the loss or damage caused by
these two types of pollution could be shared by the ﬁrms
and the producing and importing States, where it is not
possible to associate other actors involved in the use of
mines who are beyond any control owing to their lack of
legal personality in the international context.
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The scheme should be a hybrid one, combining a system
of ﬁxed awards for less serious injury with a more ﬂexible
approach for more serious injury, which is reﬂective of the
Northern Ireland model. A ﬁxed bereavement award should
also be set, which would include a lump sum payment for
the spouse and each child, subject to an overall limit152.

Although there is at present no speciﬁc international fund
to compensate victims of antipersonnel mines, there
are such funds to compensate victims of another type
of pollution: pollution by persistent oil. In 1969, special
rules were drawn up at international level to guarantee
compensation for loss or damage suffered by victims of oil
slicks. Two international Funds were created in 1971, then
in 1992, to obtain compensation for the victims, even if the
person responsible for the pollution could not be identiﬁed.
The two Funds, the IOPC (International Oil Pollution
Compensation Funds), are based on the principle of nofault liability. They are ﬁnanced by the oil industries and
run by the Member States. A protocol, not yet entered into
force, has been adopted in London on May the 16th 2003,
by the diplomatic conference of the IMO (International
Maritime Organisation). It aims to institute a third degree
of complementary compensation154.

are seeking, as well as the logic underlying the creation of
an international compensation fund.

3.1. Presentation of the IOPC: international
compensation mechanism to deal with the
risk of oil pollution.
Following the Torrey-Canyon oil slick problem, the ﬁrst
major example of pollution that affected Brittany in
1967, the international community decided to set up an
international compensation mechanism based on the
principle of strict liability (no-fault liability) together with a
compulsory insurance system.
In international law, the principle of no-fault liability (strict
liability or else risk liability) describes rules governing
compensation for loss or damage when liability can be
evoked in the absence of fault.
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The main objective of the new international rules governing
compensation for oil pollution is to ensure the “reasonable
and prompt” settlement of claims for damages owing to
pollution. According to the new rules, the no-fault liability is
incumbent upon owners of oil tankers, up to a certain limit.
When this limit is exceeded, the oil recipients (primarily
oil companies) pay the difference, up to a higher limit,
through the intermediary of an international Fund to which
they contribute. The new rules are therefore based on
the established principle of liability shared between the
owners of oil tankers and oil interests.

3.1.1. The legal framework: a system of
shared liability in an international legal framework
According to the ofﬁcial deﬁnition, “The International Oil
Pollution Compensation Funds 1971 and 1992 (IOPC
Funds) are two intergovernmental organisations which
provide compensation for oil pollution damage resulting
from spills of persistent oil from tankers155.”
They have been created in the framework of international
conventions156. As the 1971 Convention was terminated
on 24th May 2002, and the 1971 Fund has to be liquidated
in the coming months, we will limit our analysis to the 1992
Fund.
The 1969 and 1992 Conventions on Civil Liability
govern the liability of ship-owners for oil pollution damage.

They lay down the principle of their strict liability (i.e. their
no-fault liability). Consequently, the IOPC’s main function
is to offer additional compensation to victims of oil pollution
in the Member States, when such victims cannot be totally
compensated according to the terms of the Conventions
on Civil Liability. Anyone who has suffered pollution
damage (including clean-up costs) in a member State,
for example individuals, companies, local authorities or
States can claim compensation.
• The provisions of the 1992 Civil Liability Convention
The Civil Liability Convention imposes strict liability on the
ship-owner for pollution damage caused by the escape or
discharge of persistent oil from his/her ship. The owner is
thus liable even in the absence of fault on his or her part,
except if he/she proves that the damage resulted from an
act of war, a grave natural disaster, an act of sabotage
committed by a third party or negligence on the part of the
public authorities responsible for maintaining lights and
other navigational aids.
This provision was designed to provide better
compensation for victims, who can bring an action against
the person who is in theory the most solvent. If the shipowner is not responsible for the accident, he/she can then
take action against those he/she deems responsible.
A ship-owner can nonetheless limit his/her liability
according to the ship’s tonnage157.
The ship-owner is deprived of the right to limit his/her liability
“only if it is proved that the pollution damage resulted from
the ship-owner’s personal act or omission, committed with
the intent to cause such damage, or recklessly and with
knowledge that such damage would probably result”158.
Finally, under the 1992 Convention, claims for
compensation can only be made against the ofﬁcial owner
of the tanker concerned. The Convention prohibits claims
for compensation against the owner’s agents, the pilot,
the charterer, the ship’s manager or operator, or against
any person carrying out salvage operations or taking
preventive measures.
• The IOPC’s complementary role
The IOPC compensates the victims of oil pollution damage
when they do not obtain full compensation under the Civil
Liability Convention, either because the ship-owner is
exempt from liability (see previous item); or because he/
she is ﬁnancially incapable of meeting his/her obligations
and his/her insurance is insufﬁcient to satisfy the claims
for compensation; or else because the damage exceeds

IOPC, Annual Report 2002, International Oil Pollution Compensation Funds, Report on the Activities of the International Oil Pollution Compensation Funds in 2002,
London, United Kingdom, (2003), 182 pages, p.14.
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The ﬁrst Fund, called the ‘1971 Fund’, was created in 1978, in the framework of two international Conventions: the 1969 International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil
Pollution Damage and the 1971 International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage. These two Conventions
were modiﬁed in 1992 by two protocols, which led to the creation of a second compensation Fund, called the ‘1992 Fund’. The modiﬁed Conventions, i.e. the 1992
Convention on Civil Liability and the Convention on the Establishment of the 1992 Fund, came into force on 30 May 1986.
157
The amount of compensation due by an owner is limited to 3 million SDR (Special Drawing Rights. 1 SDR represents about 1.42 euros) for a ship not exceeding 5 000
units of gross tonnage. To this are added 420 SDR for each additional unit of tonnage for ships with a tonnage between 5 000 and 140 000 units of tonnage. For ships with
a tonnage equal to or higher than 140 000 units of tonnage, the limit is 59.7 million SDR. So that the owner is constantly able to take on his/her liability, he/she is obliged by
the 1992 Convention to be insured by the “Protection and Indemnity Club” or another specialized insurance company.

IOPC, Annual Report 2002, International Oil Pollution Compensation Funds, Report on the Activities of the International Oil Pollution Compensation Funds in 2002,
London, United Kingdom, (2003), 182 pages, page 16.
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the limit of the ship-owner’s liability under the Civil Liability
Convention.

compensated, and provided that their cost is “reasonable”
and proportional to the results “likely to be achieved”.

The Convention does not provide for total compensation
for the damage suffered, but for fair and reasonable
compensation, because of the amounts of money at
stake. It thus sets a maximum amount for each incident.

3.1.2. Structure and ﬁnancing system: a
Fund run by the Member States and ﬁnanced
by the oil industries

If the total amount of claims approved by the Fund for a
given incident exceeds the total amount of compensation
available, then the compensation given to each claimant
is reduced proportionally, so as to treat all claimants in the
same way (principle of equality of the victims).
This compensation system applies to pollution damage
suffered in the waters of the countries parties to the
Conventions, wherever the accident occurred, wherever
the oil tanker comes from and whoever owns the oil. Any
individual, association, ﬁrm, public or private body, local
authority or State having suffered damage by pollution in a
Member State can claim compensation. The costs actually
incurred and the damage actually suffered because of oil
pollution may give rise to compensation.
• The concept of ‘pollution damage’
‘Pollution damage’ is deﬁned, in the 1992 Convention, as
being any loss or damage caused by contamination. As
regards damage to the environment, other than the loss of
income resulting from the modiﬁcation of the environment,
it is speciﬁed that compensation is limited to the cost of
“reasonable measures actually taken or to be taken to
improve the state of the contaminated environment”.
Pollution damage also includes the cost of “reasonable”
preventive measures, that is measures taken to avoid or
minimise pollution damage.
As regards ecological damage, the IOPC statutes are
clear: the Fund compensates costs incurred, and not the
damage established by a statistical model. Claims for
compensation regarding changes to the environment are
only accepted “if the claimant has sustained an economic
loss that can be quantiﬁed in monetary terms”. Ecological
damage is therefore not taken into account as such.
Only “reasonable measures of reinstatement” can be

• A Fund run by Member States’ representatives…
The 1992 IOPC is an intergovernmental organisation
with a legal personality under international law. The
Administrator of the Fund is its legal representative. This
has been Måns Jacobsson’s function since the creation
of the Fund. It is also composed of an Assembly made
up of representatives of member states and an executive
committee.
The IOPC cooperates with numerous intergovernmental
organisations and international non-governmental
organisations, as well as bodies created by private interests
involved in maritime oil transport (owners of oil tankers, oil
companies, specialized insurance companies, etc.).
In April 2004, the 1992 Fund was composed of 85 states
members.
This number should increase in the coming months
because of the forthcoming liquidation of the 1971 Fund. It
should be pointed out that the Member States, though they
are from both ‘industrialized’ countries and ‘developing’
countries, are all coastal States, and therefore they are all
possible victims of an oil slick.
• … and ﬁnanced by the oil industries
The IOPC is ﬁnanced by the annual contributions paid by
any person (government authority or company) having
received more than 150 000 tons of crude oil or heavy fuel
oil in the ports or terminals of a Member State during the
calendar year in question, following its maritime transport.
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The contributions are calculated by the Secretariat of the
Fund on the basis of oil reports drawn up by the States,
according to the estimated compensation payments and
administrative costs for the coming year, and voted by
the Assembly. They are paid directly to the IOPC by the
contributors. As the payments made by the 1992 Fund for
compensation claims vary considerably from one year to
the next, the level of the annual contributions to be paid is
also very variable.
The main contributors are the oil companies in
industrialized nations. In 1999, 86% of total contributions
came from 10 countries. In 2001, 79% came from 9
countries: Japan, Italy, Korean Republic, the Netherlands,
France, United Kingdom, Singapore, Spain and Canada.

159
Moreover, the future protocol intends to multiply by ﬁve the compensation ceiling for victims to 1 billion Euro (1.115 billion USD), or 750 million DTS. The approval of the
complementary Fund is not obligatory but opened to each state party to the 1992 Fund. The protocol would enter into force three months after having been ratiﬁed by at least
eight states that have received 450 million hydrocarbon tons submitted to contribution during one civil year. Finally, the Fund would only compensate for damages from pollution
within the territory of one of the states parties to the complementary Fund, and that occur after the entry into force of the Protocol. IOPC 92, Claims Manual, p. 30.
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The compensation paid by the 1971 Fund for a given
incident was limited to an overall amount of 60 million
SDR, which included the sum paid by the ship-owner. The
1992 Fund was created partly to satisfy the need to raise
compensation limits. At present, the maximum amount
paid by the 1992 Fund for a given incident is 135 million
SDR. This limit has been raised of 50,37% to 203 million
SDR (302 million USD) as from 1 November 2003159.

3.1.3. The procedure
The IOPC’s procedure is based on an amiable settlement
of the damage sustained by victims. However, if the
claimants are not satisﬁed with the amount they have
been granted, they may refer the case to the competent
national court where the accident took place so as to
obtain fairer compensation. An action must be brought
against the defendant within three years of the date of
pollution damage, or within six years of the date of the
incident having caused the pollution.
Outside this timeframe, claimants lose deﬁnitively their
right to bring an action.
Claims for compensation must be submitted to the
IOPC or to the ship-owner’s insurance company, with
documentary evidence. The claimants are responsible for
quantifying and proving their loss. The Fund cooperates
closely with the insurance companies to settle claims, and
generally carries out an investigation into the event and
an assessment of the damage. The claims’ merits from a
technical viewpoint are studied by experts appointed by
the IOPC.
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The general criteria for admissibility of claims are the
following160:
- any expense or loss must actually have been incurred;
- any expense must relate to measures which are deemed
reasonable and justiﬁable;
- there must be a link of causation between the
expense/loss or damage covered by the claim and the
contamination caused by the spill;
- the economic loss must be quantiﬁable.
Claims for compensation for pure economic loss (i.e. loss
of income suffered by people whose property has not
been contaminated) are only admissible if they refer to
loss or damage caused by contamination: the cause must
be pollution, and not the incident itself. Moreover, there
must be a “reasonable degree of proximity”161 between the
contamination and the loss suffered by the claimant.
Finally, to be admissible, measures aimed at preventing
pure economic loss (a publicity campaign for example)
must have a “reasonable” cost that is not “disproportionate”
to the damage or loss which they intend to mitigate. The
measures must be “appropriate” and offer “a reasonable
prospect of being successful”.
The IOPC thus lays great stress on the concept of
“reasonable measure”, so as to avoid abuse.
According to its statutes, responses must be adapted and
proportionate to the loss.
As regards preventive measures and clean-up operations, for
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example, the Claims Manual edited by the IOPC speciﬁes:
“The 1992 Fund compensates the cost of reasonable
measures taken to combat the oil at sea, to defend sensitive
resources and to clean shorelines and coastal installations.
The relationship between these costs and the beneﬁts derived
or expected, should be reasonable162”.
• a system that removes liability
In fact the IOPC acts as a mutual risk system, inasmuch
as it relieves the operators of vehicles transporting oil
of direct liability. These operators contribute in exactly
the same way to the Fund, whether they have had any
accidents or not, and whatever state their ships are in.
Besides the advantage, for the potential persons
responsible for an oil slick, of knowing their legal
obligations and exemption from liability in advance, this
system is interesting in that the two circles that create the
risk (the oil transport industry and the industry that reﬁnes
and treats the product) suffer the consequences of the
pollution. The “polluter pays” principle is thus respected.
Moreover, the channelling of liability to the ship-owner has
the advantage of encouraging the designated responsible
person to take the necessary precautions and to take out
the necessary insurance contracts.
Finally, it should be recalled that the IOPC is the product
of States, and not an insurance system set up by oil
companies. The rules of the game are set by the States.
In principle, it is up to them to change the rules so as to
make good the imperfections of the system. We should
however qualify this remark: the States, which are both
taxpayers and tax collectors, have an ambiguous role in
the mechanism. Thus, it sometimes happens that far from
just making sure that the contributing industries pay levies
to the IOPC, the States ﬁght for these industries’ interests
(which are also indirectly their own).

3.2. Application of model: Compensation Mechanism to Landmine Victims
The IOPC was set up in the framework of a strategy
for supervising a thriving trade, the oil trade, to provide
protection from the risk of oil slicks, which is an accepted
risk though evidently not sought-after.
It now constitutes international regulation governing
compensation and intended to provide protection from the
risks inherent in the maritime transport of oil, a paciﬁc and
legally recognized economic activity.
On the contrary, antipersonnel mines are placed
voluntarily by actors who are totally aware of what they
are doing and who use risk in their military strategies. The

IOPC 92, Claims Manual, op. cit., June 1998, p. 17-18.

Ibid, p. 25. The criterion of reasonable proximity includes the geographic proximity between a claimant’s activity and the contamination, the degree to which a claimant
was economically dependent on an affected resource, the extent to which a claimant had alternative sources of supply or business opportunities, and the extent to which a
claimant’s business formed an integral part of the economic activity within the area affected by the pollution.
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3.2.1. Pollution damage: damage linked to
the use of mines
In the framework of the IOPC, the system aimed at
compensating for damage caused to the environment.
Anti-personnel mines can also have serious consequences
for the environment. Consequently, one could imagine a
State whose territory had been mined by another State
availing itself of a violation of international environmental
law before an international court so as to obtain
compensation163.
In fact, international environmental law constitutes a
major legal base in the framework of the ﬁght against
mines. However, though the damage caused by maritime
pollution affects mainly the environment and indirectly man
via a loss of earnings that may have been occasioned by
the damage, mines on the other hand affect man directly.
That being the case, using environment law to obtain
compensation for victims of mines would amount to
leaving aside compensation for the physical harm suffered
by victims of mines, without totally excluding it.
In the sphere of mines, environmental law must go hand in
hand with human rights and humanitarian law.

3.2.2. The transposition of a system based
on no-fault liability
The system of no-fault liability seems very appropriate
when dealing with mines. Though accepting the principle
of no-fault liability in this domain may seem shocking from
a moral point of view, it nonetheless offers the advantage
of avoiding situations of conﬂict (in the search for liability
or fault) which would only result in harming the victim
even more or reducing his/her chances of obtaining
compensation.
The search for liability poses a number of problems:
• In the framework of the IOPC, the actors involved can
be clearly identiﬁed: ship-owners and oil companies, and
possibly States.
In the framework of mines, the actors cannot always be
identiﬁed. Apart from the States and arms ﬁrms, there are
actors difﬁcult to identify (such as rebel groups, opposition
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governments etc.) and this makes action to obtain
damages more difﬁcult.
• The IOPC is based on a system of shared liability164, on
Conventions establishing the civil liability of the owners.
The compensation Fund is only used to supplement
compensation.
On the other hand, those responsible for accidents caused
by mines are not legally responsible as are the shipowners in the case of an oil slick. There are no legal rules
governing the liability of users of mines other than the
Ottawa Treaty and, in certain circumstances, the Geneva
Conventions and Additional Protocol I165.
• If the victim cannot take court action against the person
having used a mine, he/she would ﬁnd it difﬁcult to claim
compensation from the producer, ﬁrstly because it is
difﬁcult to prove where a mine has come from (especially
when it is handmade) and also because the victim is not
often in a situation to be able to do so.
The possible involvement of ﬁrms which produce
antipersonnel mines and UXO or which used to produce
those weapons in the ﬁnancing of an international
compensation fund is even more problematic because the
mine industry is made up of manufacturers of components
rather than mine manufacturers as such. Moreover, some
mine components (powder, lighters, release mechanisms
etc.) are not speciﬁc to the military industry, they are also
used by civil industry. The manufacturer of components’
share of political liability is therefore difﬁcult to assess.

It thus seems difﬁcult to set up a compensation fund
for victims of mines, to be used in addition to prior
proceedings that establish the offender’s liability. On
the other hand, we could envisage a compensation
fund to be used after exhaustion of domestic remedies
(for example to compensate victims of crimes in those
countries having established such remedies) or else in
addition to compensation already received but considered
insufﬁcient.

See para. 1.5 of the ﬁrst part of this study.

The risk liability of the ship owners is introduced by the 1992 Civil Liability Convention, which lays down the principle of strict liability for ship owners and creates a system
of compulsory liability insurance. Regarding to landmines, one would have to think to a similar convention introducing the liability of mine manufactures.
164
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See ﬁrst part of this study.
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See ﬁrst part of this study.
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• Moreover, the use of anti-personnel mines and their
production have only been considered illicit under
international law since the signature of the Ottawa treaty,
and only as regards the signatory States. Consequently,
what international legal basis may be used to claim
compensation from a mine producer for the period
preceding the treaty, or from a producer belonging to a
non-signatory State? One could invoke the strict liability
of States, which does not depend on the commission of
an illicit act under international law. However, according to
the general international law, strict liability is almost never
applied at international level166.

© P. Biro / Handicap International Belgium

causes of mine pollution are thus very different from those
of oil pollution. We cannot therefore make an immediate
comparison between the IOPC and a possible international
compensation Fund for damage by antipersonnel mines.
Nonetheless, from this viewpoint the system is rather
interesting.

3.2.3. What legal foundation in the absence
of international universally accepted rules
governing the use of mines?
As we have seen, the IOPC ﬁts into an elaborate set of
international rules governing the oil trade. We should thus
determine on what legal foundation a compensation Fund
for victims of mines could be set up.
For the moment, the Convention on the prohibition of the
use, stockpiling, production and transfer of anti-personnel
mines and on their destruction (the Ottawa Treaty)
postulates a clear unequivocal ban on the production and
use of anti-personnel mines.
At ﬁrst glance, it would seem logical to include a
compensation Fund in the framework of the Treaty,
especially since the States have committed themselves to
providing assistance to victims of mines.
Furthermore, the States Parties are also partly responsible
for accidents that take place after they have ratiﬁed
the Treaty, since they have neglected their duty to take
precautions (delimiting mined zones, preventing accidents
etc). Indeed, the Member States of the Convention have
committed themselves to taking a number of measures
to prevent anti-personnel mines from being a continual
threat to the civil population. If these measures are
not taken and an accident ensues, the State on whose
territory the accident takes place could be accused of
committing a fault.
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Nevertheless, the limits of this postulate are easy to see.
Insofar as the mine trade is only illegal for the signatory
States of the Ottawa Convention, only these countries
would be liable under its dispositions, and this could
dissuade other States from joining the Treaty and thus
limit the number of victims who have access to the Fund.
Establishing such a Fund in the framework of the Ottawa
Treaty would exclude the ﬁnancial contribution of States
not parties to the treaty and thus limit the available
resources.
If the principle of no-fault liability is accepted in the sphere
of mines, would it not be preferable to set up a Fund
independent from the Ottawa procedure and based on
international solidarity?

3.2.4. The contribution system or the difﬁculty
of involving the arms industries in a Fund
based on solidarity
• A Fund created by the States, who join on a voluntary
basis
Would governments be ready to create a compensation
Fund for victims of mines based on the IOPC model?
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See part one of the study concerning the right to reparation (2.3.2 Collective claims).

In the case of oil pollution, governments, like the oil
companies, are very interested in becoming members of
the IOPC since, in the event of a catastrophe, the pressure
of public opinion is such that they are obliged to intervene
and spend money on repairing the damage caused and
on compensating the victims. The IOPC system enables
them to have these expenses reimbursed and to satisfy
most of the victims’ claims for compensation. They are
thus able to respond to the pressure of public opinion.
In the case of mine pollution, however, the countries
likely to ﬁnance a compensation Fund are not affected
on their territory by the problem of anti-personnel mines.
Consequently, the only advantage for these countries of
creating and ﬁnancing an international compensation
Fund is to relieve the pressure of public opinion.
The example of class action and particularly the out of
court settlement-won by Kenyan victims of mines against
the British Government in 2002 enables us to qualify this
remark167. The UK Ministry of Defence agreed to grant
compensation to the Kenyan nationals for the damage
caused by mines used by the British army during military
training and left behind in Kenya. This example constitutes
an interesting legal precedent, but it remains a unique
case for the moment.
As for the countries most affected, who would beneﬁt
greatly from a compensation Fund, they are often
in difﬁcult economic situations, and do not have the
necessary resources to ﬁnance such a Fund.
The States’ contribution to the Fund should therefore be
made on a voluntary basis in the name of international
solidarity.
• The arms industries’ contribution
The IOPC is of real beneﬁt not only to victims and States
but also to ship-owners and oil companies. The shipowners are better protected in the case of an oil slick since
they have limited liability, the amount of compensation is
limited and they are able to get insurances.
The IOPC also functions as an insurance system for which
the oil industries accept to pay, because it rids them of any
liability in the case of an accident. If such a system did not
exist, the oil companies could be held responsible for the
damage caused by an oil slick and would undergo the risk
of having to pay the compensation set by law or by public
opinion in the affected country.
First of all, in the case of mines, it must be underlined that it
is essentially the States who buy the element responsible
for the damage, and not the industries. Furthermore, the
industries cannot be asked to ﬁnance a Fund because of a
risk of pollution during transport. Therefore, in the case of
anti-personnel mines it can be argued that the States have
a much greater political responsibility than the industries

It will be noticed that the Bad Honnef Declaration refers
to industries that used to produce anti-personnel mines.
Indeed, as mentioned, mine production and trade in mines
are now prohibited by the Ottawa Convention.
The ﬁgures available do not relate to recognized trade in
mines, but just suspicions of such trade. In the last few
years, the Landmine Monitor has found no proof of the
import or export of anti-personnel mines by States parties
or signatory States, nor by any non-signatory State. It
seems that trade in antipersonnel mines is now reduced
to a limited amount of illicit trafﬁcking170.
A possible compensation Fund cannot be ﬁnanced on
the basis of the present transfer of anti-personnel mines.
Consequently, we should consider the transfer of mines
retrospectively or else take into account the transfer of
arms as a whole. Moreover, the latter solution can be
justiﬁed if we consider the mines problem as part of
the larger problem of unexploded munitions and other
explosive remnants of war.
The Fund could be provisioned by a tax levied on the arms
industries for their sale of arms.
Assuming that a number of States agree to introduce a
tax on arms production (or their sale) in order to ﬁnance
an international compensation Fund, it is very likely
that the arms industries would lobby against it. We can
imagine a system in which the States are obliged to pay a
contribution to the Fund proportional to their production of
mines, their available stocks and more generally their arms
production, while leaving them to choose the sources that
are to ﬁnance the contribution.
We are once again in a totally different context to that of the
IOPC. The industries that ﬁnance this Fund are situated in
countries liable to have an oil slick in their waters, and
therefore likely to call on the IOPC. In the case of victims
of mines, the situation is different. The industries likely to
ﬁnance an international compensation Fund – that is, by

hypothesis, arms industries situated mostly in western
so-called ‘developed’ countries – are not affected on their
territory by the problem of anti-personnel mines.
Consequently, there is no direct advantage for the arms
industries of ﬁnancing a compensation Fund, since victims
of mines are mostly citizens in far-off countries who have
very limited means of threatening them with court action
and cannot bring any public pressure to bear.
Thus, if the ‘developed’ countries were to envisage
making the arms industries ﬁnance a Fund in the name
of international solidarity, then they would come under
pressure from these industries and their lobbies.
The arms industries are made up of organized active and
powerful pressure groups.
Among these industries, the percentage of the annual
turnover represented by arms sales varies considerably.
For example, in 1998, among the 10 main international ﬁrms
producing arms, the percentage of total sales represented
by arms sales ranged from 14% to 77%. Insofar as a
number of these industries also make products for the
“civil” market, the pressure of public opinion (especially
via boycotts) may prove effective.
If an association of victims of mines were to institute
legal action against producers of mines in the United
States171 and won their case in the American courts, the
compensation obtained could be paid into a Fund for
victims of mines.
In short, three ways of ﬁnancing a Fund could be
envisaged:
- a contribution from States and others to show their
solidarity;
- the payment of a tax on arms sales;
- compensation paid by the arms industries following
decisions by the courts.

3.2.5. The victim’s compensation. What deﬁnition? And for what compensation?
Damage caused by mines is in no way comparable to that
caused by maritime pollution.
Therefore, the harm suffered is more difﬁcult to quantify
than in the case of maritime pollution.
If the Fund was situated outside the Ottawa procedure,
it should ideally take into account all direct victims,
past, present and future of anti-personnel mines or

In June 1997, experts from all over the world gathered in Bad Honnef, Germany, with the aim of deﬁning the principles to be followed in the action programmes against
mines. Following the Conference, a Declaration was adopted by the International Campaign to Ban Landmines.
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GERMAN INITIATIVE TO BAN LANDMINES, Mine Action Programme from a development-oriented point of view (‘The Bad Honnef Framework’), 1999 [1997], p. 9.

We should emphasize however that, for the ﬁrst time in its history, the Landmine Monitor received proof recently of the transfer of anti-personnel mines between Iran
and Afghanistan (see ICBL, Toward a mine-free world, Landmine Monitor Report 2002, NY: HRW, August 2002, p. 7-8). Iran had instituted a moratorium on the export of
anti-personnel mines in 1997.
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For additional information on possible remedies in American law, please see the ﬁrst part of the study.
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that produce, or have produced, anti-personnel mines
under the States’ authority. The exception is of course
handmade mines, which are made privately. Even so, the
mine-producing industries’ participation in an international
compensation Fund can be justiﬁed insofar as these
industries have beneﬁted by the trade in anti-personnel
mines. This is what the NGOs actively ﬁghting mines
express in article 37 of the Bad Honnef Declaration168:
«For the provision of additional Funds, the principle that
the polluter pays should be considered: companies that
have proﬁted from the development, production and sale
of mines could pay into a reparation Fund»169.

unexploded ordnances. It should cover both material and
economic damage. Depending on funding possibilities
and negotiations between States, it could be extended to
the indirect victims of mines and UXO, and compensates
psychological harm.
As a minimum, the Fund should compensate the direct
civil victims of anti-personnel mines, at the present time
and in the future. The amount of compensation should be
set according to the physical “damage” sustained by the
victim and the effects on the victim’s family situation and
economic situation.
In the case of communities affected by the presence of
mines, collective compensation could be granted.
One can also wonder if there would be compensation for
victims of mines who do not belong to the Member States of
the Fund. States have some responsibility for the presence
of mines on their territory. Opening up the Fund to the victims
of States not parties would mean ridding these States of
their responsibility for the problem. Nonetheless, the States’
contribution to the Fund should not be made to the detriment
of national compensation mechanisms for victims of mines.
The Fund should only be used as a last resort. In other
terms, as far as possible, and in view of his/her country’s
legal system, the victim (or his/her representative) will also
have to provide proof that he/she has ﬁrst exhausted all
possible domestic remedies.

52

Could it be possible to allow only Member State nationals
to refer cases to the Fund, whatever the amount of the
State’s contribution? Could it be morally acceptable
therefore that victims be treated differently according to
the State to which they belong?
It would be advisable to ensure that the total amount of
compensation claims did not exceed the total amount of
available resources, in the same way as the IOPC. To
avoid a ﬁrst come ﬁrst served situation, the Fund could set
periods of eligibility for claims and allocate compensation
on a yearly basis.

3.2.6. The Fund’s structure and how to refer
cases to it
We can imagine the creation of a compensation Fund in
the form of an intergovernmental organisation with a legal
personality, like the IOPC. The Fund’s administrator would
be designated by the Member States.
The Fund, like the IOPC, could have appeal procedures
referred to it against decisions regarding compensation.
Nonetheless, to ensure real efﬁciency it would be
advisable to introduce cooperation mechanisms between
the Fund and the different actors involved in assisting
victims of antipersonnel mines and UXO.
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For example, to facilitate access to compensation for
everyone, one could imagine a third party referring cases
to the Fund or instituting proceedings (providing proof
of the link between the victim and mines as well as the
information needed to determine the total amount of
compensation), an organisation empowered to do so and
recognized in this ﬁeld.

3.2.7. Analysis of the funding needs
In the case of the IOPC, the contributions requested of
oil companies to provision the Fund in the last four years
were of between 40 and 50 million pounds sterling per
year, that is about 62 to 78 million dollars. If we base our
calculations on the price of 25 dollars per barrel of oil, we
can estimate that the total yearly amount of contributions
for all ‘contributing’ companies is about 2.5 to 3.1
million barrels, or the equivalent of the daily production
of a company such as Total Fina Elf. Under these
circumstances, we can understand that the oil companies
have accepted the system without complaining. It seems
that even if these amounts were no longer sufﬁcient to
cover all the damage caused by oil slicks, the IOPC has a
certain leeway for raising contributions.
If the amount of compensation for the damage caused
by mines were of this order, it is possible that the arms
industries would not be opposed to the setting-up of a
Fund similar to the IOPC, when faced with the pressure of
public opinion. But would it be morally acceptable?
The working group for assistance to victims of the ICBL
(International Campaign to Ban Landmines) estimates the
costs associated with the rehabilitation of survivors of mine
accidents for the whole of their lives at 9 000 dollars per
survivor172. The number of survivors of mines throughout
the world is calculated to be more than 300 000. The
amount necessary to assist them with rehabilitation would
thus be about 2.7 billion dollars173. This is a rather rough
estimate that does not take into account the fact that a
number of victims have already beneﬁted from different
forms of assistance. Compensation corresponding to
loss of income of victims of mines is not included in this
estimate.
Nevertheless, if we compare this with the amount of income
from arms sales between 1996 and 2000, which amounts
to 102 billion euros174, we can see that a tax on these sales
would be largely sufﬁcient to provision the Fund.
According to the Landmine Monitor 2003, 11 700 new
victims of mines and UXO were recorded during 2002.
Although this ﬁgure is probably lower than the real ﬁgure
(there are an estimated 15 000 to 20 000 new victims
every year), it nonetheless enables us to calculate the
number of claims that the Fund might have to manage
every year.

HANDICAP INTERNATIONAL, Anti-personnel mines today! Synthesis of the 1999 Report, Paris: L’esprit frappeur, (1999), p.89.

This estimate is based, inter alia, on the fact that amputated adults need new artiﬁcial limbs and orthopaedic equipment every three to ﬁve years, and children, every six
months. Providing a survivor of a mine accident with an artiﬁcial limb costs between 100 and 3 000 dollars.
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Figures provided by the SIPRI in 2001 (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute).

At the meeting of the G8 in May 2003, the Heads of State
mentioned the possibility of introducing a tax on arms
sales for the beneﬁt of a world fund against hunger. This
is a very positive initiative, but using these funds to beneﬁt
victims of mines would offer the advantage of confronting
the arms producing industries with their responsibilities
and of applying the principle that the polluter pays.
The IOPC is an interesting model as regards
compensation. The nature of the activity in question is
fundamentally different to that of mines, and the model
can therefore not be transposed immediately.
Nonetheless, the application of the polluter pays principle
is very relevant in these two domains.
The importance of the needs in term of compensation
constitute a signiﬁcant limit to the applicability of a model
based on the IOPC. Therefore, it is interesting to study an
other model which would focus on assistance to landmines
victims rather than compensation.
This can be the case of a model offered by the United
Nations Voluntary Fund for Victims of Torture.

4. An applicable model? the United Nations
voluntary Funds for victims of torture
We underlined before that responsibility and means are
two major points in establishing a compensation fund. It
is a long time process to make the idea of a victim’s right
to reparation and compensation admitted. As the question
of reparation raises a lot of problems, other models of
victim assistance could give solutions. The United Nations
Voluntary Fund for Victims of Torture is a model worth
studying in this purpose.
In 1981, the United Nations General Assembly passed a
resolution establishing the United Nations Voluntary Fund
for Victims of Torture, which aims to provide humanitarian
assistance to victims of torture and their families175.
The objective of this study is to analyse how relevant it
would be to transpose this model to the mines sector.
The comparison with the Fund for torture victims looks to
be a particularly interesting one as in both cases we are
dealing with civilians who, in violation of humanitarian law
and human rights, have suffered physical, psychological
and socio-economic harm, which often remains
unpunished. In both cases, the use of torture and the use
of landmines can form part of a strategy for creating a
climate of terror amongst the civilian population.
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On the basis of this observation, is it feasible to create an
international Fund for the victims of landmines along the
same lines as the Fund for victims of torture? What are
the advantages and disadvantages of such a model when
applied to the sector of antipersonnel mines?
To answer these questions, for each of these types of
harms (antipersonnel mines / UXO and torture), one
need to take into account the legal and practical context,
the different stakeholders involved, their objectives and
the reasoning behind the creation of an international
compensation Fund.

4.1. The United Nations Voluntary Fund for Victims of Torture: a model for landmines victims?
Article 1 of the United Nations Convention against
torture, adopted by the General Assembly in 1984 and in
force since 1987, deﬁnes torture as an act carried out by a
public ofﬁcial or at his instigation or with his consent:
“…by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical
or mental, is intentionally inﬂicted on a person for
such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person
information or a confession, punishing him for an act
he or a third person has committed or is suspected of
having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a
third person, or for any reason based on discrimination
of any kind.”
This deﬁnition helps to identify victims of torture in
international law. However the voluntary Fund on their
behalf was established prior to the convention against
torture.
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4.1.1. Mandate and admissibility
The Fund was established by General Assembly resolution
36/151 of 16th December 1981 to receive voluntary
contributions from Governments, non-governmental
organisations and individuals for distribution to nongovernmental organisations providing humanitarian
assistance to victims of torture and their families.
Applications for grants should aim at providing medical,
psychological, social, economic, legal, humanitarian
or other forms of assistance to victims of torture and
members of their families. Subject to availability of
funds, a limited number of grants could also be given
for the training of professionals or for the organisations
of conferences and seminars with a special focus on the
treatment of victims of torture. The amount of the grant
requested cannot exceed one third of the annual budget
of the programme submitted.
Only non-governmental organisations can apply for grants
from the Fund. Applications from Governments, national
liberation movements or political parties are not admissible.
Consequently, although this Fund is for victims of torture,
the victims themselves are not at the centre of the Fund’s

UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY, Un voluntary fund for victims of torture, A/RES/36/151, 16 December, 1981.
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The total amount of compensation over one year could
thus be around 105 300 000 dollars (just for rehabilitation).
In 2002, arms sales throughout the world amounted to
more than 16 billion euros (about 14.5 billion dollars).
So contribution needs would be about 0.65% of income
from arms sales.

operational procedures. An individual victim cannot obtain
assistance from the Fund, if he/she is not represented by
an NGO.
As regard to the selection criteria, the staff of the project
should have experience in direct assistance to victims of
torture and the programme should be functioning. Projects
aiming at campaigning against torture, preventing torture
or providing ﬁnancial assistance to other projects are
not admissible. No new application for a grant can be
considered until satisfactory narrative and ﬁnancial reports
on the use of previous grants are received.
One of the Fund’s criteria for awarding grants is the
provision of information on the victim’s history and the
type of assistance he/she receives.
• “The personal history of the victim:
In what context the victim was tortured;
The type of torture suffered;
The type of torturer involved;
The type of psychological and physical after-effects suffered.
• The assistance provided under the project:
How the victim came into contact with, or was referred to,
the organisation;
What type of assistance was provided to the victim under
the project;
What type of staff member carried out the assistance;
Where was the assistance provided.
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more than 12 million United States dollars were received
for consideration by the Board of Trustees at its 21st
session (13-27 May 2002). The High Commissioner for
Human Rights, on behalf of the Secretary-General, and
on the basis of the recommendations made by the Board,
allocated approximately 7 million dollars in new grants for
2002-2003 to 169 projects submitted by non-governmental
organisations from about 60 countries.
From 1997 to 2001, the trend on priorities for assistance
conﬁrmed that focus was being placed on psychological
assistance (from 61 to 82 %), medical assistance (from
58 to79 %), social assistance (from 46 to 69 %), legal
assistance (from 13 to 51 %) and economic assistance
(from 0 to 20 %), highlighting a sharp increase in multidisciplinary projects (involving several types of assistance)
and the growing need for legal assistance, essentially
due to the number of victims who are now undertaking
proceedings to put an end to their torturers’ impunity and
obtain justice177.
The 22nd session of the Board of trustees took place from
12th to 28th May 2003.
By now, some contributions have been paid that would
be taken into account during the 23rd session: 202 365 $
contributions already paid and 82 606 $ pledges.
The United States delegation has emphasised its
government’s support for the Fund, which, in 2002, took
the form of a voluntary contribution of 5 million dollars.
It has declared that its government is in favour of the
Fund’s work and was hoping soon to be in a position to
support it as it has done in the past.

• The results:
What results have been achieved through the assistance
provided.

4.2. Application to landmines victims

• Future assistance:
Will the victim continue to be assisted under this project;
What kind of assistance will be provided to the victim
under this project;
For how long will the assistance be provided;
What results are expected”176.

Torture is a very political act in that often the victim is
chosen intentionally because of his or her political or
religious convictions or ethnic origins. The act of torture is
used to achieve a result: obtaining information, intimidating
an individual or a third party, a punishment.
For mine victims, the situation is different. Landmine
casualties occur indiscriminatingly. People are not targeted
as individuals; if they are targeted, it is as members of a
community.

4.1.2. Operating procedure
During its annual session in May, the Board reviews the
narrative and ﬁnancial reports on the use of previous
grants, adopts recommendations on applications for
new grants, hears project leaders, meets with donors,
consults with the Special Rapporteur on Torture and the
Committee against Torture and adopts other relevant
recommendations to the Secretary-General on the
activities of the Fund. This latter will report once a year
both to the General assembly and to the Commission on
Human rights on the activities of the Fund.

4.1.3. The Fund’s activities
About 200 applications for funding for a total amount of

4.2.1. Victims of Mines and Victims of torture

Nonetheless, victims of torture and victims of mines are all
victims of a violation of their most fundamental rights, the
right to life and the right to health.
They are faced with the same type of needs, medical
and psychological care and sometimes socio-economic
assistance, although methods for providing assistance
may differ, as the type of trauma suffered is not comparable
in the two cases. Nevertheless, a person having suffered
the amputation of a limb at the hands of his or her torturers
will receive the same type of treatment and assistance as
a mine victim amputee. In the event of a lack of suitable
structures, the assistance they need can in both cases be
provided by non-governmental bodies.
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See UNITED NATIONS, COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, United Nations Voluntary Fund for victims of torture, NY: United Nations, 18 January 2001, E/CN.4/2001/59, 9 p.

Similarly, many NGOs or local associations are involved in
providing assistance to victims of mines. We could easily
imagine a similar Fund being set up in the sector of mines
to ﬁnance the activities of these organisations. However,
inasmuch as this type of Fund is not based on the idea
of indemnifying or individual compensation, one needs to
analyse whether the application of this model in the mines
sector is really appropriate.

4.2.2. What place for the victim?
The voluntary Fund for victims of torture is not a
jurisdictional body aiming to obtain reparation for torture
victims, which would mean establishing responsibility.
It seams difﬁcult to talk about complete compensation in
this area as the victims are not the direct beneﬁciaries
of the grants awarded by the Fund, but are indirect
beneﬁciaries through the intermediary of an NGO. It is
however a type of compensation.
In many mine-polluted countries, there are programmes
of assistance to mine victims that are run either by the
states directly, or by national or international NGOs. The
victims remain dependant on these structures and on the
type of assistance they receive from them. Their place
in the decision-making structure is not central, and their
only room for decision about the aid they wish to receive
is limited to the assistance programmes accessible to
them.
If we take the Fund for victims of torture as a model, it
seems that only 30% of the total cost of the project can
be ﬁnanced by the Fund. It is therefore down to the
organisation to ﬁnd the additional funding. Thus, not only
do the victims not have direct access to the funding, but
also the assistance they may receive depends on the
ability of the organisation representing them to ﬁnd further
funding.
Furthermore, the assistance that can be brought to victims
is not enough in itself to make them feel that they have
received complete reparation. For this, victims or their
families would need to have also direct and individual
access to the Fund to obtain compensation in case they
have not been able to obtain reparation via a legal case.
The intention here is not to invalidate the principle of
assistance by claiming that the means available for victims
of mines via NGOs are sufﬁcient and that creating a Fund
for this purpose would be superﬂuous, but rather to admit
that these people can claim to receive compensation or
indemnities personally in order to have free choice over
how they attempt to reorganise their lives.
The model provided by the voluntary Fund for victims of
torture does not offer this possibility. It is true that in the

case of victims of torture, legal assistance represents a
ﬁrst stage that may result in obtaining reparation before
a jurisdictional body. For victims of mines, means of
recourse against this type of harm are difﬁcult to use as
the responsible party is rarely identiﬁed. Consequently,
granting legal aid in the current legal framework may not
be sufﬁcient.

4.2.3. The Fund’s legal foundation: an independent Fund
As the Fund is not linked to the Convention against
torture, contributions are not compulsory, nor are there
any relation between the ratiﬁcation of this convention and
contributions to the Fund.
Consequently, one can easily imagine a Fund for victims
of mines being set up along similar lines, in other words
independent from the convention prohibiting the use,
stockpiling, production and transfer of anti-personnel
mines and on their destruction (Mine Ban Treaty), which
would also mean being able to extend assistance to
victims of explosive remnants of war.
There is a double advantage to such a system: on the
one hand, as there is no obligation to contribute attached
to signing the treaty, there is no danger of this dissuading
potential signatories. On the other hand, the States which
have not signed can contribute to the Fund, which means
there are no restrictions on the source of the voluntary
contributions.
Including such a Fund within the UN system is also
a guarantee of its independence, impartiality and
transparency. Their presence in many developing
countries means that the United Nations would rapidly
be able to identify the NGOs working in the ﬁeld of
assistance to mine victims and monitor the quality of the
programmes funded. We can easily imagine that a Fund
for victims of mines could be created within the United
Nations, in the same way as for the victims of torture.
However, we could also argue that the lack of dynamism
and ﬂexibility and the administrative red tape of the UN
bodies could be an obstacle to the efﬁcacy of such a
Fund.
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4.2.4. Voluntary contributions: a risk of a shift
in funding towards the voluntary Fund without
any signiﬁcant global increase
At the moment, the funding of mines victims assistance
projects comes from various different sources: UN
agencies, institutional (State) funding bodies, private
foundations, NGOs using their own capital.
States could see the creation of a voluntary Fund for the
victims of mines as a way of continuing to ﬁnance this
type of project without having to carry out the monitoring
and control. The risk would therefore be to see this state
funding simply transferred to the newly created Fund
without the global amount of funding for mine victims
increasing. However, current trends show that States have
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After analysing the criteria given earlier for selecting and
identifying victims, we can see that such criteria could
easily be applied to other types of victim and particularly
to victims of anti-personnel mines. Thus, the form and
methods of the Fund for victims of torture could easily be
transposed to victims of mines.

more of a tendency to prefer bilateral aid, in other words,
aid over which they retain control and visibility178.
There could also be a certain reticence about creating
a Fund that would deprive them of all control over how
the funding is used. The risk then would be to have both
a powerless Fund and parallel, uncoordinated bilateral
initiatives.
Only the states could answer these questions since
they are the most involved in funding programmes of
assistance to mine victims.
On the basis of all this, we could ask whether setting up
such a system is a signiﬁcant step forward in terms of the
rights of mine victims or offers any real advantages other
than that of creating a system for monitoring the funding
of assistance to mine victims, a possibility that does not
exist at present179.
One advantage would be to centralise the contributions
from private individuals or foundations concerned by this
cause. However, the example given by the Fund for victims
of torture outlines that of the 551 548 dollars worth of
contributions allocated to the Fund, only 400 dollars come
from private individuals, and the rest comes from States.
This Fund would therefore continue to be dependent on the
solidarity of the states. Inasmuch as it excludes any idea
of compensation or reparation, it would be difﬁcult to apply
the «polluter-pays» principle, which would mean state and
non-state actors involved in the production and use of antipersonnel mines having to contribute to the Fund.
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It is very likely that the creation of a Fund for the
victims of mines modelled on the Fund for the victims
of torture would not sufﬁce to cover real needs in terms
of assistance. Indeed, the number of mine victims in the
world is estimated at more than 300 000 and the number
of new victims each year at 15 to 20 000 (not counting
the families of victims)180. If the Fund were only destined
for new victims of mines (the most minimalist hypothesis)
and we estimate the number of victims at 15 000, and if
the Fund received the same amount of contributions as
the Fund for victims of torture, 7 million dollars, then the
amount allocated per victim would be 466 Dollars. This
amount does not take into consideration the operating
costs of the organisation responsible for providing aid to
the victim.
This study of possibilities for creating a compensation/
indemnity Fund for victims of mines based on similar
international Funds, is essentially an attempt to make
some signiﬁcant progress in the area of rights for mine
victims. One of the ways of doing this is to provide victims
of mines with an individual and personal method for
obtaining reparation or compensation. Rights for mine
victims also means allowing them free choice in the
way they manage the situations they are faced with. The
United Nations Voluntary Fund is therefore not an ideal

model for promoting the rights of mine victims as it makes
a third party of the victims.
However, the problem of accidents due to landmines has
consequences in public health terms that are much better
covered at a collective level. Consequently, a balance
should be found between the needs of the person that are
linked to his or her life choices and that require individual
procedure and care-management and his or her needs as
part of a health issue that has to be dealt with on a broader
scale than that of the individual.
Not differentiating the victim from the group means
denying his or her individual status and ensuing rights.
However, considering each individual case without taking
the collective aspect into account could lead to both
inequalities and an increase in expenditure.

5. Conclusion
What provisions should be envisaged for compensating
mine victims : national measures, international funds ? In
the spirit of the Ottawa process, assistance to landmine
victims should be anchored in options taken on a national
level. This is reiterated in the action plan adopted in Nairobi
in December 2004.
If, however, insufﬁcient funds were not raised at national
level, a model of a fund based on international cooperation
and guaranteeing the right to compensation for victims
could emerge. The above comparative study sketches the
outlines of this.This Fund should be an intergovernmental
organisation covering the whole world and its philosophy
should be based on that of the Ottawa Treaty.
Such a Fund should not only cover injuries due to
landmines, but also those due to UXO, which have
the same effects as landmines. The Fund’s operating
procedures, described below, could also result in an
improvement in services to disabled people generally:
whilst acknowledging the speciﬁcity of the situation of
landmine victims, the development of initiatives that could
at the same time beneﬁt other persons with disabilities
should not be excluded.
An international compensation fund should make
both individual and collective compensation possible.
It is therefore possible to envisage a combined system
of claim. In other words, claims for compensation to the
Fund would be open to individuals, or groups of persons
and also to national or international organisations for
victim assistance, whose activities and projects focus on
landmine victims and their families. It is true that the Fund
would then be faced with a major obstacle: the risk of
double compensation. Depending on the character of the
prejudice, individual or collective, people having already
received compensation via funds allocated to assistance
organisations would not be entitled to claim for individual
compensation; the aim of such an international Fund being
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In a recent report, questions about the functioning and ﬁnancing of the fund were raised. See UNITED NATIONS, COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, United Nations Voluntary Fund
for Victims of Torture, Report of the Secretary General, Addendum, NY: United Nations, E/CN.4/2004/53/Add.1, 22 March 2004, 6 p.

Via the mines observatory, member NGOs of the ICBL carry out monitoring that contributes towards developing the data collected by the United Nations, but which is
still incomplete.
179

180

ICBL, Toward a mine-free world, Landmine Monitor Report 2003, op. cit., p. 38-42.

to compensate as many victims as possible. Thus, the
Fund should be given real powers of control over methods
for allocating funds.
In order not to intervene in the duties of the States, the
Fund should have a subsidiary competence. Indeed,
member States should be obliged to establish their own
national compensation mechanisms181. The Compensation
Fund should intervene as a last resort, after all regional
and domestic remedies have been exhausted. This should
encourage victims to ﬁrst attempt to claim before courts or
commissions at regional or national level. These courts
and commissions should thus be empowered to provide
reparation / compensation for landmine victims.
A compensation fund should take into account the different
types of prejudice from which landmine victims suffer.
Demands from UXO victims should also be admissible to
the Fund. Ideally, compensation should also be admissible
for direct and indirect victims of physical, economic or
psychological prejudices, suffering permanent and nonpermanent after- effects.
Firstly, compensation for physical injuries would seem
to be indisputable. It should be calculated on the basis of
the cost of the victim’s medical care. Indeed, some people
suffering from permanent injury require medical treatment
over the long term, including a prosthesis and frequent
replacements. However, the Fund should deduct all social
security beneﬁts and/or pensions already received from
the amount awarded.
Secondly, compensation should take into account
economic prejudice. For example, compensation for the
loss of ﬁnancial resources of a victim of landmines or UXO
with dependent children and forced to cease professional
activity, should be calculated according to two criteria:
prior income and the number of dependent children at the
time in question. Moreover, deterioration of habitation or
assets should be considered as economic loss suffered by
victims. Compensation for victims of landmines and UXO
should take into account damage due to the deterioration
of the environment. Indeed, people can be seriously
affected from living in a contaminated area. Their standard
of living deteriorates and the environment in which they
live may be polluted because of the presence/explosion of
landmines/UXO.
As regards economic prejudice suffered by a child victim,
compensation should take into account speciﬁc needs
for accompaniment and for his/her individual life project.
A certain degree of subjectivity in the evaluation of the
economic prejudice may be unavoidable.

The funds collected should be shared among those
victims who have made an admissible claim and allocated
in accordance with the level of personal injury suffered.
The funds should be allocated on an annual basis in order
to ensure that they are shared fairly among all the victims
making a claim to the Fund during a given period. The
funds collected would also be distributed to organisations
for assistance, when the prejudice is collective.
Given the enormous cost of satisfying the needs, the
Fund’s ﬁnancial resources need to be wide-spread;
this means participation from as many and varied
actors as possible.
Landmine producers could be made to contribute to the
fund through pressure from the courts (or credible threats
of such). If producers believe there is any chance a court
would even hear a case brought by a landmine victim
against a producer, they might consider making a donation
to the fund as part of a settlement with the victims (which
would mean no legal costs, no order to compensate from
the court and no disturbance to the lucrative business
of making and selling weapons). It would therefore be
a business decision motivated by ﬁnancial imperatives
rather than a moral obligation.
Secondly, an international Compensation Fund for
landmine victims should be ﬁnanced by States in the
name of international solidarity, partly by means of
voluntary state contributions and partly by means of
obligatory contributions from States Parties. They may
consider allocating part of their armaments/defence
budget or levying taxes on arms companies to be paid
directly into the Compensation Fund.
Finally, civil society, aware of the necessity to provide
compensation to victims, could contribute to the Fund. Thus
it would be open to voluntary contributions from a variety
of sources provided that these sources are consistent with
the spirit of the fund and the Mine Ban Treaty182.
Thus, any private person involved in the ﬁght against the
use of landmines could make voluntary contributions to
the Fund.

Thirdly, the compensation fund should take into account
psychological injury, suffered both by direct and indirect
victims.

181
As recommended by the Commission on Human Rights in principle 17 of its “Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of
Violations of International Human Rights and Humanitarian Law, (24th October 2003), doc. E/CN/2004/57.
182
Contributions to the ICC trust fund are regulated according to a similar rule: “The Board shall refuse such voluntary contributions … that are not consistent with the goals
and the activities of the Trust Fund [ICC-ASP/1/Res.6 Annex, para. 9.].
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ORGANISATION OF A POTENTIAL COMPENSATION FUND
AT THE INTERNATIONAL LEVEL

Voluntary contributions
- Arms and components manufacturers (as part of
a settlement with the victims)
- States (members to the Fund or not)
- Entreprise-Any person (public or private)

Obligatory Contributions
- Arms and component manufacturers (obligatory
tax or court decision)
- States

FINANCEMENT

REFERRAL
Individual
(individuals, direct/indirect landmine
victims / UXO)
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Collective
(organisations / associations
for assistance to victims)

COMPENSATION FUND
Inter-governmental organisation
COMPETENCE OF THE FUND
• Funds allocation

COMPENSATION

RATIONE MATERIAE COMPETENCE
- Damages due to landmines or UXO
- Proof of damage and causal relation
- Physical/economic/psychological/environnemental damage
RATIONE LOCI/TEMPORIS COMPETENCE
No limitation to the Fund’s competence

INDIVIDUAL
- According to
the injury/damage

COLLECTIVE
- According to the assistance project
- According to the size of the community affected

ALL REMEDIES EXHAUSTED
- National/regional
- Compensation commissions/Courts of
justice
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